89. Editorial Note

On November 3, 1962, the Saudi Government issued a communique over Radio Mecca, expressing concern about UAR intervention in the [Page 200] internal affairs of Yemen and noting that “an attack had taken place on several Saudi localities by combat aircraft supplied by the government of the UAR to the Yemen insurrectionaries who call themselves the Yemen Army Arab Republic.” The communique stated that the attack had come on November 2 and included sorties across the Saudi frontier during which bombs were dropped on five Saudi locations. The same day, Radio Mecca also announced that: “The (National Egyptian) Middle East News Agency has stated on the basis of a report from radio Sana that there are 5000 Saudi soldiers in Yemen who took part in the combat in Harad. The government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia categorically denies this news and announces that the government of Saudi Arabia does not have a single officer or soldier operating in Yemen.” (Reported in telegram 333 from Jidda, November 4; Department of State, Central Files, 786H.00/11–462)

During the evening of November 3, Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Saqqaf called on Hart to relay an extremely urgent message from Faysal calling the attacks “savage acts against Saudi Arabia” and announcing that Saudi Arabia held the UAR responsible for these acts of aggression and reserved the right of response. Saqqaf said that Faysal wanted to know where the United States stood concerning this aggression and what procedures it planned to follow. In response to a question, Saqqaf affirmed that there was not a single Saudi officer or soldier on Yemeni soil nor had any Saudi aircraft passed into Yemen. (Telegram 334 from Jidda, November 4; ibid., 786A.5486B/11–462) A similar approach was made in Washington by Saudi Ambassador Khayyal on November 5. (Telegram 217 to Jidda, November 5; ibid., 786A.5486B/11–562)

On November 4 in Riyadh, Prince Sultan bin Abdula Aziz summoned the Chief of the U.S. Military Training Mission (CHUSMTM) in Saudi Arabia, Colonel Wilson, to a series of meetings during which Wilson was informed that the Saudi Government would soon formally request U.S. assistance to establish an active air defense system for the maintenance of internal security. This would involve the sale of certain arms on credit, the transfer of 11 F-86 U.S. aircraft located at Dhahran to the Saudi Government, with continued maintenance and operational assistance from U.S. personnel, and U.S. assistance in reorganizing Saudi defenses. (Telegram 117 from Dhahran, November 5; ibid., 786A.5622/11–562)

On November 7, Prince Sultan again summoned Wilson and asked that he convey to President Kennedy Faysal’s request for a U.S. show of force in Saudi Arabia. Faysal did not wish for the participation of U.S. forces in the defense of Saudi Arabia, but the appearance of U.S. air and naval forces to provide convincing evidence to the Saudi people and others of the depth of U.S. interest and support for Saudi Arabia. He asked for more visits of U.S. warships and possibly an aircraft carrier. (Telegram 346 from Jidda, November 7; ibid., 786A.5811/11–762)