Office of the Historian

170. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

Washington, February 28, 1963.

SUBJECT

  • Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker’s Call on the President, 9:30 AM, Friday, March 11

There are enclosed the proposed terms of reference for Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker’s mission to Crown Prince Faysal. National Security [Page 376] Action Memorandum No. 227,2 the terms of reference, and the “Review of Policy toward the Yemen Conflict” prepared for the President’s meeting on this subject on February 25,3 constitute the essential documentation for Ambassador Bunker along with a more precise concept for improvement in Saudi Arabia’s western air defenses being worked out by State and Defense.

Main points for discussion:

a)
Ambassador Hart can be very helpful in advising on Saudi mentality and on Faysal’s particular characteristics.
b)
The President continues to be deeply concerned for the integrity and security of Saudi Arabia.
c)
Faysal’s honor. Faysal has personalized the conflict into a struggle against Nasser. He feels if he terminates assistance before complete withdrawal of troops by the UAR he will be charged with abandoning a commitment to the royalists and will be vulnerable to UAR propaganda citing his “defeat” and bad faith. In presenting our formula, it must be made clear that the Secretary General’s mediatory effort, the UAR public commitment to withdraw, and our determination to bring pressure to bear on the UAR directly and through the UN to carry out this undertaking provides the opportunity for Faysal to disengage with honor.
d)
Military support. It must be made clear that augmented US military support must be conditioned on suspension of Saudi support of royalist forces.
e)
UN Mediatory effort. If Faysal has not agreed to receive Dr. Bunche, he should be urged to do so without interposing conditions.
f)
Publicity. We are trying to minimize the possibility of leaks. U Thant and Bunche have been informed that Ambassador Bunker’s primary mission is to deal with bilateral relations and should not in any way interfere with or complicate Bunche’s mediatory mission but could well be helpful. U Thant interposed no objection but it is obvious that publicity would complicate our relations with the SYG.

What we hope Ambassador Bunker will achieve:

a)
Faysal’s agreement to suspend support to royalists (thus placing the UAR in the position of either implementing or violating its pledge to remove its forces from Yemen).
b)
Faysal’s agreement to cooperate with Dr. Bunche to reach accord through him with the UAR on modalities of Saudi disengagement and withdrawal of UAR forces.
c)
Reaffirmation to Faysal of US interest in Saudi Arabia and in the strengthening and development of the Kingdom under his leadership.

J. T. Rogers4

Enclosure5

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Presidential Emissary to Prince Faysal

A. United States to make clear to Faysal

1)
Strong continued US interest in security and stability of Saudi Arabia.
2)
We agree on objectives; have differed on means.
3)
Only feasible means we see of bringing about UAR troop withdrawal from Yemen is suspension of Saudi support of royalist forces.
4)
UAR probably has military capability to consolidate YAR control and is clearly able to strike telling blows at supply points or other centers of Saudi support.
5)
Saudi policy has led to increased UAR and Soviet presence in Yemen, not to departure.
6)
US cannot be put into position of providing a protected haven from which Faysal carries on operation which risks escalation and which is directed against government we recognize.
7)
Augmented US military support must be conditioned on Saudi disengagement from Yemen.
8)
US committed to departure UAR troops upon Saudi suspension.
9)
Formula can be found consistent with his honor.
10)
Need for full concentration on internal development and reform.
11)
US is best friend Saudis can have—we have demonstrated this.

B. What we want from Faysal

1)
Agreement to suspend support to royalists.
2)
Agreement to stationing of neutral observers in Nejran–Jizan area to certify support activities suspended, on condition that others would be posted to Hodeidah and YAR airports to certify outward movement UAR forces.
3)
Willingness to cooperate with the SYG’s representative to reach agreement on modalities through him with the UAR and YAR.
4)
Willingness to prevent efforts by Imam’s adherents to continue support from Saudi territory.

C. What we can offer Faysal

1)
Formula by which he can disengage with honor; pressure in Cairo and Sana’a to accept.
2)
Implementation of UAR pledge to remove troops. If Faysal agrees to suspend, we will press Nasser to withdraw, with an initial unit to be withdrawn immediately.
3)
Military support to deter attacks, development of air defense system, and expedited training of Saudi air forces and air defense personnel.
4)
Encouragement of moderation and concentration on domestic affairs by YAR.
5)
Continued support for Faysal’s program for modernization and reform.

D. Procedure

1)
Avoid all publicity.
2)
Confer with Ambassador Hart prior to meeting with Faysal.
3)
Ambassador to decide whether he should accompany emissary.
4)
PAO ‘Isa Sabbagh to translate.
5)
Need for secrecy to be stressed.
6)
If Faysal willing to explore further the proposals conveyed in the President’s letter and by emissary, this to be done with Ambassador Hart and with SYG’s representative.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/BUNKER. Secret. Drafted by Davies and Strong and cleared by Talbot. Komer forwarded this memorandum and its attachment to President Kennedy on February 28 together with the revised draft letter from Kennedy to Faysal (Document 172) and the record of action for the February 25 meeting on Yemen (see Document 164).↩
  2. In his covering memorandum, Komer advised: “I suggest you give Bunker some general words of reassurance for Faysal, but impress on him that we are not prepared to defend Faysal if he continues to intervene in Yemen.” (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries, Saudi Arabia) No record of Kennedy’s meeting with Bunker on March 1 has been found.↩
  3. Document 165.↩
  4. Document 163.↩
  5. Rogers signed for Brubeck above Brubeck’s typed signature.↩
  6. Secret. Drafted by Strong and Davies.↩