Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

207. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State⁰

Tehran, March 7, 1962.

693. Reference: Embassy telegram 682.¹ I had audience of one and a half hours with Shah this morning. Following exchange of amenities I opened the discussion, as I had sought the meeting, by inquiring the significance of the message conveyed to me by the FonMin on March 5. I said that I was somewhat surprised and at a loss to understand how the Shah could relinquish the position of Commander-in-Chief as to do so would be entirely unconstitutional.

He replied that this was indeed the case and that the implication was that if the situation did not improve in such a manner to permit him to carry out a program of stability, security and reform, that he would be unable to continue.

He said substantially the things he had said to Yatsevitch as stated in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] citation which I need not repeat here in detail.² He said that he had worked hard for twenty years and could not see success ahead, that he felt that he was about to lose both faith and face. He felt that the U.S. either didn’t understand the importance of Iran to the free world and the situation here or didn’t care. He reviewed the consequences to the free world of the loss of Iran to the Soviets.

I reminded the Shah that on several occasions he had asked me to be utterly frank with him and then I gave him plain talk, first, with regard to his responsibilities not only to himself but to his country and followed this by a statement that his declaration to me smacked of threat which would not be well received in Washington and was not designed to accomplish the results he sought. I told him that it was obviously incorrect to suggest that the U.S. did not understand the importance of Iran and did not care about it, citing the fact that conclusive evidence of such comprehension and concern had been shown in the past. I then gave him, not for the first time, an explanation of the administration’s policy to emphasize economic aid over military in the conviction that economic and social improvement was the surest way to achieve long-term strength in a nation such as Iran. I did not fail to point out that even though our resources are great they are still limited and that the demands upon them are so extensive that they had to be distributed in such a manner as to produce the greatest benefit for all the free world. I added that there was a body of opinion in the U.S. which felt that because of the drain on our gold reserves foreign aid should be drastically reduced or stopped but that the administration, after careful study and calculation, had concluded that it is possible to continue to assist other nations of the free world on a large scale in spite of the drain on gold and risk to the international value of the dollar.

The Shah professed to understand all of this and then launched into his favorite comparison of the treatment accorded Turkey and Iran. He again pointed out that, in his view, Iran was the best basically equipped in this part of the world to establish as strong bastion both from a military and political point of view. I agreed with this but pointed out again that the ultimate strength of the nation lay in its economic and social improvement. The Shah responded to this by saying that assistance on a major scale for Iran would only be required for a limited time because, with its capacity for growth, the country would be able to maintain itself within a few years. He reverted to a comparison with Turkey and I pointed out to him that he was in error if he believed that the U.S. classified its allies as good, indifferent and bad and parceled out economic and military aid on this basis. I told him that all of our aid is supplemental of indigenous resources and that it is allocated as judiciously as possible in order to maintain the strength of our allies and to encourage progress. Said that on this basis Turkey obviously required more help than Iran particularly with respect to foreign exchange because of Iran’s assured income of 300 million dollars a year from oil revenues. I went on to say that Turkish forces had been brought up to a high level because of Turkey’s obligations under the NATO Treaty, that our military assistance to Turkey was being reduced in order to give greater emphasis to economic aid. Although the Shah understood all of this he gave no indication of agreeing with its logic.

At this point I told the Shah that the matter of economic and military assistance to Iran was under active consideration in Washington and that I was hopeful that within a short time I should be able to present him with a comprehensive and balanced program. I added that it was my personal hope that we should be able to consider a long-term program rather than the year to year basis on which we have been proceeding in the past. The Shah said that of course he would be anxious to receive a communication on this subject but that he needed to know where he stood with regard to the military within the next two weeks because it was necessary to establish the 1341 budget and a decision on this had to be made. I refrained from giving him any estimate of when a program might be ready for a presentation to him.

