64. Editorial Note

On June 7, 1961, Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, reviewed with Ambassador Kamel several items relating to U.S.-UAR relations. Kamel mentioned, among other points, that it would help improve relations if P.L. 480 assistance to his country were put on a multi-year basis. A member of Fulbright’s staff subsequently read the memorandum of this conversation over the telephone to someone in Rostow’s office at the White House. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, United Arab Republic, 1/61–6/61)

On June 8, Rostow mentioned the Fulbright-Kamel conversation during a telephone conversation with Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Ball and added, according to notes of the conversation: “the President is anxious to get closer to this fellow.” Rostow continued that the “White House thought there was a possibility in the long term PL 480 for initiating and maintaining closer working relations with the UAR.” Ball responded that he liked the idea; and Rostow said that he would contact George McGovern, Director of Food for Peace, about it. (Ibid., Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, United Arab Republic)

On June 9, Komer apparently sent to Rostow Bowles’ May 16 memorandum to Kennedy regarding a possible Nasser visit to the United States (Document 48) under cover of the following note:

“In the light of Nasser’s apparent growing differences with Moscow, his continued economic difficulties especially in Syria, and in view [Page 157] of the Ben Gurion visit, time might now be ripe for you or Mac to take up this question with the President. I think the case for a Nasser visit is strong even if nothing concrete came of it. As a very important wheel in the Arab and neutralist world, he too should get the Kennedy treatment.

“However, I see no reason in waiting until Spring 1962 if we are to start things rolling. We don’t want to jump quickly lest it be too obvious we are reacting to Moscow-Cairo differences; on the other hand, if he wants to explore a limited accommodation, a visit should come early in the process. Moreover, Nasser’s knowledge that we plan to invite him might make him less obstreperous at the September neutralist confab. Ergo, why not buck attached to President with positive endorsement now. In particular it may be worthwhile to urge course 3 (see Page 3).” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Staff Memoranda, Robert Komer)

The same day Bundy forwarded to President Kennedy the May 16 Bowles memorandum and the memorandum of the Fulbright-Kamel conversation under cover of a note that reads in part:

“As you know, things are moving a little better between Nasser and us. The attached suggestion from the Department of State makes sense so long as we are reasonably sure that we could mount a Nasser visit without disruptive action by the Zionists. My hunch is that this should be wholly possible; but you might want to see the judgment of others.” (Ibid., Country Series, United Arab Republic, 1/61–6/61)