Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

186. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (Dutton) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, February 2, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Farbstein Resolution on Arab-Israel Negotiations

Discussion:

In the past several weeks we have tried unsuccessfully to persuade Congressman Farbstein of our wisdom in voting, during the recent General Assembly debate, against the Israel-encouraged resolution calling for direct Israel-Arab peace negotiations (Tab B).¹ On January 24 he introduced a resolution stating the sense of Congress that the United States Delegation to the United Nations should favor direct Israel-Arab peace negotiations (Tab C).²

We foresee serious complications for the Johnson mission if the resolution is adopted. Most important, it would raise again in Arab minds the bogey of Zionist ability to influence American policy. Arab leadership would inevitably fear that at some critical juncture in the Johnson effort the United States ability to back up whatever agreement might have been reached would be vitiated or turned against them. The progress we made in the recent General Assembly in convincing the Arabs of our impartiality would be dissipated, and heightened suspicion would replace the present willingness to cooperate.

Our current strategy is to seek defeat of the Farbstein resolution in Committee. Our chief steps have been (a) a Talbot-Farbstein letter regretting introduction of his resolution (Tab D),³ (b) a reply through the Bureau of the Budget (Tab E)⁴ to Representative Morgan’s letter requesting the Department’s views (Tab F),⁵ and (c) consultation with Mr. O’Brien in the White House.

We think it would be helpful were Congressman Farbstein to have your views before his coming meeting with you at which a more detailed discussion could occur.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached letter (Tab A)⁶ to Congressman Farbstein.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86B/2–262. Official Use Only. Drafted by Crawford on February 1 and concurred in by Strong, Buffum (IO/UNP), and Palmer (IO/UNP).
1. Tab B is a letter from Dutton to Congressman Farbstein of December 18, 1961, pointing out that the U.S. draft resolution submitted during the recent U.N. General Assembly debate referenced previous General Assembly resolutions that had urged the governments concerned “to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly” and affirmed that the governments concerned had the primary responsibility for reaching a settlement. Dutton explained that the United States would be gratified if both sides decided to undertake direct negotiations, but that this did not appear to be a practical possibility until some movement was gained through the quiet diplomacy of the Johnson mission.
2. Tab C is the Congressional print of H. Res. 525, January 24, introduced in the House of Representatives and referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
3. Dated January 31.
4. Tab E is an unsigned and undated copy of a letter to Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Thomas E. Morgan, currently being cleared with the Bureau of the Budget. The letter was sent on February 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/1–2562)
5. Tab F is a letter from Morgan to Secretary Rusk, dated January 25, transmitting a copy of H. Res. 525 for comment.
6. Tab A is a memorandum from Grant (NEA) to Dutton of February 8, thanking Dutton for his efforts with Farbstein and welcoming the news that the Congressman might not press his resolution. Grant also noted that the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs had redrafted the letter from Secretary Rusk to Farbstein in accordance with Dutton’s suggestion. A copy of the entire collection of documents attached to the source text contains a copy of a letter from Rusk to Farbstein drafted on February 7 that expressed concern that passage of H. Res. 525 would be interpreted as a sign of diminished United States support for the PCC and would adversely affect the Johnson mission’s chances for success.