Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

212. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee)⁰

Washington, March 11, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Contingency Planning in the Event of Further Unrest in Syria

Current unrest in Syria appears to stem from three principal sources, viz: (1) The High Command of the Army which, while divided within itself but dominated by anti-UAR elements, is dissatisfied by the performance of the recent civilian government; (2) Civilian politicians, some of whom have a pro-UAR propensity, who are dissatisfied with Army intervention in civilian affairs; (3) Some young Army officers and non-coms, students and some labor elements who are generally pro-UAR.

In this connection it is pertinent to discuss the following contingencies:

A. Communist Intervention: Because the Army was largely purged of Communist officers during the period of the union with the UAR and because Syrian Communists have been kept under strict control since the Syrian secession, we believe the Communists, though capable of contributing to some degree to existing unrest, are presently not in a position to affect the basic situation materially. We believe the danger of Communist takeover is out of the question for some time to come and we should establish our policies on the basis that Syrian unrest is due essentially to internal and inter-Arab quarrels. Only if Israel or the West place heavy pressure on Syria is an early resurgence of Communism likely.

B. UAR Intervention: The principal contingency (but unlikely) to be considered is the growth of a pro-Nasser movement from within, aided and abetted by the UAR financially, by propaganda and through the operations of undercover agents to bring about a government more amenable to Cairo’s influence or possibly restoration of some form of unity between Syria and Egypt. Whereas this would not be an unmixed blessing (nor an unmixed advantage), such an eventuality would not impinge sufficiently on U.S. interests to justify the disadvantages of U.S. intervention.

From observation of UAR behavior during the Syrian revolt in September and the recent crisis, we believe external intervention by the UAR is unlikely. There would appear to be a possibility of UAR armed intervention only if an internal pro-UAR movement had grown to proportions where success or failure might depend on UAR military support and where such support could be given at negligible risk to the UAR, e.g. under conditions where large areas of the country, including the principal port at Latakia and the principal airports, were in pro-UAR hands, a separatist pro-UAR regime was established calling for UAR intervention. If there should appear to be a clear likeliHood of overt UAR military intervention, we believe action should be taken through diplomatic channels (only as a last resort in the United Nations, preferably by an Arab country) to discourage such intervention. However, we believe a direct confrontation of UAR and US military forces should not be contemplated on view of (a) the benefits to the Soviets of such a policy; (b) the absence of sufficient US stake in Syria to justify such a drastic measure; and (c) the general desirability of avoiding direct US intervention in inter-Arab affairs in the absence of a significant element of Communist troublemaking.

C. Iraqi Intervention: Due to the internal problems which confront the Iraqi Government and Iraq’s limited military capability beyond its frontiers, the possibility of Iraqi armed intervention, even in the event of a threatened UAR takeover, is remote to say the least, and need not concern us.

D. Jordanian Intervention: During the recent unrest Jordan threatened to intervene militarily if the UAR moved forces into Syria. We (and the UK) undertook strongly to discourage such intervention on the basis that it might provoke further instability in the area and would be disastrous for Jordan, as well as fastening on the US and the UK, by extension, responsibility for Jordan’s action. This should continue to be our policy.

E. Turkish or Israeli Intervention: Any intervention by Turkey or Israel should be discouraged on grounds that as non-Arab powers such intervention would be considered aggression, would be productive only of harm, would reflect adversely on us, and would strengthen the Soviet position. In their present internal preoccupations the Turks would be unlikely to consider armed intervention in Syria except in the case of possible Communist takeover of Syria. While continued separation of Syria from the UAR would appear to be in Israel’s interest, we tend to doubt that Israel would use force to try to prevent Syrian union or federation with another Arab country.

Summary

We believe we should adhere to the principle of non-intervention and we should encourage others to adopt a similar policy. Our conviction of the correctness of this policy is strengthened by the observation that, if left to themselves, the Syrians and other Arab peoples are generally able to find a modus vivendi which avoids direct hostilities between Arab and Arab. In the absence of serious Israeli or Western pressure the Syrians (and Arabs generally) are capable of successful resistance to Communist attempts to exploit situations of unrest.

0. Source: Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 66 D 308, B–3. Secret. Drafted by Barrow and Strong on March 10.