Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963

141. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State⁰

Cairo, January 24, 1963, 7 p.m.

1089. At Nasser’s request had seventy minute conversation with him this morning as follow-up President Kennedy letter of January 19.¹

Nasser inaugurated talk by expressing appreciation for letter, attested to President Kennedy genuine concern re Yemen problem and stated his personal satisfaction Kennedy ideas directly presented to him. Then requested I elaborate on proposal suggested in letter.

To lay foundation for urgency and timeliness of mediation efforts I recapitulated current YAR-UAR-SAG situation, emphasizing following:

1. Current military situation is stalemate with tribal Royalists unlikely dislodge YAR present position and YAR incapable bringing tribes under control. Result will be protracted, possibly permanent, struggle similar to Kurdish-Arab hassle in Iraq.

2. Prolongation of situation extremely dangerous to all parties. YAR already beset with tensions between Baidani and Sallal, Zaidis and Shafais, and individual personalities.

These tensions will increase if present inconclusive situation continues with possible result of demise of Sallal group. UAR must be finding commitment burdensome, expenses heavy, and growing suspicion and resistance to UAR in rest of Arab world. Recent evidence of hard currency expenditures by UAR for Czech arms and Soviet aviation gas presages strong Western and USA reaction against diversion of UAR hard currency in light of recent USA, Italian and UK loans made for stabilization purposes. For SAG, protraction of conflict poses possible growth internal instability and resulting USA concern for special interests in country. In view of all this, time is now ripe to take constructive forward step and end situation.

Nasser here broke in to agree prolongation of situation to no one’s interest. He reiterated earlier statements UAR was not seeking to overthrow SAG, UAR anti-Saudi activities being aimed only at stopping Saudi support for Royalists. UAR indeed under heavy expense, although hard currency component probably smaller than I assumed. Yemen has neither a proper government, an army, nor a functioning political organization and these must be developed if new regime is to be stabilized. When first approached by US with disengagement proposals, UAR assumed we were in position easily to secure SAG compliance. This assumption apparently false. SAG involvement increased rather than decreased after recognition, with Pakistan and Belgian arms pouring in. Nasser particularly mentioned alleged arms supplies from Belgium including aircraft from Sabena. Faisal terms for disengagement obviously a hoax and based upon premise that during withdrawal of UAR troops SAG would build up Royalist forces to point where they could take over. Yemeni tribes are loyal to no one but themselves and given gold, ammunition and technical direction will fight for either side. Since SAG in position to furnish these, border tribes have remained anti-YAR and will continue to do so as long as external support available. Basic problem is supply of ammunition and material rather than money. If these can be stopped situation will quiet down and UAR will gladly carry out disengagement undertaking.

I then turned to specifics of Presidential proposal, drawing largely on Deptel 989.² I stressed neutral intermediary would be personal representative UNSYG and not head of official UN mission or USG representative. While plan envisions three steps (initial visit, formulation disengagement plan with acceptance by contending parties, and verification) details would need to be worked out by direct consultation with parties concerned. This was not a cut and dried American plan with all specifics settled but a modality of approaching problem. It rested upon willingness of four contending governments to accept SYG personal representative as friend of all and work in cooperation with him.

At this point Nasser asked what special representative could accomplish that had not already been tried. Since USG apparently unable to put effective pressure on SAG for disengagement, how could special representative do this? I pointed out that behind special representative would lie prestige of UN and that using his services would throw spotlight of international concern on Yemen affair. If any party refused reasonable cooperation after initially accepting plan, this would be public knowledge and would generate force of world opinion. At present time disengagement discussions carried on by 4 American Ambassadors in 4 capitals in air of secrecy with consultation only possible through medium of Washington. With special representative all 4 parties would be on record as desiring disengagement and would make views known to single intermediary. If any party welched on agreement or failed cooperate, world would know where trouble lies.

Nasser then asked details as to observation role of special representative, noting UAR convinced most UN observers tend to side with the aggressor since it is more difficult to detect overt aggressive action than open defensive action. I pointed out final phase of plan did not call for observers but “verifiers”. Very presence of neutral intermediary would assist verification and have moderating effect, as witness useful role of UNEF on Palestine border. Nasser acknowledged good work of UNEF, commenting it was so good he had accepted bitter Arab attacks against him for allowing operation to continue.

He also asked whether disengagement and verification would cover activities in Sheikhdom of Beihan. I answered we had no specific evidence of these activities beyond general sympathy and comfort and said I would welcome any specific evidence UAR could give me. British have denied fact of Beihan assistance and I would accept this until hard evidence proved contrary. However, if UAR felt Beihan a legitimate disengagement concern, this, with appropriate supporting evidence, could be laid before the mediator when specific disengagement plan being discussed.

I then returned to President Kennedy’s ardent desire to set forward disengagement and his strong interest in proposed plan. Nasser inquired as to possibility of direct Presidential American representative. I pointed out this would open US to accusation of colonialism and imperialism of which Soviets would take full advantage. Moreover parties to YAR dispute might be attacked on same grounds. Nasser acknowledged this would probably be result.

Nasser then inquired who SecGen and USG had in mind as emissary. I replied no names were under consideration as yet. In original proposal, some considerations had been given to a European but possibility now existed SYG would choose an American to represent him. Nasser thought this might be useful since USG itself involved in disengagement plan and use of American could generate deeper US interests in process. I stated that of course neutral intermediary would have to be acceptable to parties concerned and that if principle of plan were accepted, specific names would be put forward.

Nasser then asked that I send him as quickly as possible memo of conversation particularly containing outline of plan as presented above. He said he would consider this himself and in concert with Presidential Council and also would take it up with Sallal. He promised to call me for a definitive answer within next two or three days—probably on Sunday or Monday,³ depending upon when Ramadan begins (Saturday or Sunday).

Comment: This has been my frankest discussion with Nasser on Yemen problem. Nasser was unusually candid about difficulties and details of military situation and quoted extensively from intelligence reports, which on whole substantiate our own estimate. It may be wishful thinking on my part but I detect favorable consideration of plan since no alternative was discussed. Of particular interest was Nasser’s frank statement about Baidani’s shortcomings which are being reported in separate telegram.⁴

Badeau

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 786H.02/1–2463. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Amman, Jidda, Taiz, London, USUN, and Sanaa.
1. See Document 135.
2. Dated January 24. (Ibid., 786H.00/1–2163)
3. January 27 or 28.
4. Telegram 1091 from Cairo, January 24. (Department of State, Central Files, 686H.86H/1–2463) On January 27, Nasser summoned Badeau to inform him that the UAR accepted the proposal for the U.N. Secretary-General to appoint a special representative as a neutral intermediary in the Yemen dispute. Nasser said that he had sent a message to Sallal on this subject, but had not yet received a reply. (Telegram 1103 from Cairo, January 28; ibid., 786H.00/1–2863)