Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

278. Memorandum From the Acting Chief of Staff of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Glass) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

S-18, 373/P–3

Washington, June 21, 1963.

SUBJECT

• (C) Soviet/Bloc Activity in the Yemen¹

1. Reference your Memorandum I-8372/63 of 14 June 1963 requesting an assessment of Soviet/Bloc activity in the Yemen, the following information is provided.

2. Soviet/Bloc activity in the Yemen began as early as 1956 with the signing of a military aid agreement which provided the Imam of Yemen with approximately $30,000,000 worth of arms and equipment. Included in these shipments were IL-10 piston ground attack aircraft, piston trainers, helicopters, transports, T-34 medium tanks and rocket launchers. Most of this equipment was placed in storage and allowed to deteriorate. Prior to the revolution, Soviet technicians built the modern port of Hodeida and improved several airfields. In addition, the Chinese Communists built the present highway between Hodeida and the capital, Sana. Immediately following the revolution in September 1962, the Soviets assisted Nasser in meeting the military requirements of the new Yemen Arab Republic and apparently have provided some military equipment to the YAR directly.

3. Soviet and Bloc influence in the Yemen is being enhanced by a growing number of instructors and technicians. It is estimated that there are now approximately 1,000 Soviet technicians in the Yemen engaged primarily in airfield construction and the instruction of Yemeni personnel in the use of Soviet equipment. Russian pilots are flying transport missions and probably bomber operations against the Royalist forces. Soviet instructors are teaching at the Taiz military school and scholarship grants for study in the USSR are being made available to Yemeni students.

4. In late May 1963, at least 500 Soviet personnel began construction of a jet airfield north of Sana at al Raudha on the site of the present UAR military airfield. On 15 June, the US air officer who commands the detachment engaged in airlift operations for the UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM) observed the construction work in the al Raudha area. The Russians are engaged in building a hard-surface runway parallel to the existing 12,000-foot packed dirt and gravel airstrip there. As of 15 June, approximately 1,000 feet of heavy rock foundation had been completed but no surface material had been laid. The strip appeared to be 100 to 150 feet wide. Russian women apparently are driving some of the gravel trucks of which some 50 were observed. A large quantity of heavy earth-moving equipment is also being used, and all the equipment appeared to be of Soviet manufacture. It has been reported that construction will begin shortly at Hodeida on a 700-unit housing project and an electric station plus the completion of an artesian well system. Other economic aid projects are reported to be under consideration.

5. While some Egyptians and some Yemenis view the growing Soviet influence in the Yemen with alarm, Soviet aid is likely to continue and may be increased. From the Soviet viewpoint, the Yemeni Revolution has provided a made-to-order opportunity for the Soviet Bloc to identify itself with a revolutionary cause. In keeping with their policy in other Middle Eastern countries, the Soviets have been willing to supply military and economic assistance even though the activities of local Yemeni Communists are strictly curtailed. The Yemen has an added strategic significance for the USSR because of its proximity to Aden, the Horn of Africa and the southern entrance to the Red Sea.

6. From the Yemeni viewpoint, Soviet aid is welcome generally because of the poverty-stricken state of the government and because it tends to provide a counter to the overwhelming Egyptian influence. From the Egyptian viewpoint, Soviet and UAR interests in the Yemen coincide at the moment; both wish to protect and secure the revolutionary regime and they are cooperating toward that end. If and when the republican regime is consolidated in the Yemen, the Soviets will almost certainly attempt to play a more independent role and this will bring them into conflict with Egyptian interests. Nasser is unlikely to be willing to permit any challenge to his predominant position of influence in the Yemen. He can be expected to pressure the YAR to curtail Soviet and Bloc activities to the extent necessary to maintain this position.

Robert R. Glass
Brig. Gen., U.S. Army

0. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Yemen, 000.1—1963. Secret. No drafting information is on the source text. A stamped notation reads: “Noted by Mr. Sloan.” An attached note indicates that Sloan forwarded the memorandum to Komer at the White House on June 25.
1. Another estimate of Soviet involvement in Yemen, prepared by the Office of National Estimates of CIA on July 24 is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Yemen, 7/63. The estimate concluded: “The Soviets, in the absence of effective competition, have established an imposing presence in Yemen. Unless they make serious blunders in their relations with the Yemenis, the Soviets stand to have a favorable “image’ and a friendly atmosphere in which to operate for years to come.” A memorandum prepared by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research on “Soviet Airport Project in Yemen” (RNA-31), dated June 28, and other memoranda on the subject are in Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 66 D 116, Yemen, USSR.