62. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State0
1471. During two-hour audience with Shah this morning, most of time was taken up with substance Deptel 1304.1 In view of my early departure and to insure no misunderstanding, I took with me full contents of paragraphs a through e changing only word “expects” in para b to “assumes” as I felt former might create sufficient displeasure to prevent his paying attention to balance of message. Offered to read message to Shah but he preferred read it himself which he did several times with great care and seriousness. At conclusion he asked we transmit to Washington following views on which I made notes with his permission:
- (A)
- I (the Shah) agree except I believe pressure actually comes from Communists with Mosadeq partisans and allies being largely willing dupes. To give way in the slightest to any one of these groups would be the end of Iran and I would leave rather than do so.
- (B)
- I backed Amini as PriMin as I feel he is a strong and courageous man who has shown his complete patriotism in many ways; for example, oil negotiations and backing CENTO.
- (C)
- Again I agree but must point out that it would be most dangerous to let army get involved in politics or politics involved in army. With army loyal to me and under my direction, I was able to dissolve Majlis twice recently and to make necessary changes in the government. If army were subservient to Cabinet or Majlis, this would have been impossible. Army will remain under my personal control and Amini appreciates situation and has no desire to have it otherwise.
- (D)
- I cannot entirely agree that internal political conditions have direct relationship to size of expenditures of army. This is true if the expenditures are at expense of such public programs as health, education and welfare. It is not true if assistance for military increments comes from U.S. Everything, therefore, depends on U.S. aid and I cannot spend more for the military from our budget than I am now doing. If your current year’s help is less than $28 million, there will have to be a cut in the armed forces. Only way to effectively offset a cut is in modernization of equipment. Likewise, if there is a cut in U.S. aid, why is Iran the only ally getting so little attention militarily. All I need is modernization and a moderate sized army to stop the possibility of local wars. Egypt, for [Page 154] example, spends $400 million on its army in addition to military equipment. Iraq has received $500 million in equipment from the U.S. and spends annually $100 million on armed forces which on the basis of populations would mean $400 million for Iran. Because of the bilateral in CENTO, we can obviously afford to get along with less. While there is room for discussion on size of army, I must urge, if Iran is to help protect itself, we must receive modern military equipment.
- (E)
- I greatly appreciate interest shown and help being given by U.S. I must make it quite clear that if Iran is to remain free and if I am to remain in Iran, it will not be possible if the Tudeh party or fringe groups or connections come into control. We will continue for some time to need your backing against any such contingency.
Comment
Shah was calm and serious during our conversation and I felt had little to criticize in “home truths” presented to him with exception of paragraph D relating to army. In discussing this year’s military assistance I said I still couldn’t give him figure but I had no reason to think it would be as much as $28 million. I added, however, that I believed everything was being done to get this money to him promptly and that this in itself would be a major benefit even if the amount were smaller.
At no time during the conversation was there the slightest indication that Amini was other than his personal choice and a person in whom he had confidence and to whom he was prepared to give his full backing as long as the Amini government followed the line of close alliance with the West, no compromise with the Soviet Union, and was prepared to do the best job in promoting stability and economic progress in Iran.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.00/6–661. Secret. Received at 2:41 p.m.↩
- Document 61.↩