164. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to the President’s Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs (Bowles)0

SUBJECT

  • Proposed Discussion with President Nasser

We suggest that if possible you have two discussions with Nasser, the first being a tour d’horizon of our mutual interests and problems in light of the world situation, and the second being an attempt to reach common conclusions.

Between the two conversations you might have talks with such people as Baghdadi, Mohieddin, Ali Sabri1 and Mahmoud Riad.2

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We believe your visit to Cairo should follow rather than precede our planned offer to explore (without commitment) more comprehensive economic cooperation. We consider it essential that there be no implication of pressure and that your discussions take place in the favorable atmosphere that our offer of economic cooperation should create. Moreover, we think it imperative to make an early response to the U.A.R. on the economic aspects of our proposed action program.

Your meetings with Nasser might be an appropriate occasion to discuss frankly the question of a state visit.

Inasmuch as we are trying to build up Ambassador Badeau’s position, we would suggest he accompany you on your meetings.

Bearing in mind that Nasser is highly susceptible to flattery (so long as it seems genuine) but also highly sensitive to criticism, we suggest the tenor of your remarks be such as to draw him toward what we hope he will do and avoid any direct implication that we’re telling him what he should not do.

For that reason, we would suggest avoiding direct discussion of his nationalization and sequestration measures, his handling of the French espionage case, his antagonistic propaganda against the U.K. or other of his more radical policies.

Attached, along with a draft text of a letter from President Kennedy to President Nasser regarding your visit3 and a telegraphic instruction to Ambassador Badeau, is an outline of what we would consider the most useful type of dialogue.

We believe that in any release here concerning your trip, the stop in Cairo should be mentioned in passing and that in Cairo press conferences should be avoided.

Attachment4

SUGGESTED POINTS FOR DISCUSSION WITH NASSER

1.
The World Situation: To the extent possible give Nasser the impression he’s being given an “inside” briefing of our tactics in dealing with crises such as Berlin, Laos, Viet-Nam. Emphasize basic weaknesses of the Communist system and basic strengths of the Western position.
2.
Neutralism: Discuss background of our post-Belgrade policy toward Yugoslavia, our decisions on Goa, the Volta Dam project in Ghana and what we think the proper role of the neutrals should be. Encourage statesmanship on Nasser’s part as a neutralist. Stress our acceptance of neutralism and its basic inacceptability to the USSR.
3.
Africa: Note with satisfaction our differences on the Congo seem to be dissolving. Welcome closer relations between Casablanca and Monrovia powers.
4.
The Middle East: Stress nothing basically incompatible between US and UAR goals. We just as interested as UAR in social progress. UAR has great opportunity to lead by example. There are many roads to social progress. Hope UAR will consider borrowing what is good from the West as well as from others. US recognizes key importance of UAR to stability of area and would strongly oppose any attempt encircle or isolate UAR. We cannot guarantee our Allies always see things our way, but we do propose to pursue our course.
5.
US–UAR Relations: We would like to get back to 1952–55 era of mutual confidence. As young men of courage and determination, Kennedy and Nasser between them should be able mark out areas of mutual interest and defend them against assault by forces seeking divide us. It is essential to prevent extraneous issues from complicating our relations. We should judge each other by our actual deeds and not by what the rumor-mongers may say we’re doing.
6.
Nasser Visit: Discuss frankly the question of a state visit.
7.
Israel and the Zionists: Subscribe to UAR view that Palestine question be “kept in the refrigerator” and stress virtues of quiet discussion and cooperation with Johnson mission. Discuss frankly the problems created for us by the Zionists and necessity to convince them that closer US–UAR relations need not ipso facto prejudice Israel’s security.
8.
Conclusion: Stress our conviction that with determination, patience, courage and understanding US and UAR can work together toward mutually-desired goals of political stability, economic and social progress, cultural exchange and avoidance of Communist infiltration or Soviet domination in the Middle East and Africa.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/1–1562. Secret. Drafted by Barrow.
  2. Minister for Presidential Affairs.
  3. President’s Counselor on Foreign Affairs.
  4. Not attached but see Document 176 for the text of the letter.
  5. Drafted by Barrow.