23. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic0

1734. Your final private meeting with Nasser, which we assume will take place shortly, would afford opportunity useful review trends in US–UAR relations since your arrival year ago.1 We would hope such presentation might give Nasser increasing understanding USG desire continue to be cooperative provided this can be done on mutually acceptable basis. Accordingly, you may wish make following points in addition customary farewell courtesies:

In past year, despite periodic specific difficulties, our disposition assist UAR meet its economic and development plans has been maintained. In this connection, it may be worth noting that this assistance has been equivalent more than $140 million in loans and surplus agricultural sales since March 1960.
Past year has likewise witnessed extension significant US commodity aid and technical cooperation Syrian Region. We hope continuing difficulties in arranging entry USOM technicians may be overcome in order prevent further delays in implementing agreed-upon programs.
Despite foregoing record, we have noted recent increase anti-American output UAR media and regrettable failure UAR authorities assure adequate protection Embassy during February 15 demonstrations. Damage these caused has even now not been made good by UAR. Even Nasser himself, in recent Syrian speeches, chose to single out West by reviewing past criticism while avoiding criticism Communists even though Communist papers and exiled politicians currently attacking Syrian adherence UAR with increasing frequency.
We believe Nasser might wish consider unfortunate image UAR which thus created in American and other public opinion. This serves not only undermine progress made in restoring US–UAR relations, including favorable impact Nasser’s own visit New York last fall, but makes it more difficult for us maintain similar momentum in future.
Re Congo, February 21 Security Council resolution co-sponsored by UAR for which USG voted2 revealed broad support existing for strengthened UN operation. Intervening weeks have witnessed welcome and essential accretions strength to UN force and stage is now set for firm action implementing resolution. For our part, we have provided air and surface transportation UN reinforcements and are continuing our efforts with Congolese and Belgians to bring about full implementation recent resolution. In this situation, we feel all UN members have special responsibility refrain from premature criticism or counter-productive public discussion which would only serve undermine current UN endeavors to prevent civil war and to restore tranquility. Only when these over-riding objectives achieved will atmosphere be created in which Congolese themselves can work out solutions their complex internal problems without outside interference. (FYI. Specific guidance re Tananarive resolutions (Embtel 1539)3 being sent separately. End FYI.)
Complex Algerian problem also appears gradually moving toward settlement. We gratified this encouraging trend and have welcomed recent indications UAR also appears hopeful mutually satisfactory settlement may be reached.
Should Nasser inquire re UNRWA item at resumed UNGA, you should take line USG continues be concerned by tragic plight refugees but believes repetitive UN discussions this issue unlikely advance solution. While we do not believe an UNRWA resolution required this session, we would not oppose resolution that did not go beyond 1959 UNGA text4 if Arabs believe they need a resolution. However, we are unable support new elements such as Arab draft recently introduced, because we believe any new elements more appropriately discussed next fall when pursuant to 1950 resolution whole subject of future of Arab refugees comes up for review. We trust Arab delegations will recognize force this position in discussions now proceeding New York. This general connection, you may wish point out Cairo radio and press allegations re new “Johnson Plan” solve Palestine question are without foundation (Deptel 1723).5

In event you believe it helpful, you may say you look forward opportunity report to President on your return and would be glad transmit any personal observations Nasser may have on foregoing or other subjects mutual interest.

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You also authorized assure Nasser your somewhat early transfer wholly unrelated US–UAR relations but rather prompted by over-riding considerations affecting post to which you going. You may add you understand your successor will be appointed promptly and you feel sure he will continue your own efforts maintain and develop cordial personal and official relations with Nasser and his government.6

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/3–1861. Secret. Drafted by Brewer (NEA/NE) on March 17; cleared by Ferguson (AFW) in draft, Buffum (IO/UNP) in draft, Valdes (EUR/WE) in draft, Chase (AF/N) in draft, Perkins (S/S), and Brown (O) in substance; and approved by Jones (NEA) who initialed for Rusk. Repeated to Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, and USUN.
  2. Ambassador G. Frederick Reinhardt presented his credentials to the Government of the United Arab Republic on March 22, 1960. He left Cairo on May 6, 1961, following the announcement of his appointment as Ambassador to Italy on April 6.
  3. U.N. doc. S/4722. For documentation on the Congo crisis, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XX.
  4. Dated March 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/3–1461)
  5. Reference is to Resolution 1456 (XIV), December 9, 1959. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 1044–1045.
  6. Dated March 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 884.411/3–1461)
  7. On May 6, Reinhardt reported on his farewell calls on senior UAR officials in telegram 1811. Nasser had stressed UAR economic development and appeared surprised over U.S. complaints about Egyptian press coverage. Reinhardt offered these comments: “I regret to report that despite growing U.S. economic assistance and cultural exchange which has characterized my fourteen months in Cairo, lack of mutual confidence between U.S. and UAR has, if anything, become more apparent… . This fact derives to a large extent from Nasser’s determination to maintain and enhance if possible his status as a neutralist leader and to attack the U.S. as necessary to this end. Current Nasser-Tito-Sukarno initiatives for a new conference of non-aligned states (including Latin America) indicate that this policy can be expected to prevail for foreseeable future with all that this implies for U.S.-UAR relations.” (Ibid., 611.86B/5–661)