190. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy0

Mr. President:

Attached is the current situation report on the Sino-Indian border war you requested. It was prepared by the Department of State, in consultation with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. It represents the agreed views of all three.

I would add one comment on section 3 of the memorandum. Section 3-b (page 5) is devoted to difficulties that the new situation in India will raise for our relations with Pakistan. It seems to me that the problem could be stated a little more sharply in a somewhat different way. We are now faced with the necessity of making the Pakistani realize that their alliance with us had been of immense value to them. This comprises not only the substantial economic and military assistance we have given, but also the general support that the alliance provides in their relations with India. They are obviously the weaker power, and they have been able to maintain as strong a line on Kashmir as they have in part because of the existence of our support in the background. We are now beginning to confront them with the fact that we are really not able to support their demand for a settlement via plebiscite, and that their best opportunity for settlement on terms something like ratification of the status quo may be passing from their grasp. This will be a difficult and painful process, but it is one we must push through.

C.K.1

Attachment2

Report on Current Activity on the Sino-Indian Borderand Estimate of Future Developments

India is facing its most serious crisis since independence. Large-scale Chinese Communist attacks (see map attachment)3 in the Northeast [Page 364] Frontier Agency (NEFA) have resulted in Chinese advances at a number of points, some of them approximately 15 miles south of the McMahon Line, and in Ladakh the Chinese Communists have overcome Indian forward positions and threaten the principal Indian bases in that area. Moreover, the Soviet Union has supported Peking’s proposals for negotiation on terms unacceptable to the Indians. These developments strike at the heart of India’s policy of nonalignment and have far-reaching internal consequences. India has turned to the West for assistance in meeting its military requirements. The development of a closer Western relationship with India is causing an almost traumatic reaction in Pakistan. Pakistan’s foreign policy over the past decade has been directed in large part towards correcting the imbalance of power with India through the special alliance relationship with the West.

1. What is Going On: A Military and Political Review

Military

The present phase of the Sino-Indian border conflict began early last spring when India decided to put out advanced patrols and outposts in the Ladakh area in an effort to forestall further Chinese advances there and eventually to push back some of the Chinese outposts. In July the Chinese demanded that the Indians withdraw their forward patrols and threatened, if they did not do so, to invade NEFA. Instead of withdrawing, the Indians intensified their forward patrolling activities in the months that followed.

There is now evidence that in August and early September the Chinese concentrated their troops at points along the NEFA border. They launched an attack on October 20. Within a week the Chinese Communist forces advanced at several places within NEFA, reaching at one point near the Bhutan border a position approximately 15 miles south of the McMahon Line. Simultaneously, the Chinese attacked in Ladakh and eliminated the forward posts established by the Indians last spring and summer.4 Total Indian casualties are in the neighborhood of 5,000.

Chinese gains have been a result of a combination of advantages over the Indians, most notably a better supply situation, more modern equipment and larger numbers of men.

At the present time, the Chinese seem to have halted their advance in NEFA. In Ladakh the Chinese have also halted along the boundary line which they claimed in 1960, but they are in a position to move against important Indian positions just west of this line.

[Page 365]

As the Chinese have moved further into Indian-claimed territory, their supply problems have increased but even so they still appear to have a limited advantage over the Indians in this respect. The present halt in the Chinese Communist advance may be designed to permit them to regroup, resupply and prepare for further limited advances. At a minimum the Chinese Communists will consolidate, with some minor tactical adjustments, and dig into their positions in preparation for the severe winter. The indications are that they want to hold the territory which they now occupy, at least as a bargaining counter; they show no particular interest in a negotiated settlement; nor do they seem interested thus far in extending their military activities beyond the disputed border areas. Future Chinese Communist military action may well be determined in large part by Indian moves.

Political

The rapid Chinese advances in both NEFA and Ladakh have had a profound effect on Indian political thinking. The Indian leaders are being forced to re-examine some of the basic assumptions which have been central to Indian political life and attitudes. The great exponent of peaceful coexistence has been attacked by a nation which ostentatiously shared this attitude. The effectiveness of nonalignment as a policy has been clearly brought into question. The Soviet Union’s action in supporting an unacceptable Chinese Communist offer to negotiate the conflict has led the Indians to rethink their thesis that they could count on the Soviet Union to restrain the Chinese Communists and to provide India with substantial quantities of military equipment.

These developments cannot but have a far-reaching effect on the internal Indian power structure. The demotion of Krishna Menon, who has been widely criticized, from his position as Minister of Defense to that of Minister of Defense Production is one of the first public manifestations of these changes.5 The position of the Communist Party of India has been undermined. Other important changes will follow and increased strains will be placed on Prime Minister Nehru. We anticipate a long period ahead of adjustment and examination.

Also of very great importance, these developments threaten to place a heavy additional burden on an Indian economy already falling short of its economic development goals, and at the very time when the attainment of these goals is more important than ever.

[Page 366]

2. What We and Other Western Countries are Doing

In face of reverses both on the border and in Indian foreign relations, Prime Minister Nehru asked for Western assistance. After deliberately waiting for the Prime Minister’s request, the United States initiated an air shipment on November 1 of military supplies to India designed to reinforce Indian resistance on the border to the Chinese Communists. These initial shipments include:

40,000 Anti-personnel Mines
1,000,000 Rounds caliber .30 ammunition
200 Caliber .30 Machine Guns with mounts and accessories
54 81 millimeter mortars with mounts and accessories
100,000 Rounds 81 millimeter ammunition
500 ANPRC-10 radios
250 ANGRC-9 radios

India has also approached the United Kingdom, Canada, and France with requests for various types of military equipment primarily in the field of small arms, infantry support and anti-tank weapons, together with necessary ammunition, communications equipment, transport aircraft, and helicopters. India has also requested rapid delivery of equipment previously ordered, and apparently is making direct commercial inquiries about procuring aircraft in the United Kingdom.

