215. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran0

624. We recognize importance of prompt action to cope with Shah’s current depressed mood, while still not unduly distorting size or [Page 533] distribution of major economic and military aid packages we think best suited meet Iran’s needs.

Therefore, President has approved following course of action:

(1)
You inform Shah promptly that US aware of his concerns and proposes move visit up to mid-April or mid-June so full discussion possible (Presidential message for delivery to Shah at this time will follow).1
(2)
You should plan to return Washington, arriving for consultation at least one week prior to date Shah’s arrival. You may so inform Shah.
(3)
You should reassure Shah as to great US interest in Iran, that intensive study both military and economic aid underway (delayed by lack completion Third Plan), and that President expects discuss whole picture with Shah, though of course inappropriate reach firm decisions during visit.
(4)
During Shah’s visit we will give him full treatment on continued US strategic superiority, growing US conventional strength, unlikeliHood direct as opposed to indirect local aggression (with reminder Khrushchev’s remarks to President at Vienna), all designed to reassure Shah as to military threat. These reassurances will be combined with full exposition our view as to Iran’s most pressing requirements, and tentative indications shape and magnitude total aid we contemplate, given satisfactory Iranian performance and in view other global requirements.
(5)
Following visit, which we hope will set stage effectively, we will give you detailed military and later economic aid proposals for discussion.

Above approach seems best calculated achieve immediate reassurance needed, permit President himself explain our strength and policies, and provide best setting for subsequent aid negotiations.2

Ball
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.11/3–1662. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Bowling; cleared by King (U/PR) in draft, Meloy (G), Manfull (S/S), Gaud (AID) in substance, William Bundy (DOD/ISA) in substance, and McGeorge Bundy (White House); and approved by Talbot.
  2. In telegram 625, the Department of State transmitted to the Embassy in Tehran for delivery a message from President Kennedy to the Shah of Iran that invited the Shah to visit the United States as early as April 10–17 or June 11–18. The message then conveyed the following assurance: “In the meantime I wish to reassure you categorically that there has been no diminution in US interest in the security and well-being of a friendly Iran. Indeed, we have been actively developing a new military aid program and, equally important, analyzing the indispensable support we expect to give to Iran’s new Third Development Plan. Both are essential, in our view, to Iran’s security and I shall look forward to discussing their inter-relationship with you.” (Ibid.)
  3. In telegram 723 from Tehran, March 19, Holmes reported that the President’s message had been passed to the Shah, who on March 18 had responded in a message to President Kennedy expressing appreciation for the invitation, accepting the invitation for April 10, and adding: “The assurances which you have so thoughtfully conveyed to me concerning the military and economic aid to Iran are indeed comforting and most welcome in view of the difficult phase through which we are passing at a critical juncture in world conditions.” (Ibid., 788.211/3–1962)