92. Paper by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Strong)0
NICOSIA CONFERENCE
Discussion of Refugee Question—Afternoon August 3, 1961
Ambassadors Barbour, Hart and McClintock presented their paper (transmitted to AHM by PT’s letter of August 3).1 They remarked that personal diplomacy by the President is the only hope for making progress on the refugee problem, their proposal makes it possible to bypass the unfavorable attitude of UNSYG and takes into account the unfavorable situation in the UN, U.S. initiative is essential particularly since the U.S. puts up the bulk of the money, and it is not possible to spell things out in greater detail in advance.
Talbot referred to a proposal that if Israel were to allow a certain number of Arab refugee families per month to settle in Israel, many would become disillusioned and would leave. (No response from group.)
Wilkins proposed that the IBRD do the Ghab project in Syria and resettle 200,000 refugees there. Hart proposed putting more money into Jordan. Macomber responded that given the emotional nature of the refugee problem King Hussein was unlikely to buck Nasser. He referred to the Alpha project2 which sought to settle the whole Palestine problem but ran into the opposition of Nasser.
[Page 210]Discussion ensued on the cost per family of resettlement, McClintock suggesting $5–7,000 and Wilkins remarking that the Israeli cost per family for resettlement was $2500. Badeau remarked that he did not like the term “one-shot” since creation of a whole new social fabric is required. McClintock agreed with Hare that “baksheesh” was the wrong term since what is involved is compensation, not a gratuity.
Wilkins queried what situation we would be in if the project failed or what would be our situation if it succeeded. He suggested that if we succeeded we might be more unpopular with the Arabs but not seriously so. If we fail we may still have put enough pressure on them to vote for some other solution, but in any event we would not be worse off than now.
Hart pointed out that repatriation must be phased, that Israel cannot accept a flood of refugees. We should not start with a fixed number but let it evolve. Barbour concurred, pointing out that the President told Ben-Gurion that the repatriation would be phased.
Jernegan predicted that the scheme won’t get off the ground, nor any other. Any approach will result in blasts from Iraq or Saudi Arabia and all the rest of the Arabs will have to fall in line. Badeau inquired whether the plan could be proposed by other auspices and thus be better received. Jernegan said that this at least would save the U.S. from taking all the beating.
Talbot asked whether there was less risk in trying something under any auspices or in doing nothing. Jernegan remarked that he would let the whole thing alone, referring to Hammarskjold’s attitude. Barbour declared that the IBRD would not touch the refugee problem because it is too political. McClintock said our name is mud anyhow and we won’t be hurt much if we fail. Wilkins agreed.
Badeau asked how this fits in with the Arab proposal for a property custodian. Hart said it works both ways, Jewish property was confiscated outright in both Egypt and Iraq.
Barbour commented that Israel is more likely now than in the past to accept a reasonable solution on the refugee problem without demanding an overall settlement. What Israel seeks now is an advance agreement on safeguards.
Macomber said Jordan will be deeply disappointed if there is no U.S. initiative but the proposal in front of the group would weaken the regime and set us back because of the irrational view that Israel cannot continue to exist, that the existence of Israel is an historical aberration. There could be a very private approach to Hussein which would be acceptable to him if he thought he could get away with it.
Hare stated that the Arabs were humiliated by their defeat by Israel and any solution must be tilted their way so it appears that they have the [Page 211] preponderance of gain. In the proposed plan he does not see a victory for the Arabs. We can’t buy our way out but must restore Arab dignity.
Barbour replied that Ben-Gurion would be unlikely to survive politically if he makes a public statement on repatriation even if he has an under-the-table arrangement with us.
Knight suggested that Tito has good relations with both sides and might take on the job. Badeau remarked that Nasser probably wants the refugee problem solved but much depends on the day and the mood in which he finds himself. He inquired whether stability in the refugee camps would be affected if the approach failed. Macomber said there was relief in the camps when it was learned that the “Kennedy 25% plan” was found not be be true. The plan as written up might give the refugees a tool to try to topple the King.
Talbot wondered what effect failure would have on Congress; might result in reduced support to UNRWA. Macomber was of the view that failure would have no bad effect on Congress; at least we would be seen to be trying. Jernegan concurred.
Hart urged that we avoid any appearance that the plan had been hatched with Israel. Any public statement by Israel would lead the Arabs to think it to be a plot. We should appear to buffet Israel into something that appears to give the Arabs a victory.
Macomber noted that the refugees already understand the unpleasantness of living in Israel under Jewish rule.
Talbot summarized as follows: Israel expects an effort but prefers none. Jordan would be disappointed if there were no effort but is unlikely to accept. Nasser may want some sort of settlement but he and Kamel say “put the Israel issue on ice”. No other country thinks the refugee problem a threat to world peace but we consider it a serious nuisance. We are under pressure to do something. Congress insists that UNRWA be cleaned up or that we get out of it. A PCC report is due October 15 and a debate is due in the next GA. The issue will continue to plague us. If we could get a process started tensions would be reduced. It would cost us a lot of money over the next several years. Psychology of expecting something to be done is now greater than ever before. The new administration is expected to do something and if it doesn’t now it probably won’t be done. If we fail no great damage will be done and we shall be better off with Congress. If it is kept secret an approach to Hussein won’t hurt him. The Arabs have been hammering for exactly what is being proposed. 1962 is an election year and it will be hard to do anything then. We might try to bring the President and Nasser together this fall. There is unanimity that we should have a try, though Jernegan is very reluctant. Refugees are not a time bomb but Jordan waters and nuclear energy are.
[Page 212]Knight remarked that we must save Arab face. He thinks there will be shooting when water is diverted by Israel. McClintock said it could quickly be found whether there is any “give” in Nasser’s position on refugees and if so we could then go to Hussein. Polk remarked that it would leak in Washington, and he inquired whether there was any other possible type of move that had not been discussed.
Wilkins asked whether we can get a commitment from Congressional leaders for money prior to approaching Nasser and Ben-Gurion.
On Jordan waters, McClintock said Israel would be wise to agree to a watermaster now in order to relieve tensions.
Talbot’s final remark was that there is no Israeli willingness to reduce immigration. This year Israel will have an excess of 100,000 immigrants over emigrants. We cannot influence the rate, so the longer the refugee question is unsettled the less room there will be in Israel for Arabs.
- Source: Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 229, Refugees, PCC. No classification marking.↩
- Document 91.↩
- Reference is to U.S.-U.K. discussions held during 1955 to devise a solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute. Project Alpha culminated in the secret mission of Robert Anderson to Egypt and Israel. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, volumes XIV and XV.↩