Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

88. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, July 20, 1961.

Highlights of Discussion at Secretary’s Planning Meeting on the Policy Guidelines Paper on the Near East¹

The Under Secretary chaired the meeting.

Others present were:

• G—Mr. Johnson
• NEA—Mr. Talbot
• NE—Mr. Strong
• ARA—Mr. Braddock
• FE—Colonel Brannon
• EUR—Mr. Tyler
• AF—Mr. Witman
• IO—Mr. Jones
• L—Mr. Meeker
• E—Mr. Martin
• S/P—Mr. Morgan
• S/P—Mr. Wriggins

In a brief introduction, Mr. Talbot identified the principal elements in the Rationale, including the strategic role of the Near East, the emotional drive toward Arab unity, the problems of orderly economic and social development in a feudal society in transition, etc. He warned that the present calm of the Near East was more apparent than real, since within the next two years Israel will have the capacity to draw Jordan waters, its technical advance will further disturb the Arabs and the refugee problem will call for major review.

The more important points raised in the wide ranging discussion that followed were these:

(1) Our bargaining power with the Arabs is increasing as world supplies of oil are growing and alternative sources of fuel develop. But this will pose serious problems of readjustment within the Arab states and in our future relations with them.

(2) Although the continuing tribal and quasi-feudal social structure in the Near East differentiates it from Latin America, it cannot be ruled out that soon we will have to develop a policy less exclusively concerned with government and more designed to identify us with popular demands.

(3) The paragraphs concerning the use of force² were criticized as being unnecessarily general and not responsive to the contingency of disruption of Near East states from within. Some comfort was provided by vivid comments concerning the purely indigenous tradition of clandestinity, secretive plotting and Arab mutual infiltration which had developed a certain immunity to exotic Communist forms of the malady. But the Soviet leap frogging strategy, perhaps, deserved more specific reference.

(4) These paragraphs were insufficiently explicit about the unfortunate side effects of using force in the contingencies mentioned.

(5) The anomalous position of Israel was commented upon, a country receiving DLF and other forms of assistance even though its per capita income is higher than that of many parts of Europe. Disparities in income within the area as between Israel and Jordan or the oil-producing states and the UAR were important sources of regional tensions. It was suggested that regional economic organization might help reduce these disparities. Pressure may have to be put on Israel to cause her to act in a responsible way. We should bear in mind that the freedom of action of the USG is not as limited by the supporters of Israel in this country as we sometimes think and we should act accordingly.

(6) Arab neutralism was seen as a short run nuisance but a long run asset, with much flexibility within it which might be utilized to our advantage.

0. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 67 D 396, Policy Guidelines, Near East. Secret. Drafted by Wriggins.
1. Regarding the Policy Guidelines series, see Document 13. A copy of the draft guidelines paper under discussion at the July 20 meeting is in Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 67 D 396, Policy Guidelines Near East. It is attached to a transmittal slip from Morgan to Secretary Rusk that indicates that the paper would be discussed at the Policy Planning Council meeting on July 20. The final Policy Guidelines paper for the Near East and a separate memorandum of conversation for this meeting, drafted by Strong, are ibid.
2. Under the section entitled “Military,” the draft paper indicated that the United States should “Be prepared to use force or to support the use of force to ensure the independence of each state of the area from the Soviet Bloc.” Under the section entitled “Contingency,” the paper hypothesized that, in the event of Arab-Israel hostilities, the United States should take a variety of steps including trade and financial embargoes; and, “Should these actions be inadequate to end hostilities promptly, be prepared to take appropriate military actions. Such measures should be carried out through the United Nations, if feasible, although unilateral action by the U.S. or bilateral action with the UK should, if necessary, be initiated.”