Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

141. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State⁰

New Delhi, June 20, 1962, midnight.

4119. Eyes Only for President. I met Nehru for an hour at 7:15 and, subject to finding a definite alternative to MIGs and Menon’s operations on return, I am reasonably encouraged. Though looking tired Nehru was alert and seemed less affected by his illness than I had expected. Except for pleasantries at beginning and end entire discussion was on the MIGs. I made these points:

(1) That our concern was with effect acquisition on Indian reputation for neutrality and nonalignment and political effect in US. Interpretation was more important than the fact. I noted that word MIG like U-boat was highly evocative and that we hadn’t raised objection to 12s or helicopters.

(2) That purchase would be for rupees and no one, myself included, would perceive that food sales for rupees was aid while airplane sales for rupees a commercial transaction.

(3) [apparent omission] Expensive and sophisticated weapons in the area, that we continued to believe the main chance lay with economic development which these planes put in double jeopardy by adverse Congressional reaction as well as diversion of resources.

In response Nehru said that MIGs had come to attention in normal course of looking at supersonic fighters. Investigating officers “not at all pro-Soviet” found them simpler and better suited to manufacture in India than American, British, French. He cited particular doubts about the Lightning. Indians were also attracted by the price. He then said he appreciated our reaction and the problem that the purchase would present for the President vis-a-vis the Congress and public.

On the matter of aid he tried somewhat unenthusiastically to insist this was a commercial purchase and the rupees would soon be spent in the normal course of events. I responded with an argument previously used that this put a curious interpretation on our restraint on spending rupees. In the end, I think he rather yielded the point.

Nehru then said that he was of two minds on buying such equipment and perhaps they were safer without it. He agreed only because Pakistan had the planes, recalling his refusal of an offer of planes by Eisenhower. I took the occasion to give him a fill-in on background of arms aid to Pakistanis, the technical limitations of supersonic fighters and to minimize the importance of the resulting Pakistan air power. I noted that we were not offering India 104s because we accepted her policy of nonalignment. We would be in a poor position to protest aid from the Soviets that impaired that policy if we offered it ourselves.

There was a good deal more discussion in this vein but the foregoing will give the general flavor. Toward the end the following 3 points of importance emerged:

(1) Nehru said that no offer has been made by the Soviets and no negotiations have been entered into. In response to a direct question he said that while despatch of an investigating team was being considered there would be “no decision in the immediate future or the near future.”

(2) I asked him to consider a British counter-offer on comparable terms, including the Orpheus, and noted our willingness should the need arise to help on dual-purposes materiel relative to the Northern border. While I mentioned the C-130 as an example, I left the numbers fuzzy, recalling that we had previously helped him out with similar equipment. He said he would consider British offer.

(3) He said that Sandys had reminded him of the promise to consult before going to the Soviets for planes, a promise which he said had slipped his mind. He had given promise at behest of Mountbatten, implying that it wouldn’t have been given to anyone else. He left me with the impression that he intends rather reluctantly to honor it.

I have the impression of substantial progress in getting the deal postponed. This is on the assumption of a counter-offer which it will be evident was always essential in the background and, needless to say, Menon will bend every effort to remove the block when he gets back, and his ability to do so is of course related to the Prime Minister’s susceptible state of health. During the next few days I will talk with Morarji Desai and, should he initiate the discussion, with TTK, but I must avoid seeming to build up a campaign. The press swarmed over me after my meeting and in view of the special sensitivity of our role in this matter I said nothing either on the record, off the record, or for background and would urge the same curious [cautious?] policy on Washington.

Galbraith

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 791.5622/6-2062. Top Secret; Niact. Repeated to Paris eyes only for the Secretary and to London and Karachi for the Charge and/or Ambassador only.