303. Memorandum From the Department of State Executive Secretary (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

SUBJECT

  • United States Policy on Iraq

Responsive to Mr. Komer’s memorandum of June 4 to Assistant Secretary Talbot,1 the enclosed memorandum explains our thinking with regard to Iraq for both the present and the future. Also enclosed are a memorandum from Mr. Talbot to the Under Secretary of State dated December 18, 1961,2 and a study of the Iraqi situation dated April 18, 1962, recently given us by the British.3

Ambassador Jernegan is due back in Washington at the end of July. His consultation will provide an opportunity for a further review of the situation in Iraq and of our policy.

We believe the course Iraq is now pursuing is deliberately designed to frighten the West by appearing to take Iraq progressively closer to the Soviet Bloc. This appearance is, of course, strengthened by the progressive weakening of Iraq’s ties with the Free World countries. We believe, [Page 741] however, that Iraqi leadership probably can go on playing this kind of brinkmanship without losing control to the Communists and that eventually anti-Qasim nationalist pressures will become strong enough to force a change which will most likely produce another strongly nationalistic government but one with a more balanced foreign policy. The British share our view.

In these circumstances we believe our course should be guided by a determination to avoid fright or panic. We should continue to adhere to our policy of maintaining, insofar as possible and under the handicaps imposed upon us, normal relations with the Iraq government. In this way we will be doing the most we can to slow, or hopefully to reverse, the present gradual trend toward closer ties with the Bloc.

Regarding the contingency of a new regime in Iraq, the most recent NEA paper, dated May 3, 1962, is enclosed.4 We believe we have in mind the necessary steps should the government change in Iraq.

A.E. Breisky5

Enclosure6

UNITED STATES POLICY ON IRAQ

Mr. Komer’s memorandum of June 4 breaks down into two principal points: 1) what can we do to stop the current trend toward the Soviet Bloc and 2) whether we are prepared to move quickly in event of a change of regime, and how.

A. The Iraqi Move toward the Bloc. What do we do?

We agree with Embassy Baghdad on the trend, on Qasim’s ebbing popularity, and on his ultimate overthrow, whether soon or ten years hence.

Iraqi policy of appearing to move steadily in the direction of the bloc is deliberately designed to frighten the West and the other Arabs into letting Iraq gain control of Kuwait. Qasim’s determination to [Page 742] proceed along this line is encouraged by his deep anti-Western antipathies and by the attractive credit arrangements by which he acquires assistance from the Bloc. Moreover, the appearance of Qasim’s trend toward closer ties with the Bloc is heightened, of course, by his worsened relations with the Western countries exemplified in the recent lowering of the level of diplomatic representation between the United States and Iraq. That Iraq can be swayed from its policy by anything less than control of Kuwait or an internal upheaval seems unlikely. However, in dealing with the Qasim regime and to maximize the prospects for keeping Qasim and any successor regime from moving more closely to the Bloc, we believe the West’s best present posture is to show a continuing interest in pursuing normal relations with Iraq but without appearing deeply perturbed at Iraq’s brinkmanship. To exhibit serious concern would merely confirm to Iraqi leadership that it is pursuing the course likely to lead to achievement of its principal objective, control of Kuwait. For the United States to maintain such a posture demands a high degree of sophistication and a confidence that nationalism in Iraq remains strong and capable of protecting Iraqi independence. We (and the British) continue to have that confidence.

Since June 25, 1961 when Qasim entered Iraq’s renewed claim to Kuwait, and from which date the reversal of a slow trend toward better relations with the West occurred, we have engaged in a continuing effort to make clear to the Iraqi Government our desire to have good relations and to be as helpful as possible. We have undertaken lengthy and, hopefully, successful efforts to work out a solution to the sticky problem of standards for Iraqi dates exported to the United States. We have regularly encouraged American businessmen to compete for business in Iraq despite Iraqi favoritism for the Bloc. After lengthy consideration within the United States Government, it has been decided to meet Iraq’s request to purchase 500 military trucks in the United States. We have avoided any open criticism of the Iraqi regime and have undertaken no clandestine activity against it. We have as best we could continued contacts with a range of Iraqi officials well disposed toward the West and have met Iraqi requests for training assistance of various types. Also we have been active in providing key officials with material which makes clear not only the nature of the Soviet regime but also includes statements tending to reflect on the Iraqi regime. We have consulted regularly with the United Kingdom. We have encouraged West German efforts in Iraq. We have pretty much kept out of the Iraq-IPC problem but it is an important factor in the equation. It seems unlikely that Qasim will go so far as to permit control of IPC operations to be transferred from the Western companies to the Soviets or the Red Chinese. IPC ability to shut down operations and thus deprive Iraq of essential revenue is an ultimate sanction which may give Qasim some pause and may [Page 743] explain in part why the British Ambassador is still in Baghdad. But resort to this sanction to topple Qasim could well start a chain of events where we could not predict the outcome would be an improvement over the present situation.

