Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

217. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations⁰

Washington, March 20, 1962, 8:52 p.m.

2412. Tiberias Incidents. For USUN: We understand Syrians have requested an early meeting of SC, and that Israelis are preparing counter-complaint. Re timing, if cease fire were being scrupulously observed we believe there would be advantage to await UNTSO report and Chief-of-Staff recommendations before SC convened. (Tentatively Syrians thinking in terms of SC meeting sometime next week.) If violations of cease fire recur, however, earlier meeting of SC may be required to assist in averting serious escalation hostilities.

With renewal of exchange fire on Lake Tiberias reported this morning, Dept fears recurrence last week’s retaliatory raid by Israelis. Our assessment Syrian feelings leads us to believe Israeli raid has been wholly unsuccessful in intimidating Syrians and that a steady escalation of incidents is distinct possibility. Therefore, we wish be sure no step is overlooked which might help pacify situation. For example, Dept has called in Israeli Ambassador and Syrian Chargé today to urge restraint and cooperation with UNTSO. Mission requested do same with respective Dels. FYI. It is premature to determine whether res in SC would be desirable. If efforts SYG and UNTSO mechanism, supplemented by appropriate bilateral representations, prove successful in maintaining cease fire, it might be possible and desirable to limit SC consideration to statements by parties concerned and SC members with view developing as broad a “consensus or summation” as possible in favor of maintaining peace and quiet, support for armistice agreement, and cooperation of parties with UNTSO.

However, this procedure will probably prove insufficient. If res found necessary, as is likely, we favor res along lines of S/3538 of Jan 19, 1956,¹ concerning Dec 11, 1955 Israeli raid against Syria. Basic principles which we would stress are obligations of parties to utilize UNTSO machinery to fullest extent and to comply with obligations under general armistice agreement. Another consideration is our opposition to reprisal raids, regardless of provocation. We wish reserve our position re onus for incident pending receipt UNTSO report. For instance, since in this case Syrian provocation apparently more serious than in 1955/56 case, attempt might be made for res more balanced vis-à-vis Syria and Israel than was 1956 res. End FYI.

For Jerusalem: We recognize von Horn may be preoccupied with family matters and that UNTSO staff has hands full in endeavoring quiet down volatile situation. However, we feel lack of complete, unbiased info re situation on ground and trust UNTSO will keep you fully informed all important developments.

Ball

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 683.84A/3–2062. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Sisco, Palmer, Buffum (NEA/NE), and Thacher; cleared by Ludlow (NEA), Talbot, and Wallner (IO); and approved by Cleveland. Also sent to Jerusalem and repeated to Damascus, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.
1. U.N. doc. S/3538, unanimously adopted by the U.N. Security Council on January 19, 1956; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956, pp. 579–580.