132. Special National Intelligence Estimate0
PROBABLE REACTION OF PAKISTAN TO THE PROVISIONOF SUPERSONIC FIGHTER AIRCRAFT TO INDIABY THE US OR OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES
The Problem
To estimate Pakistan’s reaction to the provision of supersonic fighter aircraft to India by the US as a means of forestalling Indian acceptance of MIG-21s from the USSR. In addition, to assess (a) Pakistan’s reactions to provision of comparable fighters by other Western suppliers; (b) Pakistan’s reaction to US provision to India of significant military equipment other than fighter aircraft; and (c) India’s probable response to Western offers of fighters or other military equipment.
(Note: This estimate does not consider the future military or political implications for India of the acquisition of supersonic fighter aircraft, either from the West or from the USSR.)
Conclusions
- A.
- US provision of F-104 fighter aircraft to India would draw a sharply adverse reaction from Pakistan. Though we think that Pakistan would be unlikely to repudiate its Western ties, it would almost certainly manifest a greater degree of “independence” in foreign policy, characterized by a markedly increased intransigence toward the US. In particular, Pakistan would certainly not permit expansion of the special US facilities and would probably impose new restrictions on them. (Paras. 2-9)
- B.
- The Pakistanis would probably react less severely if supersonic fighters were provided India by the UK, France, or some other Western source. (Para. 10)
- C.
- We believe that the Pakistanis would react as strongly to sizable and long-term US support for Indian ground and naval forces as they would to the provision of F-104s. (Para. 11)
- D.
- Under present circumstances, we believe it doubtful that India would accept F-104s or other Western supersonic fighters in lieu of the MIG-21s. (Paras. 12-13)
[Here follows a 3-page Discussion section.]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79 R 01012A, ODDI Registry of NIE and SNIE Files, Box 212. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on June 6, except the Atomic Energy Commission representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.↩