We believe the course Iraq is now pursuing is deliberately designed to
frighten the West by appearing to take Iraq progressively closer to the
Soviet Bloc. This appearance is, of course, strengthened by the progressive
weakening of Iraq’s ties with the Free World countries. We believe,
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however, that Iraqi leadership
probably can go on playing this kind of brinkmanship without losing control
to the Communists and that eventually anti-Qasim nationalist pressures will
become strong enough to force a change which will most likely produce
another strongly nationalistic government but one with a more balanced
foreign policy. The British share our view.
In these circumstances we believe our course should be guided by a
determination to avoid fright or panic. We should continue to adhere to our
policy of maintaining, insofar as possible and under the handicaps imposed
upon us, normal relations with the Iraq government. In this way we will be
doing the most we can to slow, or hopefully to reverse, the present gradual
trend toward closer ties with the Bloc.
Enclosure6
Washington,
June 18,
1962.
UNITED STATES POLICY ON IRAQ
Mr. Komer’s memorandum of June 4
breaks down into two principal points: 1) what can we do to stop the
current trend toward the Soviet Bloc and 2) whether we are prepared to
move quickly in event of a change of regime, and how.
A. The Iraqi Move toward the Bloc.
What do we do?
We agree with Embassy Baghdad on the trend, on Qasim’s ebbing popularity,
and on his ultimate overthrow, whether soon or ten years hence.
Iraqi policy of appearing to move steadily in the direction of the bloc
is deliberately designed to frighten the West and the other Arabs into
letting Iraq gain control of Kuwait. Qasim’s determination to
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proceed along this line is
encouraged by his deep anti-Western antipathies and by the attractive
credit arrangements by which he acquires assistance from the Bloc.
Moreover, the appearance of Qasim’s trend toward closer ties with the
Bloc is heightened, of course, by his worsened relations with the
Western countries exemplified in the recent lowering of the level of
diplomatic representation between the United States and Iraq. That Iraq
can be swayed from its policy by anything less than control of Kuwait or
an internal upheaval seems unlikely. However, in dealing with the Qasim
regime and to maximize the prospects for keeping Qasim and any successor
regime from moving more closely to the Bloc, we believe the West’s best
present posture is to show a continuing interest in pursuing normal
relations with Iraq but without appearing deeply perturbed at Iraq’s
brinkmanship. To exhibit serious concern would merely confirm to Iraqi
leadership that it is pursuing the course likely to lead to achievement
of its principal objective, control of Kuwait. For the United States to
maintain such a posture demands a high degree of sophistication and a
confidence that nationalism in Iraq remains strong and capable of
protecting Iraqi independence. We (and the British) continue to have
that confidence.
Since June 25, 1961 when Qasim entered Iraq’s renewed claim to Kuwait,
and from which date the reversal of a slow trend toward better relations
with the West occurred, we have engaged in a continuing effort to make
clear to the Iraqi Government our desire to have good relations and to
be as helpful as possible. We have undertaken lengthy and, hopefully,
successful efforts to work out a solution to the sticky problem of
standards for Iraqi dates exported to the United States. We have
regularly encouraged American businessmen to compete for business in
Iraq despite Iraqi favoritism for the Bloc. After lengthy consideration
within the United States Government, it has been decided to meet Iraq’s
request to purchase 500 military trucks in the United States. We have
avoided any open criticism of the Iraqi regime and have undertaken no
clandestine activity against it. We have as best we could continued
contacts with a range of Iraqi officials well disposed toward the West
and have met Iraqi requests for training assistance of various types.
