203. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State0
521. Re circular telegram 1474.1 I called on Prime Minister Dawalibi at my request at 11 am February 27 and read to him paraphrase in French my instructions contained in reference telegram. Prime Minister took copious notes.
[Page 502]Dawalibi, who seemed tired and somewhat discouraged, expressed disappointment at US reaction which he found somewhat one-sided and legalistic in spirit. In his view the question is not whether or not Israel draws from DZ or Tiberias, now or a little later, more or less water than contemplated in Johnston Plan which, however valid it may be technically, was turned down by all Arab governments. This, said Prime Minister, is greatest mistake of USG, which seeks through technical means to solve a problem which is essentially political. Syria and other Arabs are still at war with Israel. SARG does not recognize Israel as a state and still less as a legal claimant on Jordan waters. Considering itself at war with Israel,SARG seeks to interdict development of Negev which in turn would permit new waves of immigrants “which would constitute military reinforcements.”
Dawalibi stressed that his prime objective was through all means at his disposal to induce USG to take new substantive look at entire Israel problem. If situation allowed to coast along or is handled by officialdom on routine and “bureaucratic” basis it will inevitably sooner or later lead to a regional catastrophe.
I asked Prime Minister if he could develop what he had in mind when seeking over-all substantive new look by USG. I said that apart from pros and cons re creation of Israel—in which large UN majority, including Soviets, had participated—that country was a fact today. Any new look on basis of oft expressed Arab objective of Israel delenda est obviously out of question. To this Dawalibi clearly answered that, while he knew that many members of UN who had voted for creation Israel would not vote against, his purpose was not to go back over past but rather see what could be done to insure the peace, taking today’s situation as point of departure. At one point I sought unsuccessfully clarification of what I am quite sure Dawalibi intended as reference to guarantees against further Jewish immigration and other “solid” guarantees. As Dawalibi dodged the issue and as I was merely seeking ascertain direction of his thinking, I let matter drop.
At close of talk, which had lasted one hour, Dawalibi said with first show of emotion in several meetings I have had with him how much he wanted to penetrate barriers of officialdom and bureaucracy so as to make USG feel depth of his conviction that new and unprejudiced look at entire Israel problem must be taken by US “as real world leader” if eventual catastrophe not to befall this key area.
I said I would do my best convey depth his conviction but that in same spirit I wanted make sure of non-existence of any misunderstanding, which in such cases would do utmost harm. Thus I did not want very real appreciation of USG and myself for SARG’s concern re matter at hand to obscure basic US position on aggression; we are not allies of Israel against Arabs; we stand however for peaceful settlements of disputes [Page 503] and against resort to arms; therefore while not easy to say so, Prime Minister should expect to find us in opposition in case of Arab military move.
Prime Minister expressed appreciation for spirit in which I had spoken.
He added he would keep my comments for himself as coming from a friend because he feared that some of his colleagues, unfamiliar with manner in which they had been expressed, might interpret them as a threat. This exchange took place in relaxed and friendly atmosphere.
Comment: As I was waiting for Dawalibi with his Executive Secretary Juwayjati, latter, who is most friendly, made two interesting comments: 1) in answer to question he said on basis all information at his disposal USSR was playing no role either positive or negative in Jordan waters crisis; 2) spontaneously he told me “off the record” that Prime Minister had exclaimed to him in private “Why did Jordan have to stir up crisis at this time”.
For what it may be worth I believe Dawalibi neither plans nor wishes military action now. However, I believe he is deeply sincere in his expressed conviction that war will result if Arab-Israel situation continues on present collision course. Therefore his earnest entreaty for a new look. I am of course well aware of many contradictory and vastly complicated facts of this problem which face Department. I would however not be doing my job if I did not convey to Department my view that Prime Minister is considering problem from angle of over-all and long-range Israel threat and power relationship and that such considerations as to whether Israel withdraws Jordan water through DZ or from Lake Tiberias not germane to his thinking.
Also, while Juwayjati’s comment may well have been entirely factual report of Prime Minister’s feelings re unwelcome muddying of Jordan waters by Amman at this time, I believe it would be hazardous to place undue significance on this remark. Instead I am unfortunately convinced that Dawalibi moved by substantive and long-range elements of problem quite apart from tactical and timing considerations implicit in above quoted comment.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–2862. Confidential; Priority. Received at 4:27 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Tel Aviv, Aleppo, Ankara, Jerusalem, London, Moscow, Paris, and Rome.↩
- Document 198.↩