Office of the Historian

185. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)0

Washington, February 1, 1962.

McGB:

However delayed, attached is a surprisingly powerful statement of advantages to be gained from a Nasser visit this April.1

[Page 458]

Note especially point (Page 2) that in its state of nervous tension since Syrian debacle, UAR has apparently convinced itself that Western Powers are trying to isolate it and knock it over. I’ll bet my bottom dollar that Soviets are feeding this line to the hilt. It would be tragic if Nasser’s economic straits and fear that West out to take advantage of his weakened position led him both to lash out blindly (note stepped up campaign against Saud, Hussein, and now Shah) and to turn in desperation even more to USSR. As I keep saying, I am no Nasser-lover but this guy can still cause us so much trouble if he’s agin us that it is worth the candle to try and overcome these fears.

And time to move is precisely when he is in such a state of nerves, not after it is too late. Hence I’d urge you to put this before JFK.

RWK
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Country Series, United Arab Republic, Nasser Visit. Secret. A copy was sent to Kaysen.↩
  2. Document 182.↩