Also we have been active in providing key officials with material which
makes clear not only the nature of the Soviet regime but also includes
statements tending to reflect on the Iraqi regime. We have consulted
regularly with the United Kingdom. We have encouraged West German
efforts in Iraq. We have pretty much kept out of the Iraq-IPC problem but it is an important factor
in the equation. It seems unlikely that Qasim will go so far as to
permit control of IPC operations to be
transferred from the Western companies to the Soviets or the Red
Chinese. IPC ability to shut down
operations and thus deprive Iraq of essential revenue is an ultimate
sanction which may give Qasim some pause and may
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explain in part why the British Ambassador is
still in Baghdad. But resort to this sanction to topple Qasim could well
start a chain of events where we could not predict the outcome would be
an improvement over the present situation.
We attribute the improving Soviet position in Iraq less to Soviet skill
and sophistication than to deliberate Iraqi policy, a path being taken
despite considerable disenchantment with Soviet policy, with Soviet
practices and with the quality of Soviet performance and materials. The
answer has to come from within Iraq and the United States cannot hope
successfully to manipulate the internal forces at work. We propose to
maintain a dignified, friendly, rather regretful posture toward Iraq and
give its leadership no satisfaction in the form of believing it has the
United States Government flustered. The process of severing ties with
the West is likely to be long drawn out, for Qasim seems to be
considering the objective of controlling Kuwait as at least a
medium-term rather than as a short-term one. At the same time that the
Qasim regime moves closer to the Bloc, it displays no intention of
allowing the Communists to become dominant inside Iraq.
At present we prefer not to seek United Arab Republic views for this
would likely be utilized covertly by the UAR to strengthen any existing impression in the Arab world
that the UAR is our chosen instrument
for dealing with Arab affairs. In our opinion, the UAR in its own interest is likely to devote
increasing efforts to the destruction of the Qasim regime and the
establishment of a non-Communist successor, whether or not we consult or
encourage the UAR. At a later stage
there may be utility in consulting the UAR and we are bearing this in mind.
B. Contingencies—Change of Regime in
Iraq
Two of the attachments, our latest contingency paper (still valid) and a
recent British study, set forth our thinking and will not be duplicated
here. Suffice it to say we have very much in mind the desirability of
early recognition of a non-Communist successor regime (providing it
appears able to hold power) and of making clear in general terms our
desire to be helpful, leaving specifics to the new regime. We would urge
other Free World states to take similar action, particularly Turkey and
Iran. In event of a Communist takeover (unlikely), we would consult with
the British and with Iraq’s neighbors on courses which would remove the
regime before it could consolidate. Of the contingency courses of action
proposed by Embassy Baghdad, we believe that if Iraq needs ready cash,
it can be found promptly (but we would prefer to take no unusual steps
now to prepare the way); however, we have our doubts about the need for
or desirability of a major program with the police, would oppose use of
the CENTO label in dealing with Iraq,
and consider
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impractical the
use of an inventory system for finding experts for future employment in
Iraq.
C. Conclusion
We believe the course Iraq is now pursuing is deliberately designed to
frighten the West by appearing to take Iraq progressively closer to the
Soviet Bloc. Yet it is notable that Iraqi leadership very carefully
maintains an internal balance of political forces designed to prevent
any one element, including the Communists, from becoming dominant. From
our observations of Iraqi policy and actions since Qasim came to power,
it has become clear that Iraqi leadership has the will and the probable
capability to play brinkmanship without losing control to the
Communists. We also think the anti-Qasim nationalist forces will become
more and more troubled as Qasim pursues his course which results in
isolating Iraq progressively from brother Arabs and from the Free World.
Eventually, in our opinion, unless the West makes serious mistakes, such
internal pressures will be created in Iraq as to force a change. That
change is estimated as most likely to produce another strongly
nationalistic government, but with a more balanced foreign policy. The
British, with whom we consult periodically, agree with our
assessment.
We are unhappy with Iraq’s present course and are doing what we can
within our limited capability to slow and hopefully reverse the present
gradual trend toward closer ties with the Bloc. Of basic importance is
the need to avoid fright or panic which would lead either 1) to placing
of pressures on Iraq and thus force Iraq to move more rapidly in the
direction we do not want it to go, or 2) to proving to Qasim the course
he has chosen is the correct one.
