279. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy0
The attached State memorandum on future policy toward the UAR1 is to keep you informed of State’s thinking on the next steps in this important foreign policy experiment. You will want to keep close tabs on its evolution, because of its high domestic sensitivity and the repercussions it is already creating elsewhere in the Middle East.
To sum up State’s view, it is “so far so good.” Nasser has responded favorably to the bait we have offered in the form of PL 480 and other aid; largely as a result, UAR behavior has been quite moderate over the past several months.
The Kaissouni visit was apparently viewed by Nasser as a test of our good intentions. We were quite forthcoming, though far short of the UAR bids. We promised $20 million in stabilization credits if the UAR met IMF terms (they have) plus up to another $10 million to match other contributions. We promised to consider favorably some $51 million in development loans, and committed ourselves to 400,000 tons more of Title I wheat. Though all this seems impressive, it is in fact just enough to keep Nasser afloat economically; so we haven’t gone too far yet.
On the other hand the Shah, Saud, Hussein, and the Israelis are all vocally unhappy at the shift in our policy. They are not persuaded by our argument that if we don’t help Nasser he’ll become even more mortgaged to Moscow. But the only serious problem is that of the Israeli-Arab balance, which we are seeking to preserve by compensatory moves.
State sees the next several months as a period of wait and see, before moving on to a possible consortium. Nasser has said he intends to write you his thanks for the recent help, which would permit a friendly letter in return. Then, if things go well we can consider an invitation.
Bearing in mind that we are engaged in a long term effort to overcome an ingrained UAR heritage of suspicion of the West, it seems to be [Page 687] going reasonably well. The important thing is not to let the inevitable minor irritants which will crop up deflect our strategy. On the other hand, State is reluctant to go very far as yet with the sort of political dialogue on issues of mutual concern for which improved US/UAR relations should gradually open the way. We will keep pressing State to this end.2
- Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, United Arab Republic, 3/62–5/62. Secret. Komer’s memorandum was passed to McGeorge Bundy under cover of a May 28 note that reads: “I think it important that we keep JFK up to date on progress of the Nasser gambit. Aside from the flak it is already generating, it is a most delicate operation in which the President’s prestige is inevitably caught up. On the other hand, I hope that over time it will prove (like our Yugo policy in the ‘50s) one of the major foreign policy plusses of his Administration. Attached is over-long but well written, and worth JFK’s weekend reading. Meanwhile, S/P and I are ginning up some ideas on how to get a more effective political dialogue going.” (Ibid., Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer)↩
- Document 276.↩
- The following handwritten addition, apparently by McGeorge Bundy, appears at this point on the source text: “but not to any action without Presidential Review.”↩