108. Memorandum by Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff0
CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR POSSIBLE SOVIET MOVE OR DEMONSTRATION AGAINST IRAN
We now confront what may be a two-pronged problem in Iran. In addition to the longer-term adverse internal trend, there is now reason to believe that the Soviets may seek to put pressure on Iran in connection with the Berlin crisis.1
Therefore, it is essential that we do some urgent contingency planning against this possibility. The first step might be to do up a paper by the end of this week, perhaps according to the following outline.
I. Estimate of the Situation.
Assessment of indications from all sources that the Soviets might be contemplating some form of pressure. Estimate of what forms this might take, up to and including overt aggression under cover of the 1921 Treaty.2
II. Counter-Measures Open to Us.
We should examine the whole spectrum of possible counters to the above, ranging freely at the outset.
- A.
- Methods of Warning the USSR . Public exchange of letters between President and Shah reaffirming US commitment; unilateral US statements; visible contingency planning; joint maneuvers; warnings from other CENTO members or CENTO itself; etc.
- B.
- Precautionary Moves. Many of these will of course tie in to the warning aspect, and reinforce its credibility. Joint planning with GOI for [Page 258] rapid movement of American forces (we must consider angle of frightening Iranians unduly in all of these possible moves); visit of high-ranking US military personalities, perhaps Chief of Staff of CMPS; actual movement of token US forces ahead of the event, e.g. an air wing under guise of extended maneuvers; logistic preparations for receipt of US forces.
- C.
- Urgent Review of Contingency Plans. We should undertake a crash review of how we could react militarily in event of various Soviet moves actually coming to pass. This is particularly urgent in the light of competing requirements for SEA and Berlin. How much could we really afford to deploy to or near Iran? How quickly could we move? In this connection we should bear in mind that prompt precautionary moves or reaction in event of a Soviet move will have a much greater deterrent effect than a much larger-scale reaction after a period has elapsed. Thus the emphasis in all of the planning in A through C above should be on forestalling action, designed to deter a Soviet move before it really gets rolling.
III. Coordination With UK and CENTO Members.
How much of this should we undertake?
IV. Keeping Up Iranian Morale.
In all of the above we should bear in mind that the minimum Soviet objective would probably be to panic the Iranians into withdrawing from CENTO and perhaps causing the fall of Amini Government. Our own warnings and other signs of evident concern, if not properly handled might actually contribute to this panic. Hence we should very carefully assess the psychological impact in Iran of whatever we might do.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 788.5/9–1361. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: “from Komer.” Another notation on the source text, which reads, “President, From,” was apparently made by Department of State recordkeepers and refers to the Department of State indexing category for White House documents.↩
- On September 9, the Embassy in Tehran in telegram 225 conveyed an account of a recent meeting between Prime Minister Amini and Soviet Ambassador to Iran Pegov during which Pegov maintained that certain Baghdad Pact documents, which the Soviet Union had in its possession and which Iran maintained were forgeries, revealed that Iran and other CENTO powers had plans to attack the Soviet Union. Pegov indirectly threatened strong action against Iran unless it withdrew from CENTO. (Department of State, Central Files, 378.75/9–961)↩
- Treaty of Friendship, between Persia and Russia, Moscow, February 26, 1921; see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 114, pp. 901–907.↩