277. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Emissary for Near East Arms Limitation (McCloy)0
Washington, June 19,
1963.
Here as promised is my own personal slant on the arguments best calculated to persuade Nasser that our arms limitation gambit deserves real thought on his part.
- (1)
- Essentially, our desire is to examine with Nasser and then the Israelis on a strictly private basis whether some alternative to a nuclear/missile arms race wouldn’t be to everybody’s advantage. We merely ask Nasser to examine our proposition carefully. We’ve carefully designed it to be evenhanded; we’re not asking the UAR to do anything we won’t ask Israel to do. Indeed one might even argue that the balance of strategic advantage in our scheme would be in the UAR’s favor simply because the Israelis would be denying themselves a capability they are much closer to realizing.
- (2)
- So our best argument with Nasser is that the Israelis would be quite likely to come out ahead in any escalation of the arms race. It is simple fact that Israel’s 25 MW reactor (which we have no evidence is going military at present) would nevertheless give them a capability of doing so if they chose. We also rate them high on missile development, so Nasser should be careful about an arms race here as well.
- (3)
- We should think Nasser would be worried about the possible belligerence of an Israel possessing such mass destruction capabilities, which we could not prevent them from using (even if we cleaned up after the event a la Suez).
- (4)
- We doubt missiles alone without nuclear warheads make much sense except as psychological weapons. And we doubt the USSR would give nuclears to Nasser any more than we would. It has never given them to any of its own satellites, including China (indeed this is one of the big issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute).
- (5)
- In any case, if the UAR should get a major weapons edge, we would find it almost impossible to resist Israeli pleas for comparable capabilities. The Hawk example is a good one here.
- (6)
- Nasser’s chief concern may be doubt that the US could or would enforce a nuclear/missile ban on Israel. We should counter that we are prepared to make this a basic issue of confidence; our whole policy is based on non-proliferation. If we oppose weapons for the French, even at [Page 598] the cost of major differences with De Gaulle, we certainly are going to oppose Israel having them. To do otherwise would undermine our whole global policy. So Nasser can be reassured that we would do everything necessary to make sure Israel lived up to a nuclear/missile ban. By the same token, however, we could not do so unless we could reassure the Israelis that the Arabs would not acquire nuclear capabilities either.
- (7)
- Nasser may think that if the US is so opposed to nuclear proliferation it wouldn’t let the Israelis have nuclear weapons in any case. Our riposte is that while we are totally opposed to Israeli nucs, we can’t stop the Israelis any more than we can the French from going nuclear unless we can offer them something like a mutual self-denial pact with the Arabs in return. Regrettably this option is not open to us with the French.
- (8)
- Should Nasser argue that, while the US might deny Israel nuclears, the French would continue helping, our response could be that Israel values its ties with the US more than those with France. We are confident that we can get Israeli acquiescence but only if Nasser plays ball too. At any rate, why not try?
- (9)
- Our hope is to work out some scheme which would be politically palatable to Nasser and Israel. For example, we are deliberately avoiding any restrictions on conventional weapons, simply because we feel that this would be too complex and because we do not see either side denying itself birds in the hand. It would be more sensible to start with birds in the bush. Recognizing the political risk to Nasser of engaging publicly in anything that might be construed as an agreement with Israel, we would also favor the maximum degree of tacit, private understanding feasible.
As to the Israelis, we are essentially counting on their desire for firmer US security commitments to buttress our approach. Our position is that we cannot even consider such commitments unless we are sure Israel is not traveling the nuclear road. If Israel meets this requirement, then it is obviously to her advantage to be sure that Nasser doesn’t travel the nuclear road either. If you would like, I could elaborate my ideas on the Israeli approach later.
R.W.
Komer1