Office of the Historian

223. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel0

Washington, April 27, 1963, 4:47 p.m.

752. Following information has already been sent to Beirut, Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda, London, Amman:

[Page 487]

Mounting indications exist immediate coup being planned by Army and other groups in Jordan. Believed aligned neither with Nasser or Baath but going ahead with Nasser’s knowledge and maybe assistance. We unable gauge at present chances for success and objectives not entirely known to us.

Seems Israel aware coup plans and is extremely nervous. Prospect exists if coup successful and UAR influence appears predominant, Israel may decide for military action in Jordan or Egypt, or both. Ambassadors in area should review emergency plans and preparations without in any way revealing above knowledge.

For London: Situation being reviewed today with UK Embassy. Request you do so likewise with FonOff.1

For Tel Aviv: If coup attempt in fact takes place you should at once strongly advise Ben-Gurion take no military action and say we will maintain close touch with GOI. It by no means clear coup, if successful, would mean immediate Nasser control over Jordan or introduction non-Jordan forces. We will use full weight our influence toward unchanged situation on Jordan-Israel border.

For Damascus and Baghdad: In event Jordan coup effort you should immediately approach Government at highest level and say every effort will be made prevent external interference and spread of coup. Syria and Iraq can make best contribution by remaining absolutely quiet and in no way goading Israelis.

For Cairo: In event coup, advise Nasser if UAR identifies itself as coup author or mentor it would only serve goad Israel. We rely on UAR avoid any measure contributing to risk conflagration involving others beyond Jordan.

Ball
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 JORDAN. Secret; Limit Distribution; Emergency. Drafted by Strong and Nyerges; cleared by Ford (S/S-O); and approved by Cottam.↩
  2. An April 27 memorandum from Komer to Bundy indicates that Ball spoke to Greenhill of the British Embassy on April 27 and that “apparently UK has no plans of any kind for military action and is strongly disinclined to move. We are convinced they see anything they do in Jordan as greatly complicating their much more important position in the Persian Gulf—they’re dead right. But Greenhill did agree to engage in immediate contingency planning and George [Ball] is getting McNamara to lay it on.” Komer’s memorandum also indicates that King Hussein was warned of the coup plans. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Jordan, 4/63)↩