84. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom0

165. Department Officers met July 11 with Dean of UKUN and Greenhill of British Embassy to continue earlier US–UK contacts at higher level on Kuwait crisis.1 Purpose of meeting to sound out British thinking on the political aspects of current situation and of problem of disengagement.

Dean carried bulk of conversation for UK side. Lacking confidence in Arab League or “Arab presence” ability to assure Kuwait independence his thinking centered on an UNTSO-type presence of forty or fifty observers possibly on both sides Iraq-Kuwait frontier and including an Arab element. As seen by Dean such arrangement would permit UK maintain its agreement with Ruler, would act as deterrent at low cost with few administrative problems and probably escape Soviet veto if UAR acquiesces. Would not be pursued unless Ruler and US satisfied arrangement adequate. Successful negotiation in New York very unlikely hence negotiation bilaterally with members of SC required; would be up to US to deal with Saudis. After bilateral negotiation SC might apply rubber stamp. Spinelli-type UN presence inadequate in Dean’s opinion.

Department officers observed Iraq most unlikely agree to UN observers on its territory, Soviets and possibly UAR might support Iraqi objection, and if this element included in eventual proposal to SC it would probably be regarded as “gimmick” designed insure defeat UN presence plan.

Other possibilities canvassed by Dean were replacement of UK forces by a strong UN contingent or a political settlement, neither of which seemed practicable to him. According to Dean, London has not yet reacted to his proposals.

Dean considers Cairo may be key to Kuwait problem. Question is whether UK can get UAR agreement to satisfactory arrangement. British intend reduce forces in Kuwait substantially but still uncertain to what level. Dean of personal opinion retention of small symbolic force would be adequate but he uncertain of London’s view.

Your comments welcome.

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FYI. Apparent from conversation that UK concerned at political, military and financial problems created by move into Kuwait and anxious find way out, at same time retaining freedom of action to protect Kuwaiti independence in future. We have been quietly encouraging UN presence idea. USG continues full political support to UK on this issue, but desires avoid sharing responsibility as well as role of go-between with Arabs (except Saudi Arabia) on behalf of UK. End FYI.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 686D.87/7–1261. Secret. Drafted by Strong, cleared by Sisco and Rewinkel (BNA), and approved by Strong who initialed for Rusk. Also sent to Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, USUN, and Kuwait.
  2. The memorandum of conversation is ibid., 786D.00/7–1161.