Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIX, South Asia

105. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, February 28, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Courtesy Call on the President by Ambassador Nehru

PARTICIPANTS

• HE B.K. Nehru, Ambassador of India
• The President
• James P Grant, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA

The courtesy call on the President by Ambassador Nehru before his departure for two weeks’ consultation in India started with a brief discussion of Mrs. Kennedy’s trip to India¹ and of the Indian elections. The President then raised the subjects of Kashmir, Vietnam and the resumption of nuclear testing.

The President asked about the possibility of a meeting between Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub on the Kashmir problem. The Ambassador stated that he had seen an unconfirmed press report that President Ayub had accepted the Prime Minister’s invitation for direct talks between them and expressed his personal view that such a meeting would be helpful. He then noted that the Kashmir problem impinged on the broader subject of US-Indian relations. The Ambassador said that the major positive factor working for an improvement in relations between the United States and India is American economic aid to India. However, the appreciation for this assistance was more on an intellectual level and actions on an emotional level frequently had a greater impact on relations between countries.

At the emotional level, in his judgment, there were two factors working against improved US-Indian relations. One was of a temporary nature and the other of a longer-run nature. He stated that the temporary reaction in the United States and in Western Europe against the takeover of Goa by India was being widely misinterpreted in India. Indian public opinion is virtually unanimous in the conviction that the Indian action with respect to Goa was right, and the adverse reaction in the United States and Western Europe was being interpreted as support for colonialism. The longer-run problem was the image in the Indian public mind that the United States was giving preferential treatment to Pakistan and the United States through its military support to Pakistan has caused a diversion of Indian resources to defense. This latter problem is further complicated by Kashmir and the Pakistani actions on this subject in the Security Council. The Indian public has the image of United States support to Pakistan on this issue and of Soviet support to India. Furthermore, the Ambassador concluded, as matters now stand, India needs the support of the USSR veto in the Security Council on Kashmir.

The President replied that while we do not support Pakistan per se as a matter of principle in the Security Council on Kashmir, we are aware of the problems that the raising of this issue in the Security Council causes for us and that is a major reason for our reluctance to see the issue debated in the United Nations. On the question of military assistance to Pakistan, the President said it would be better in many ways if all our aid to Pakistan were in the form of economic assistance as it is to India. However, this is not possible for a number of reasons, a major one being that the Executive Branch cannot get enough money out of Congress for economic assistance.

The President noted that the reactions in this country on Goa have been intensified by the preacher role adopted by India on many international issues, and by Krishna Menon in particular. He said, also, that we are in a very difficult position with Portugal because of our statements on Angola and Goa. He noted that the Azores was the site of extremely important facilities for the United States and there were many in the United States who could not understand our jeopardizing such vital facilities for such apparently remote issues as Angola. He thought that the reaction on Goa was now becoming gradually a matter of the past in the United States and hoped that Mrs. Kennedy’s trip to India would serve as a major antidote there.

The Ambassador stated that his government had noted and was appreciative of the President’s public stance on Goa. His Government also recognized the importance of the Azores facilities to the United States. He expressed the hope that the President and his staff could allay the adverse Congressional reaction to the Goa takeover. The President said it would be most helpful with Congress if Krishna Menon would tone down his statements and actions which create such resentment here.

The President then stated that we would like nothing better than to withdraw from South Vietnam and return to the Geneva Accords but this would be possible only if North Vietnam would withdraw from South Vietnam. As it now stands, we have no alternative to our present military support and cannot disengage until we see the situation improve in Laos and South Vietnam. He stated that we are conscious of the dangers involved in the steps we are now taking in South Vietnam, but we are also conscious of the dangers of non-action.

On the subject of United States resumption of nuclear testing, the President stated a decision was imminent. He noted that unless the Soviets are willing to sign a test treaty of the type presented in April we have no alternative but to resume testing. In response to the Ambassador’s question as to whether such tests by the United States were necessary for military purposes, the President replied strongly in the affirmative.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, India, General, 3/1/62-3/31/62. Secret. Drafted by Grant. According to the President’s Appointment Book, the meeting was held at the White House. (Ibid.)
1. Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy represented the President on a trip to India and Pakistan in March. She visited India March 13-20 and Pakistan March 21-26. Extensive documentation on the trip is in Department of State, Central File 711.11-KE. See also the full account of the India segment of the trip in John Kenneth Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1969), pp. 275-289.