Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

94. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, August 7, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Iran

The President has expressed renewed concern over the way in which the Amini regime seems to have lost much of its initial momentum and has had little success as yet in developing any kind of a political base.¹ Moreover, we apparently face additional financial commitments to meet Iran’s recurrent budget difficulties and to make up shortfalls in the second Seven Year Development Plan. He is anxious that we continue to do everything possible to capitalize on the opportunity created by Amini’s advent, following up the excellent Iran Task Force program which he approved. If the situation seems to be deteriorating rather than improving, are there any further steps which the US could profitably undertake?

As a result he is most interested in the Department of State’s current thinking. Should we now regard Iran as a full-fledged crisis situation, and give it sustained Task Force treatment, as we are South Vietnam? Are we doing everything necessary to keep Iran afloat financially and to get a promising development program going? Can we, for example, get the Shah and Amini to glamorize the new Third Plan as a bold new effort to modernize Iran, around which all elements of Iranian society should rally? What other means can we suggest to Amini to help generate a political base? How can we influence him to get a more competent cabinet? Is there anything more we can get the Shah to do to help Amini, such as allowing a token cut in the military budget? As to the opposition, is there any way we can help Amini to split the National Front and attach to himself its more moderate elements? Finally, if we are nonetheless dubious as to Amini’s prospects, should we step up quiet contingency planning against his fall?

The President believes that it would be helpful if the Iran Task Force could prepare by the end of this week a follow-on report assessing what further measures, if any, seem desirable to forestall another Iranian crisis, and be ready to meet with him, if necessary, to consider these steps.

McGeorge Bundy

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.00/8–761. Secret. This memorandum was sent to Secretary of Defense McNamara and other members of the National Security Council as NSAM No. 67. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464, Iran 1961; also in Department of State, NSAM Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 67)
1. A memorandum from Kennedy to McGeorge Bundy of August 7 reads: “Arrange to have a conference on Iran with the Iran Task Force meeting to consider the proposals made to me by Komer in his memorandum to me on August 4th. You might submit Komer’s memorandum or an abbreviated form to the responsible people in the State Department and then let’s have a meeting to consider it or any proposals they may have.” (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Bundy, McGeorge 1961)