124. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State0
2057. Re Embtel 2044.1 In same May 19 conversation with me at Rawalpindi, President reviewed general state of GOP relations with India, and problems for Pak posed by GOl search for more modern fighter aircraft.
While deploring what he termed growing testiness, duplicity, intolerance and unyielding hostility of Indian policy toward Pak, he emphasized inescapable necessity for maintaining effective diplomatic communication with India—not just pro forma diplomatic contact but meaningful diplomatic intercourse which with time and patience might grow into constructive exchange. He revealed great and growing disenchantment with Mr. Nehru, whom he characterized as arrogant, irritable, truculent, obstinate. He characterized Nehru as a fraud [Page 253] masquerading as an idealistic philosopher who actually plays rawest and most ruthless form of power politics. He dislikes Nehru the more because he feels that he lives a pretense and sham.
When I put in a good word for Mr. Nehru, observing that Indo-Pak relations were certainly better off with Nehru at helm in India than would be case with some other figures he could name, Ayub was rather inclined to take issue with me. After discounting Krishna Menon’s chances of ever succeeding to PriMinship, he said that in his view almost any other Indian politician would have less potential than Nehru for doing harm to Indo—Pak relations. He felt that with inevitable not-too-distant step-down of Nehru from PriMinship, a better and more tolerant Indian understanding of Pak legitimate aspirations and desires for satisfactory relations with India could reasonably be hoped for.
President Ayub dwelt at some length on regretability of heavy Indian armament expenditures from resources which were needed for econ development. He thought it unfortunate that American econ development assistance helped India to build up military capability. This increased Indian military pressure on Pakistan.
I reminded him that there was no actual or prospective US military assistance program for India and that our econ development assistance was earmarked for specific and well justified econ projects not related to arms procurement.
President admitted this but argued that indirectly our aid facilitated Indian purchase of arms by swelling pool of econ resources out of which arms purchases had to be financed. He did not know precisely how a change might be effected, but he wished some aid formula could be devised which would make it impossible for India to purchase advanced types of offensive weapons without thereby losing part of the foreign econ assistance on which she depends.
When I pointed out that such punitive provisions would be offensive to national pride anywhere, he replied that Indian dependence on US aid and friendship was so great that India would respond, albeit reluctantly, to influence of this sort. When I pressed him, he admitted that we could not and should not radically alter the pattern of our econ assistance to India. He recognized that stability in India was necessary for the well being of entire subcontinent and did not quarrel with my statement that good US relations with India, including US ability to wield some influence there, was essential to free world interests, both regional and global. I told him that we intended to exemplify in all phases of our relationship with Pakistan the posture of a loyal ally and a good friend, but that we did not intend that this relationship should impair our friendship with India.
President Ayub did not quarrel with this but said his most earnest piece of advice to us on our Indian policy was, “Don’t let India take you [Page 254] for granted.” He said Indians were all too prone to do this, taking advantage of US generosity good nature and the known high value we place on keeping India non-aligned with the USSR. He said our bargaining position with India is stronger than we realize and that more realistic negotiating with India on our part is needed. He predicted that a firmer line would be successful if we played our cards since India in actuality is dependent on US politically and strategically, as well as economically. He argued that India would “have no place to go” if she turned her back on United States. He emphasized relative degree of isolation of India, assessing that not even non-aligned governments of Southeast Asia such as Indonesia and Burma have any real respect or liking for present Indian government. He quoted Soekarno as having used terms of profane contempt in his appraisal of Nehru.
President Ayub feels that case for attempting to deny advanced offensive weapons from foreign sources to India has become much stronger in recent months. He believes recent Indian record shows clearly that India has openly abandoned (if indeed she ever adhered to) principles of peaceful settlement of international disputes. Since India invokes force and threat of force for settlement of disputes, President Ayub feels strongly that any country which directly or indirectly contributes importantly to better armament of India becomes an accessory to Indian power tactics and therefore unhelpful to the security of Pakistan. He predicted that any augmented Indian military capability would be used not against China but to intimidate weaker neighbors.
I am deferring comment on above until my Washington consultations.