165. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0
SUBJECT
- Possibility of Sino-Indian Negotiations over the Border Problem
Ambassador Galbraith has reported a conversation he had with Prime Minister Nehru on August 6, during which Mr. Nehru indicated the Indians “expect to have negotiations with the Chinese.” The talks would be after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting in September and would probably be conducted on the Indian side by Foreign Secretary M.J. Desai. Nehru expressed some worry about the number of men up in the mountains “who wonder who is going to shoot first.” Mr. Nehru apparently does not expect much in the way of concrete results from the talks, but thinks they will calm the atmosphere.
Prime Minister Nehru was explaining to the Ambassador a statement he had made earlier in the day to the opening meeting of the current session of the Indian Parliament. According to the press, Mr. Nehru told the Parliament that the Indian Government on July 26 had sent a note to Peiping which pointed out the necessity of avoiding incidents and proposed, when current tensions have eased, to resume discussions on the basis of the report on the previous talks held in 1960. Peiping’s reply had been received by the Indian Government the day before, August 5. Mr. Nehru read excerpts to the Parliament. The excerpts apparently gave [Page 322] Peiping’s approval of the Indian suggestion for further discussion on the boundary question but repeated Peiping’s previous charges of Indian advances into Chinese territory. Peiping indicated that there “need not be any preconditions for Sino-Indian discussions.” Mr. Nehru characterized the note as rather disappointing but said that the Indian Government was examining the note and hoped to send a reply at an early date.
The full text of neither note is yet available so that assessment of the probability of meaningful Sino-Indian negotiations on the border in the near future must be very tentative.
The GOI has always maintained that it desires to settle the dispute by negotiation; but it has always made plain that it will only negotiate if Peiping is willing to admit there is substantial validity to the Indian position on the border question. The most fundamental aspect of the Indian position is the principle that the border is well-defined by geography, tradition and treaty and that the only matter subject to negotiation is the determination of how the principle applies to certain minor areas in dispute where surveys have not been undertaken. Peiping, however, claims that the entire border is undefined and that the Indian Government should negotiate from a tabula rasa, as it were.
When the Chinese note suggests “there need not be any preconditions” for Sino-Indian discussions, Peiping seems to be repudiating India’s fundamental position and insisting on its own point of view as the point of departure, just as in the past. The China border question is such an emotionally charged question of national prestige among such a wide segment of literate Indian opinion that it would be extraordinarily difficult for Mr. Nehru to enter into actual negotiation with the Chinese on the terms Peiping now proposes. However, conversations about the border, short of actual negotiations, could undoubtedly be justified to Indian public opinion as they were in 1960.
We have had repeated indications [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] during the last month that the USSR has been suggesting to the Indians the possibility of a friendly settlement of the border issue. The Soviets have made what appear to be offers of mediation for this purpose; Mr. Nehru has reportedly turned down these offers. We have also received reports of renewed suggestions from Peiping to the Government of Burma for it to try to persuade the GOI to hold talks with Red China, possibly in Rangoon.
It should also be noted that the military activities in Ladakh of the past three months appear now to have reached a stalemate. Indian and Chinese outposts are sufficiently close to each other that their mutual presence inhibits significant further advances on the ground by either side along the nearly 200-mile frontier from the Karakorum Pass to the Spanggur Lake. There are no indications that either side wishes to start up full-scale fighting at present.
[Page 323]Therefore, it is understandable that India and Red China should wish to shift from the game of military maneuvering on the ground to the pursuit of their objectives by diplomatic means. It is entirely possible that the diplomatic maneuvering may lead to further official conversations between the two governments.
But we remain of the belief that a greater willingness to compromise will have to be exhibited by Peiping before actual negotiations leading to a settlement can take place.