Canada is currently attempting to determine availability of a wide range of equipment which would be useful to India. The United Kingdom has air-lifted a small amount of automatic rifles and ammunition, and is also determining availability of other items. The French have also air-lifted a small amount of small arms.

In addition, Turkey has offered India some light mountain artillery and ammunition. We anticipate this equipment will be available for shipment within the next two or three days, at which time we will airship it to India.

We are making every effort to establish coordination procedures with other Western governments to insure a concerted effort in our joint attempts to meet Indian military requirements.

In addition to military supplies, the United States has undertaken the following actions:

a
We have attempted to get the Pakistani to see that they have a major opportunity to lay a basis for better relations with India. These efforts have not yet been successful, but we believe we should continue to search out ways to get this across to the Pakistani.
b
We have publicly stated that the United States recognizes the McMahon Line as the accepted international border sanctioned by modern usage.
c
We are increasing the flow of intelligence on Communist China to the Indians.

Statements of sympathy and support from Western countries contrast sharply with silence from many important neutral leaders. Some neutrals have been in touch with both sides in an endeavor to lay the basis for a cease-fire.

3. Principal Policy Issues This Situation Raises for the United States

a
We shall have to define a new relationship with India. Our military assistance is designed to help a friend, not win an ally. Western sympathy and support and Western military equipment will profoundly affect Indian thinking. We can expect the Indians to redefine their nonalignment policy, but we do not expect India to abandon this policy. Although India has been forced to re-examine the dimensions of its relations with the Soviet Union, we anticipate that India will try to avoid doing anything which would further restrict Soviet support. India needs Soviet economic aid, will want Soviet support in the United Nations on Kashmir, and still hopes to get a limited number of MIG-21’s.
b

We shall have to devise means to protect our important special interests in Pakistan and to keep Pakistan closely aligned with the West, in the face of our new relationship with India. Despite Pakistan’s very great dependence on the United States, this may be the most difficult problem ahead. We had hoped that Pakistan leaders might have grasped the present opportunity to begin to lay the basis for mutually beneficial relations with India. Instead, the Pakistani seem to be recoiling from any reduction of tension with India. The last word is not in on this and Ambassador McConaughy is seeing President Ayub on November 5.

All present signs, however, point to at least a temporary widening of the breech between Pakistan and India, a Pakistani reassessment of the value of its alliance with the United States and increased political tensions within the country. Pakistan, which sought an alliance with the United States chiefly to offset India’s preponderant military strength in the subcontinent, sees the value of this alliance much reduced in the face of United States military assistance to India. This situation bears the closest watch because Pakistan is, in fact, going through a traumatic experience almost equal to that of India.

a
c
We must search out Indian military objectives and decide the extent to which we and our Western allies are prepared to support these. This involves not only Indian policy on the border but also the Indian attitude towards the modernization of its whole obsolescent military establishment. In their current state of disarray, the Indians themselves [Page 368] are not clear about their objectives. This, therefore, will be a continuing problem. In this connection one of the principal factors will be the impact of increased Indian military expenditures on the achievement of Indian devaelopment goals. The extent of this impact will depend in large part on how the Indians define their military objectives, the extent of resources diverted for this purpose, and the division of western assistance between military and economic sectors.
d
We shall have to consider bolstering the border states (Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan) to counter Chinese Communist efforts to bring them into the Chinese orbit. This will involve a re-examination of the basis of our current policy towards these states which is to try to fix firmly the major responsibility for these areas on India.
e
We shall need to consider the implications of a possible Indian withdrawal from international responsibilities as the result of a reorientation of India’s attention inward under the impact of the Chinese attack. Menon was the great exponent of India’s participation in the international force in the Congo. There are already indications that the Indians are considering the withdrawal of their forces from the Congo. We also shall need to be alert to opportunities for capitalizing on new Indian attitudes in such specific areas as disarmament.
f
We must examine carefully the implications of these developments for CENTO and SEATO.

The power relationships which affect the subcontinent have all been shaken up. The old problems there and the new ones should be looked at in this new light, in the days ahead, so that we can see both the dangers and opportunities which are emerging. These will extend far beyond the boundaries of the subcontinent.6

  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 11/3/62-11/4/62. Secret.
  2. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
  3. Secret. A November 3 covering memorandum from Brubeck to Bundy, transmitting the situation report from the Department of State to the White House, is not printed.
  4. Not printed.
  5. In the northwest (Ladakh), about 6,000 Indian troops face about 10,000 Chinese. In NEFA there are some 30,000 Indian troops opposing the estimated 15,000 Chinese invaders, with another 20,000 Chinese in reserve across the border. [Footnote in the source text.]
  6. On November 7, Nehru announced the resignation of Menon from the cabinet. (Telegram 1665 from New Delhi, November 7; Department of State, Central Files, 791.13/11-762)
  7. A fuller assessment of the Sino-Indian border war and its implications can be found in SNIE 13/31-62, “Short-Term Outlook and Implications for the Sino-Indian Conflict,” November 9, 1962. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79 R 01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files, Box 210)