137. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Strong)0
SUBJECT
- Syria
As the first Departmental visitor to the reconstructed Syrian Arab Republic I was given the full treatment in Damascus. Some symbolic meaning was read into the choice of the State Guest House which for three years was Nasser’s home in Damascus and which had never before been used to entertain foreigners, as the locale for the luncheon given me by the Minister of Finance.
From the US point of view, the new Syrian regime, if it demonstrates staying power, represents a promising opportunity. The Ministers call this the first liberal revolution among the Arabs. They point out rapidly that it is not reactionary, but for the first time offers Arabs an opportunity for vigorous social advance under non-totalitarian conditions. Themselves surprised at their speedy success, the leaders of the [Page 322] coup are now trying to create a government that Syria will accept as better than Nasser’s combination of bright promises and a tight rein. They want to relax some of his stringent measures without awakening fears among workers and farmers that gains made under Nasser will now be lost. This is what involves them in such measures as denationalization or compensation for businesses that are to remain nationalized, 25% shares of corporate profits to be distributed among workers and (hopefully) currency convertibility.
I got no indication of current relations between the army and the civilian Cabinet. The Cabinet itself looks technically strong and politically weak. It needs to resist efforts by land owners and businessmen to pull it far to the right. Kuzbari is aware of this and a long-range threat from the left. The Cabinet meets practically daily, from late afternoon or early evening frequently until midnight. So far it has been moving in generally sound directions. I think we should approve its decision to keep Communists in jail, to widen its political base through early non-partisan elections, and to restore financial order out of the remains of Nasser’s policies.
The Prime Minister told me in almost so many words that he wants Syria to be neutral—on our side. He cannot immediately strike down the major economic and military relations with Bloc countries developed during the UAR period. He knows the Bloc is eager to maintain these relations, and that the US cannot easily replace the Bloc as a market for Syrian cotton or as a provider of military equipment. Nevertheless, Kuzbari claims to want closer political and economic relations with the US than Syria has permitted in the past. His Ministers have already asked us about an aid agreement, which of course Syria never previously was willing to negotiate.
Partly as a protection against efforts by Nasser to infiltrate and subvert his regime, Kuzbari wants good relations with his Arab neighbors. Arab nationalism must still be a strong talking point. Having broken [with] the UAR the coup leaders talk vigorously of a wider Arab unity based on “brotherHood and equality rather than on domination.” Kuzbari believes Syria can develop good relations with several Arab countries, especially since Nasser’s predominance has been reduced. I came away feeling that the survival and stability of the Kuzbari regime (or something like it) are strongly in the U.S. interest. It exists and its failure will doubtless be followed by something more extreme. It professes public and political values that are closer than either Nasser’s or Hussein’s to our general posture. If it succeeds, it could provide a rallying point for liberal—as contrasted to extreme—Arab politics. With Jordan, Lebanon and possibly even Iraq and Kuwait it might form a fraternal grouping resulting in greater security and peace in the Fertile Crescent [Page 323] area. At best, a successful Kuzbari regime could shift the balance in the Near East a little more in our direction.
If it is to survive effectively, the Kuzbari regime probably needs various kinds of political and economic support. Straight aid is not the only answer. I believe we should go to work intensively to discover ways in which we can help the Kuzbari effort and can encourage others to help as well. This will involve several difficult questions. More than any other, I am concerned about what we should do when—as it soon must—the Syrian armed forces begin to feel the pinch of shortages of spare parts. Considering all of our other commitments and involvements in the region, we need to calculate carefully how far and in what ways we and our friends can get involved with the Syrian military. Would one way be for us to help the regime meet its public safety needs by a broadly conceived program of assistance to police and gendarmerie forces? The main thing is for us to be ready with a program that is sufficiently flexible in political and economic support, so that we can respond quickly when the plea for assistance comes.1
- Source: Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 63 D 33, Damascus. Confidential.↩
- In a status report covering several subjects sent to Bundy and Rostow on November 3, Komer made the following comments regarding Talbot’s memorandum: “Phil Talbot comes back from his trip convinced that the new regime is the best and most pro-Western in a decade (agreed) and deserves our immediate support. He grants that all Arabists say that its life expectancy is limited at best and that Syria’s perennial political instability will soon recur. But he thinks it worth the gamble to back this new regime. Again agreed, but we must simultaneously reinsure ourselves with Nasser, lest embracing Kuzbari drive Nasser back toward the Bloc. From a strategic point of view, is it more important to cozy up to five-million volatile Syrians or to make our peace with the largest and most influential country of the Arab world? Hopefully we can avoid this dilemma, but let’s not ignore it.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Staff Memoranda, Robert W. Komer, 11/61–12/61)↩