Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

171. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom⁰

Washington, February 28, 1963, 7:46 p.m.

4592. Embtel 3293.¹

(1) Whether or not Yemeni revolution UAR-inspired, Yemenis executed it, Yemen was ripe for revolution, there had been at least two serious attempts previously, and it would have come sooner or later with or without outside inspiration. Aden viewpoint unrealistic.

(2) UAR forces unlikely withdraw from Yemen and republicans unlikely request their withdrawal so long as YAR threatened by royalist forces whose effectiveness depends on external support. In face continued external pressures Egyptians tempted escalate military effort within Yemen and will be tempted take stronger action against Saudi Arabia. Increasing frequency air strikes against Najran February 13, 17, 21, 22, 23, parachute drop arms north of Jidda and air strike at Khamis Mushayt February 28 confirm this intent.

(3) Despite Egyptian capability increase military effort, Yemen adventure costly and Nasser anxious find excuse for graceful withdrawal. We are convinced UAR will withdraw bulk of forces when YAR stabilized. YAR also anxious be rid frictions arising from Egyptian presence. Yemenis dislike being occupied by Egyptians and as outside pressures against YAR relieved, republicans and royalists alike will work toward objective of scaling down UAR pressure. Best way to avert Yemen’s serving as base from which UAR subvert Aden is for Aden realistically cultivate best possible relations with YAR in order minimize both YAR need for UAR protection and YAR incentive undertake subversion. Antagonizing and using force against YAR maximizes both foregoing.

(4) UK recognition of YAR would mute YAR opposition to Aden Federation and reduce likelihood aggressive YAR policy toward Aden. We recall YAR promise December 10 that when UK Minister presented credentials to Sallal, latter would make categorical public statement undertaking to observe 1934 Sana’a Treaty. Current YAR propaganda offensive against Aden, together with incidents along Beihan border, appear to us as direct outgrowth of UK failure recognize UAR. For several weeks before YAR recognize-or-leave ultimatum to UK, YAR was exercising restraint in its relations with Aden in anticipation UK recognition.

(5) UK cannot expect YAR to recognize South Arabian Federation when HMG fails recognize republican regime and flexes muscles along Yemen border. Rather than using opinions of Federation rulers to justify present policy, HMG might employ its influence to impress them with importance living at peace with their neighbors while at same time guarantee them UK support (note USG policy vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia). Federation rulers, after all, completely dependent on UK for protection and finances and have nowhere to go.

(6) If Yemeni war allowed to go on indefinitely in Yemen, aside from risk of escalation, danger exists of increased Soviet bloc penetration Yemen and thus greater threat to Western interests in Persian Gulf, Arabian Peninsula and East Africa. We cannot discount possibility YAR turn to Soviets if UAR unable secure Yemen for YAR. Better to have YAR regime influenced by residual presence UAR military mission and technicians than substantial Soviet presence, including military.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 26 YEMEN. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Seelye and Russell, cleared by Strong, and approved by Talbot. Also sent to Aden and repeated by pouch to Taiz, Jidda, Cairo, and Dhahran.
1. Telegram 3293 from London reported on a conversation between an Embassy official and Kenneth Trevaskis, British Deputy High Commission for Aden. (Ibid., POL 27 YEMEN)