Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan⁰

Washington, October 22, 1962, 9:56 p.m.

664. Karachi’s 748, Department’s 660 to Karachi.¹

In telegram 748, October 22, McConaughy stated that the approach outlined in telegram 660 might be taken by Ayub as suggesting that the United States saw Pakistan as responsible for past India-Pakistan border difficulties and suspected that Pakistan might seek to exploit the Sino-Indian conflict. McConaughy thought a more effective approach would be a straightforward appraisal of the serious turn the conflict had taken and the threat it posed to the entire subcontinent. (Ibid., 691.93/10-2262)

1. Our suggested approach (Deptel 660) not intended assess blame for past border difficulties but to acquaint Ayub with our views re necessity for all of us to avoid any actions which would add to India’s difficulties at this critical juncture in Sino-Indian relations.

2. Dept would naturally wish to avoid provoking unproductive reaction which you predict (Karachi’s 748).

3. Ambassador should stress to Ayub our view that Sino-Indian border developments have taken such a serious turn as to threaten security of entire subcontinent.

4. In view of this threat, would hope Ambassador could explore with Ayub what useful gestures GOP might make that would help Nehru and GOI psychologically. For example, Ayub might wish consider sending private message to Nehru recalling many past GOP statements that there would be no recourse to force by Pakistan in attempting to settle disputes with India and assuring Nehru that India can feel secure in putting forward its maximum effort against threat from the north.

5. From standpoint our objectives, we would not wish to elicit at this stage Pakistan proposal joint defense. If proposal made publicly, Indians would likely regard it as primarily propaganda. If made privately, Indians might feel Pakistan trying take advantage India’s critical position by forcing India accept what has been clearly unacceptable in the past. FYI. We are exploring on urgent basis what further steps we might take to encourage parties get together in this and other connections. End FYI.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 691.93/10-2262. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Gatch, cleared by Cameron and by Jeffrey C. Kitchen, and approved by Talbot. Repeated to New Delhi and London.
1. On October 20, Chinese forces launched major offensives in the Ladakh area of Kashmir and across the disputed border into India’s Northeast Frontier Agency. In telegram 660, October 21, the Department instructed McConaughy to convey to Ayub the undesirability of any action which would prevent India from concentrating on the Chinese attack and to suggest to Ayub that he propose a mutual understanding with Nehru to keep the border between India and Pakistan calm during the crisis. (Ibid., 691.93/10-2162)