Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961–1962

183. National Intelligence Estimate⁰

NIE 36.2–62

Washington, January 31, 1962.

IRAQ

The Problem

To assess the outlook for Iraq over the next year or so.

Conclusions

1. Iraq’s Prime Minister Qasim has proved more durable than appeared likely a few years ago, but his position still depends more on the ineffectiveness and mutual antagonisms of his opponents than on his own strength. No attempt to displace Qasim is likely to succeed without substantial military support. Although we cannot identify any particular individuals or groups likely to bring off a successful coup, plotting is endemic in military circles and assassination is an ever-present possibility. The present state of affairs could drift on awaiting a development which would focus the present generalized discontent. (Paras. 8–9, 11–12)

2. We believe the Iraqi economy will continue in its present sluggish state for the next year or so. Loss of oil revenues, which account for more than half the government’s income, would cause economic difficulties, stimulate discontent, and increase the chances of a move against Qasim. We believe, however, that Qasim designed the recent oil legislation to take the maximum territory from the oil companies short of pushing them to cease production. Indications are that the companies will continue to produce at their present rate but will forego planned expansion. (Paras. 13–16)

3. Qasim will almost certainly continue to make oratorical threats to seize Kuwait, particularly in view of the domestic and regional benefits to be gained from harassing the British. We do not believe he will resort to force as long as he remains convinced that the British are determined to defend Kuwait and that his troops would have to face the prospect of a fight with other Arab forces. (Paras. 22–23)

4. The Soviets will strive to maneuver Qasim into increasing dependence on them through continuance of a large military and economic aid program, and will continue to support his “anti-imperialist” moves. Nevertheless, neither Qasim nor the Soviets fully trust each other, and the Iraqi Communists are neither influential in the government nor popular in the country. Relations with the West are likely to be further strained by such things as Qasim’s pressures on Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) and Kuwait. Iraq is likely to continue in its presently isolated position in respect of its neighbors, the other Arab states and the neutrals. (Paras. 17–21)

[Here follows the 5-page Discussion section; see Supplement, the compilation on Iraq.]

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency Files. Secret. According to a note attached to the study: “The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.” All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except the Atomic Energy Commission representative and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside their jurisdiction.