Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

111. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) and the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Acting Secretary of State Ball⁰

Washington, March 16, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Suggested Next Steps to be Taken by the U.S. Government in the Kashmir Dispute

Discussion:

At the present moment the Pakistan Government is considering whether to accept Prime Minister Nehru’s invitation to President Ayub to come to Delhi, possibly in April, to discuss Kashmir. This invitation was conveyed by Rajeshwar Dayal, Indian High Commissioner in Karachi, on March 1 and allows for lower-level preliminary talks if desired by Pakistan. At the same time, Zafrullah Khan has indicated to us in New York that Pakistan intends to raise the question again in the Security Council “sometime this month,” a move which Pakistan states can be carried on in parallel with bilateral discussions with India. The Pakistan Embassy had requested a meeting with the Secretary for the Pakistan Ambassador and Zafrullah this week. In the Secretary’s absence, the meeting would be with you. The first mutually convenient time, however, will not be until March 19 or later.

With the recent Presidential initiative on Kashmir, repeated expressions of American concern over the problem by the President, the Secretary and others, the completion of the Indian elections, and the publication of Ayub’s Constitution, we believe a possibility exists for meaningful improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations through bilateral discussions on the Kashmir problem. We also believe a simultaneous consideration of this problem in the Secretary Council would be counterproductive and should be discouraged by us.

We, therefore, recommend the following sequence of actions by the U.S. Government. (A more detailed report of recent actions is attached as Tab B.)¹

Recommendations:

1. That we continue to indicate privately to both the Indian and Pakistan Governments our belief that they should and can at the present time carry on meaningful and productive discussions about Kashmir bilaterally. Ayub should be urged to respond favorably to Nehru’s invitation for direct Indo-Pakistan talks. Nehru, in turn, should be urged to respond favorably to any reasonable modifications proposed by Ayub.

2. That while making clear to the Pakistanis that the decision of whether they should press for an early Security Council consideration of the Kashmir issue is one for them to make, we should emphasize to Pakistan our conviction that a Security Council meeting prior to or during bilateral talks would jeopardize the prospects for any real progress in this dispute and would further diminish what minimal support there is for an attempted revival of the UNCIP resolution and Graham’s recommendations concerning their implementation.

3. That the U.S. remain alert to identify opportunities whereby we can extend our informal good offices to both parties to get the talks started and to increase the prospects of success once begun. These informal good offices can be carried out through our Embassies in the two capitals, the Department in Washington, and senior U.S. officials traveling in the area.

4. That, if bilateral discussions fail to take place or are unproductive, we again offer U.S. good offices or assist the two countries to find a third party who may be able to assist them in achieving an acceleration of the Kashmir question.

5. That if progress is not manifestly forthcoming in the bilateral talks and the lack of progress is not attributable to Pakistan, should Pakistan—despite the risks and disadvantages inherent in renewing debate in the Security Council—decide on such a course of action, we would be prepared to support the UN resolutions, as the President has indicated.

6. That, subject to your approval of the foregoing, we (a) inform our Embassy in Karachi of the prospective next steps, (b) inform the Pakistan Embassy here that we are prepared to talk to Zafrullah and the Ambassador at their earliest convenience the week of March 19,² (c) convey the substance of our position to Zafrullah at that time, and (d) instruct the Embassy in Karachi now to make points (a), (b) urging Pakistani agreement to bilater talks and, if asked point (c) in the draft telegram (attached, Tab A)³ which is submitted for your approval.⁴

0. Source: Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 66 D 415, Kashmir, January-April 1962 (Miscellaneous Papers). Secret. Drafted in NEA by Horgan, Grant, and James M. Ludlow, and in IO/UNPby Michael Newlin.
1. Not printed.
2. Ball discussed the Kashmir issue with Ahmed on March 28 along the lines of the recommendations outlined in this memorandum. (Telegram 1994 to Karachi, March 28; Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/3-2862) Rusk discussed Kashmir with Zafrullah on April 12; see Document 114.
3. Sent as telegram 1966 to Karachi, March 24. (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/3-2462)
4. A handwritten note at the end of the source text reads: “All recommendations initialed ‘Approved’ by Ball 3/24/62.”