We attribute the improving Soviet position in Iraq less to Soviet skill and sophistication than to deliberate Iraqi policy, a path being taken despite considerable disenchantment with Soviet policy, with Soviet practices and with the quality of Soviet performance and materials. The answer has to come from within Iraq and the United States cannot hope successfully to manipulate the internal forces at work. We propose to maintain a dignified, friendly, rather regretful posture toward Iraq and give its leadership no satisfaction in the form of believing it has the United States Government flustered. The process of severing ties with the West is likely to be long drawn out, for Qasim seems to be considering the objective of controlling Kuwait as at least a medium-term rather than as a short-term one. At the same time that the Qasim regime moves closer to the Bloc, it displays no intention of allowing the Communists to become dominant inside Iraq.

At present we prefer not to seek United Arab Republic views for this would likely be utilized covertly by the UAR to strengthen any existing impression in the Arab world that the UAR is our chosen instrument for dealing with Arab affairs. In our opinion, the UAR in its own interest is likely to devote increasing efforts to the destruction of the Qasim regime and the establishment of a non-Communist successor, whether or not we consult or encourage the UAR. At a later stage there may be utility in consulting the UAR and we are bearing this in mind.

B. Contingencies—Change of Regime in Iraq

Two of the attachments, our latest contingency paper (still valid) and a recent British study, set forth our thinking and will not be duplicated here. Suffice it to say we have very much in mind the desirability of early recognition of a non-Communist successor regime (providing it appears able to hold power) and of making clear in general terms our desire to be helpful, leaving specifics to the new regime. We would urge other Free World states to take similar action, particularly Turkey and Iran. In event of a Communist takeover (unlikely), we would consult with the British and with Iraq’s neighbors on courses which would remove the regime before it could consolidate. Of the contingency courses of action proposed by Embassy Baghdad, we believe that if Iraq needs ready cash, it can be found promptly (but we would prefer to take no unusual steps now to prepare the way); however, we have our doubts about the need for or desirability of a major program with the police, would oppose use of the CENTO label in dealing with Iraq, and consider [Page 744] impractical the use of an inventory system for finding experts for future employment in Iraq.

C. Conclusion

We believe the course Iraq is now pursuing is deliberately designed to frighten the West by appearing to take Iraq progressively closer to the Soviet Bloc. Yet it is notable that Iraqi leadership very carefully maintains an internal balance of political forces designed to prevent any one element, including the Communists, from becoming dominant. From our observations of Iraqi policy and actions since Qasim came to power, it has become clear that Iraqi leadership has the will and the probable capability to play brinkmanship without losing control to the Communists. We also think the anti-Qasim nationalist forces will become more and more troubled as Qasim pursues his course which results in isolating Iraq progressively from brother Arabs and from the Free World. Eventually, in our opinion, unless the West makes serious mistakes, such internal pressures will be created in Iraq as to force a change. That change is estimated as most likely to produce another strongly nationalistic government, but with a more balanced foreign policy. The British, with whom we consult periodically, agree with our assessment.

We are unhappy with Iraq’s present course and are doing what we can within our limited capability to slow and hopefully reverse the present gradual trend toward closer ties with the Bloc. Of basic importance is the need to avoid fright or panic which would lead either 1) to placing of pressures on Iraq and thus force Iraq to move more rapidly in the direction we do not want it to go, or 2) to proving to Qasim the course he has chosen is the correct one.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.87/6–2062. Secret. Drafted by Grant, Strong, and Thacher on June 18.
  2. Document 287.
  3. Document 150.
  4. Reference is to British document S.C. (62) 8 (WP 30/1), “The Possibility of the Downfall of Qasim and the Consequences for the United Kingdom and the West.”
  5. Document 262.
  6. Breisky signed for Brubeck above Brubeck’s typed signature.
  7. Secret.