Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

235. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Syria⁰

Washington, April 4, 1962, 9:33 p.m.

435. Embtel 641.¹ Department approves your line with Ustuwani.

We have noted your concern at Syrian belief US favoring return Syria to UAR rule and have considered whether anything useful could be said publicly here. Have decided that, as usually case, potential dangers outweigh possible benefits. Since Syrian belief reported especially strong in Aleppo where pro-UAR sentiment widespread, we wonder whether UAR may have spread story. If Syrian concern persists, suggest you use next opportunity try smoke out origin SARG fears. As you and staff endeavor combat Syrian misapprehensions suggest care be exerted avoid creating impression you are in fact employing anti-UAR line.

In our view, direction Syria goes in next year or two will be determined principally by forces local to Near East. Our means for exerting decisive influence are inadequate and we believe best to avoid actions putting us in middle without achieving useful results.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/4–362. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Dickman and Strong and approved by Talbot. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Baghdad, Cairo, Jidda, Beirut, London, Paris, Rome, and Aleppo.
1. Knight reported in telegram 641 from Damascus, April 3, that Ustuwani, using the title Secretary General rather than Foreign Minister, had called him in to warn that “any military intervention whatsoever in Syria would constitute interference in Syria internal affairs and would be regarded by Syrian authorities as aggression.” Knight gathered that this warning sprung from a widely held belief among Syria’s leaders that the United States favored a return of Syria to Egyptian rule. Knight affirmed that U.S. policy was strictly one of non-interference in Syria’s internal affairs and of non-interference in Egyptian affairs either for or against Nasser. Moreover, Syrian authorities could be certain that the United States did not in any way support or would support any action by Nasser to regain control of Syria. (Ibid.)