Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

224. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic⁰

Washington, April 27, 1963, 8:17 p.m.

2647. Embtel 1862.¹ Department compliments you on your initiative and handling of conversation with Sharaf.

Believe desirable get word to Nasser that you have now received instructions which confirm your approach to Sharaf and add following points:

(1) What Israel fears most and what likely trigger Israel military action is threat of a change which will result in UAR forces appearing on Israeli-Jordanian frontier. Thus, a coup that is given appearance of direction by UAR or control of which taken over by elements openly pro-UAR likely have only one result. We say this because Israel has capability of sudden military action with little or no chance of prior detection of intention. While USG has cordial relations with Israel and presses for restraint, we cannot count on restraining Israel when it considers its vital interests at stake. We not relaying Israeli threat. We recognize reality.

(2) We want Nasser to know that our views not based just on concern for Israel but is related to all we and UAR are trying to do. US and UAR face mutual peril in this situation. US has much to lose, but we think UAR has even more to lose.

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Operational Immediate; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Strong, cleared by Marvin (S/S) and the White House, and approved by Grant. Repeated to Amman, Damascus, Baghdad, London, and Tehran for Secretary Rusk and Talbot who were in Iran April 28-29, en route to Karachi to attend the CENTO Ministerial Meeting.
1. Badeau reported in telegram 1862 from Cairo, April 27, that after hearing reports of possible violent action in Jordan, he sought a meeting with Presidential aide-de-camp Sami Sharaf in the absence of Ali Sabri. Badeau told Sharaf that he was speaking without instructions, but expected to receive some shortly if the Jordan situation continued. Badeau then delivered what he called a “detailed and blunt exposition of our fears concerning Jordan and effect of violent action on USA-UAR relations and general stability of area.” (Ibid., POL 26 JORDAN)