232. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State0
463. Pass Defense. Reference: Embtel 462.1 Prime Minister called me to his office 0900 April 2. Said situation in Syria had become far more serious than at time my conversation with King Hussein yesterday afternoon (reference telegram), and that he now convinced that issue was whether or not Nasser power to be restored there.
I asked what new information he had which would support this conclusion. Prime Minister said that trouble in Syria had now spread as far south as Dera where he just received information UAR flag now flying. He cited other alleged reports. These did not seem convincing to me and when I pointed out he said real basis for his conclusion was “Arab intuition”. He then repeated thesis that King Hussein had previously argued with me many times, i.e. that if Nasserism regains control of Syria, moderate progressive capitalistic governments such as in Jordan, doomed in this part of Arab world. He said that in view of this Jordan would prefer face showdown in Syria rather than face issue later on when defeat inevitable.
When I questioned thesis that Jordan demise inevitable if Nasser regained control of Syria, Prime Minister held to his position but added that even if this not the case Nasser’s reappearance in Syria would mean re-establishment of iron-fist totalitarian control not only in Syria area but in Jordanian area as well. Re latter said if UAR regained control of Syria, Jordan would have to take extreme internal security measures which in effect would mean establishment of rigid conservative military dictatorship here which would be completely incompatible with progressive objectives he and his government now pursuing in Jordan.
Prime Minister next said that while Nasser threat in Syria very great, he believed that anti-UAR forces could still prevail provided prompt action taken and he made it clear that if necessary Jordanians prepared send troops to Syria to bolster anti-UAR forces.
I repeated all arguments cited reference telegram. I then made added strong argument against Jordan taking precipitous action based [Page 572] on Arab “intuition” and noted that in fact GOJ had no more information this morning than it had yesterday and actual situation in Syria remained very unclear. Said that any Jordanian troop movement even within its own borders could greatly strengthen propaganda hand of Nasser and undercut GOJ objectives in Syria.
Prime Minister said that if Jordan Arab Army (JAA) troops moved they would not stop at border but would keep going until they reached Damascus. At same time, GOJ would make clear that purpose of troop movement to Syria would be to restore recently deposed civilian government and would withdraw immediately following a plebiscite which would give Syrians opportunity free choice type of government and alignment they desired. If Syrian people freely chose associate with Nasser,GOJ would regret this but would not oppose it. On other hand, GOJ could not tolerate Syrians being brought back forcefully and against the majority will into UAR.
I pointed out discrepancy between numbers of Jordanian and Syrian troops and suggested Jordan troops would be swallowed up before they could carry out this objective. Prime Minister disagreed saying that if JAA moved quickly and decisively they would be supported by elements Syrian army dedicated to same objectives.
I noted that if Jordan troops entered Syria, Iraqi troops might also come in. Prime Minister said that would not create problem as JAA would not fight Iraqis and both could withdraw after plebiscite and restoration of civilian government. I said I thought this great over simplification of problem and that if Jordan troops went across border they would be stepping into morass from which it would be most difficult extricate themselves.
After further discussion, Prime Minister stressed that he had not yet reached firm conclusion that it would be necessary send Jordanian troops to Syria and that he not yet prepared to make such a recommendation until situation further clarified. Said, however, that if GOJ decided to move would move very quickly and Jordanian troops might be in Damascus by tomorrow morning. I said I thought this not only unwise but impossible.
Prime Minister then made two specific requests. First, he asked that USG make immediate démarche to Nasser urging that he stay out of Syrian situation. Second, he requested that USG, through its Embassy in Damascus, seek put backbone in military junta by assuring it of USG support against “minority” forces seeking restore Nasser control over Syria. At same time, suggested USG apply pressure on junta to make its peace with previous civilian government so they could work together against pro-UAR elements. (After leaving Prime Minister’s office, and while dictating this telegram, Prime Minister telephoned me adding [Page 573] further request that US Embassy in Damascus pass word to Zahr ad-Din that JAA stood ready to be of assistance if he should so request.)
Conversation concluded with my reiterating strong advice that GOJ remain calm and not take foolish or precipitous action. I emphasized again that neither GOJ, nor anyone else at moment, had any firm information re higher nature, or degree of seriousness, current Syrian situation. Prime Minister replied he still not ready recommend any major action unless further developments within Syria made this absolutely essential and said he would keep in touch with me.
Comment: While I believe GOJ is more concerned re Syrian situation this morning than yesterday, I conclude that much of Prime Minister’s talk was designed to emphasize to USG gravity GOJ attaches to situation. Absence of JAA troop movement and low-key nature of military alert remains as reported reftel. I am, nevertheless, concerned that combination of Jordan fear of UAR and prevalence of unsubstantiated but alarming rumors, could lead to precipitous action on part of JAA particularly if GOJ authorities conclude that moment had been reached when they must act or UAR triumph in Syria will be assured.
Embassy is keeping in close touch with situation and will continue to counsel restraint. I will be seeing King later in day.
With regard Prime Minister’s first two requests, I defer to Department and my colleagues in Damascus and Cairo as to whether representations along these lines would serve any useful purpose. With regard to his third (telephone) request, assume Department will not wish USG channels be used for this type communication. However, believe GOJ will seek use other channels including its own to get this message through to Zahr ad-Din.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 783.00/4–262. Confidential; Niact. Received at 2:45 p.m. and relayed to CIA, OSD, Army, Navy, and Air Force. Repeated to Damascus, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Cairo, London, Beirut, Baghdad, and Ankara.↩
- In telegram 462 from Amman, April 1, Macomber reported that King Hussein had summoned him to express his concern over reports of serious disturbances in the cities of Aleppo, Homs, and Hama in Syria, reportedly connected with efforts to restore Nasser’s authority over Syria. Hussein also pointed to reports of Israeli and UAR troop movements. (Ibid., 783.00/4–162)↩