The Shah then expressed regret that he would not have an opportunity to discuss these matters personally with the President before September and speculated as to whether or not a private visit to Washington could be arranged possibly with some desire of going to Canada. He felt that to seek such an opportunity to talk with the President would not be humiliating to him. This was said in a rather ruminating manner, without specifically suggesting that such visit be undertaken. I rode him off of this and think that he understands that it would not be possible for such a visit to occur.

The audience ended with the Shah stating that he had come to his present state of mind after great thought and examination of his conscience. That he wanted it understood that no threat of blackmail was intended but that it was his deep conviction that in order for the country to be secure and progress, the only real stability lay in him and armed forces; that in order for Iran to succeed he required a loyal army with good morale. Had cast his lot with the West out of conviction and against the desire of many elements in the country, he was correct in doing so and could not and would not change although the Russians would no doubt respond to a gesture from him. He would not do so in any circumstances; he looked to the West for support not as a reward for a position he had taken but in deep belief that it was necessary for him to do so in the interest of the nation. I reminded him that to abandon the country might produce the same disastrous results as if he were to turn to the Russians.

The substance of what the Shah told me this morning was substantially what he said to Yatsevitch in the unpremeditated and casual meeting on the ski slopes of Abe Ali, nor was it far from what he said to the British Ambassador in the same circumstances. There was, however, less apparent emotionalism and a more grim attitude than either Harrison or Yatsevitch reported.

I think that he has done little else but to mull these problems over and that there is no doubt that he has convinced himself that the position he has taken is the correct one for him. I believe that he had not wanted to send for me to tell me these things in the first instance that hence used the device of talking to Yatsevitch and Harrison when he had the opportunity at Abe Ali and by sending the message he did send through the FonMin. He no doubt expected that I would respond to this by asking to see him.

I do not believe that the Shah coldly set out with a calculated plan to make our flesh creep in order to get what he wants from us but rather that he has worked himself into a state of mind where his thoughts go round and round on the same track, digging in deeper and deeper and making firmer his convictions. I think that the principal explanation why he has done so is that he isn’t in fact big enough for the job in hand. However, there is no individual or element in Iran qualified to do the job and there probably will not be for a number of years to come. We are faced here with a situation where we are obliged to lean on a weak reed but I see no other one on which we may rely to accomplish our objectives.

I have made several recommendations in my personal letter to Talbot of March 4th and my airgram 241 of March 5th. I hope that a combination of these proposals may be worked out without delay in order that we may preclude some precipitous and irresponsible act by the Shah. Although in his present mood he is capable of committing one, I do not believe that he will do anything rash until he hears from us again.³

Holmes

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.11/3–762. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 9:30 p.m. The source text does not indicate a time of transmission.
1. In telegram 682 from Tehran, March 5, Holmes reported that Iranian Foreign Minister Qods-Nakhai, then serving as Acting Prime Minister, had conveyed a message from the Shah that the current situation with regard to the Iranian armed forces could not continue. The Shah felt that the United States did not understand Iran’s vulnerability and need for adequately equipped armed forces; if something were not done, the Shah could not continue as supreme commander of the armed forces. Holmes also indicated that British Ambassador Harrison had reported on a casual meeting with the Shah on the ski slopes, during which the Shah had talked for over one-half hour in a similar vein. Harrison had expressed genuine concern over the Shah’s state of mind. (Ibid., 788.11/3–562)
2. The report, [document number not declassified] Iran, is attached to a March 4 letter from Holmes to Talbot, which is in turn attached to Document 209.
3. According to a record of the meeting, on March 8 at 9:15 a.m., the Secretary’s small staff meeting: “Discussed at some length Ambassador Holmes’ report of his conversation with the Shah and its implication for U.S. policy. Mr. Johnson was instructed to follow up on this matter, especially two aspects: 1) to attempt to get a firm State-Defense-AID position on the AID package which Ambassador Holmes might present to the Shah; and 2) to develop a recommendation concerning the desirability of advancing the date of the Shah’s visit to the U.S.” (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 147, Secretary’s Small Staff Meetings)