Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

90. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, November 5, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (CI)
• 2 p.m., Monday, November 5, 1962

PRESENT

• The Attorney General, Mr. Johnson, Mr. McCone, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Bundy vice Mr. Gilpatric, General Krulak vice General Taylor, Mr. Wilson vice Mr. Murrow
• Mr. Cottrell was present for Item 1.
• Mr. Komer and Mr. Forrestal were present for Items 1 and 2.
• Ambassador Holmes and Mr. Bowling were present for Item 2.

[Here follows item 1 on Southeast Asia.]

2. Iran

The Group discussed with Ambassador Holmes and Mr. Bowling the internal security situation in Iran, and the proposed outline internal defense plan for the country.¹ It was noted that the plan represents current rather than new programs for strengthening Iran’s internal security. Mr. Bowling and the Ambassador emphasized that Iran is not faced with a clear definable threat, and that accordingly it would be difficult to identify specific targets against which counterinsurgency programs should be aimed. In their opinion, the general program for improving the socio/economic and security situation is the most practical. Overall United States support to Iran is expected to run at the level of 95 million dollars for Fiscal Year 1963. This is slightly less than last year’s expenditure of 100 million dollars.

The Ambassador stressed that the first priority is the maintenance of stability, under which socio/economic improvement may take place; that stability is provided by the Shah, supported by the Army; and that our main objective must be to support the Shah in order to gain the time required for necessary reforms, and socio/economic progress. The Shah recognizes the potential threats and is seeking to implement necessary reforms. His land reform program is described by the Ambassador as truly revolutionary.

Mr. Bowling described a shift in the political situation which has occurred during the last several months. Whereas in the past the Shah was allied and supported by the Army and the elite versus the middle class and students, he has now through his reform programs allied himself with the Army, the peasantry and the urban proletariat versus the traditional elite, students and middle class.

The student problem is complicated by their inability to participate in meaningful political activities, as elections are not being held during this period, and participation in politics is accordingly limited to meetings and discussions.²

[Here follow items 3 and 4 on unrelated matters.]

Thomas W. Davis, Jr.³
Executive Secretary

0. Source: Department of State, Special Group, Counterinsurgency Files: Lot 68 D 451, Minutes of Meetings, November 5, 1962. Secret.
1. The paper was circulated to members of the Special Group on November 1. (Ibid.)
2. Following this meeting, Komer sent Bundy a memorandum (with copies to Kaysen and Robert Kennedy) that called Ambassador Holmes’ presentation at the meeting “one of the better snow jobs of recent memory.” He quoted Holmes as saying: “Iran is the most stable country in the Middle East” and described the Holmes/Bowling presentation as: “(1) in general things are going well in Iran; (2) existing programs are adequate, though of course some more money would be welcome; (3) the present regime is being pushed as hard as is feasible and is moving as fast as it can on the road to reform.” Komer found “such euphoria hard to believe,” and advised: “if moving at the Shah’s pace means just bottling up revolution, we’re again postponing the inevitable. We need a ‘controlled revolution’ in Iran, and today’s performance reinforces my conviction that we must promote one. We don’t know where we’re going in Iran, and are inviting greater risks by refusing to take lesser ones.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Iran, 11/1/62–11/30/62)
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.