Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

77. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, February 20, 1963, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• US-Polish relations; East-West issues

PARTICIPANTS

• Edward Drozniak, Polish Ambassador
• Dr. Marian Dobrosielski, Counselor of Polish Embassy
• The Secretary
• EUR/EE—Arthur I. Wortzel

Ambassador Drozniak opened the conversation by expressing his gratitude to the Secretary for his important assistance in achieving conclusion on February 1 of the PL–480 agreement with Poland.¹ He said that this was a good and useful agreement and particularly timely in view of the bad crop which Poland had had in 1962 and the severe winter, which had already affected transportation and industrial production and which would affect agricultural activities next spring.

The Secretary thanked the Ambassador for his remarks and added that he had derived personal satisfaction from the conclusion of the agreement.

Drozniak said that he was returning to Warsaw February 26 for consultation and that he would like to be able to report to Polish officials, particularly to Foreign Minister Rapacki, concerning the attitude of the US Government on matters of importance to Poland. He wished, therefore, to pose two questions. The first had to do with the US Government’s view of the perspectives for 1963 concerning major international questions such as the situation in Berlin and Germany and a nuclear test ban and disarmament, including the Rapacki Plan.

Looking at the general international situation, the Secretary replied, we believe that 1963 is a year in which it might be possible to work out agreements which may reduce international tensions. As for cessation of nuclear testing, we want to conclude a test-ban treaty and are disappointed that the USSR has not thus far made it possible to work out an agreement. To us, the key is to obtain adequate assurance that a test ban will be respected. We can understand that the Soviets may not feel that they require on-site inspection in the US, the nature of our society being such that a combination of 98% open observation and 2% espionage can meet their requirements. We, however, are faced with a large area not accessible to us. We thus have a difference between us not only of policy but of fact.

We have, in the face of a difference as to the number of on-site inspections required, proposed that we put the issue of numbers aside and settle the rest of the treaty, leaving President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev possibly to settle the numbers question once we know what the numbers really mean in terms of treaty provisions. The Soviets have refused, and acted in a way which suggests a move toward an uninspected moratorium. We have had much experience since 1945 with the difference between agreement in principle and an actual agreement.

The Secretary asked Drozniak to tell Minister Rapacki that we want very much to have a test-ban treaty, that we are prepared to believe that the Soviets also wish a treaty, and that we will continue to work hard toward reaching agreement.

Turning to Berlin, the Secretary said that the key factor remains the presence of Western forces, this not being negotiable. We believe that relations between the parts of Germany and between Germany and Europe can become more normal. We expect that there will be discussions with the Soviets and we will see what happens. We see possibilities of progress, but it will take patience, care and time. Asked by Drozniak whether the Soviet proposal concerning a UN presence—the UN flag—in Berlin did not offer a solution, the Secretary commented that we have indications that this is not all the Soviets have in mind, and that their statements on this subject have not been consistent. Although we have not taken the matter up on an inter-allied basis, we think it possible that a UN presence which would insure a lessening of tensions throughout the Berlin area might be a solution. Concerning denuclearization, the Secretary said that this must be considered in the total framework of disarmament and basic issues in Europe. In a sense, he said, technology has overtaken the Rapacki Plan. If the area proposed were denuclearized, the Soviets would still have a massive capability. We thus now face technical problems which make the idea of zones doubtful.

The Secretary then said that there are other problems which concern us—for example, Laos. We are disturbed by the lack of cooperation on the part of the Pathet Lao with the Royal Laotian Government. We support Souvanna Phouma and know that cooperation between him and Phoumi Nosavan is good, but that there is tension between Souvanna and the Pathet Lao.² It is extremely important that the coalition succeed, it being a test case of a personal agreement between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev. It is in the interests of both sides that Laos be let alone. We have no influence with the Pathet Lao, and hope that those who do will use it to prevail on them to support the coalition.

The Secretary commented that the role of Poland as a member of the International Control Commission in Laos is important and that Poland has a heavy responsibility. If there is not freedom of movement in Laos, we must suspect what is going on. We hope that Minister Rapacki will think about the implications of the ICC’s acting in a way to reduce suspicion. The Secretary added that we are not happy about an inspection of Air America if many other things going on are not inspected.

Thanking the Secretary for his exposition, Ambassador Drozniak posed his second question. What, he asked, does the Secretary see as the prospects for our bilateral relations. The Poles are very much interested in developing our relations in all fields. He was concerned at this time with our economic relations and wondered what the chances were for reversing Congressional action concerning most-favored-nation treatment for Poland, for amendment of the Battle Act, for ending the boycott of Polish goods in the US, and for future agreements under Public Law 480.

The Secretary said that he would like to be completely frank, because it is important that we understand each other. We are interested in improving our bilateral relations. This is so for many reasons, including the long history of ties between our countries. We are interested despite the fact that Poland pursues policies in matters of importance to us which we find disagreeable. However, we try to understand Poland’s special situation including its geographic location. If Poland were located elsewhere and pursued its policies, our relations would be bad, but we take into account our understanding that Poland does not have full control of its own situation. Unfortunately, the US public and Congress do not have the same understanding of Poland’s situation. The Secretary asked Drozniak to express to Minister Rapacki his appreciation for Rapacki’s understanding of our problems as we try to understand Poland’s.

Concerning MFN, the Secretary said, the President has made his position and his intention clear. The Secretary added that he was not at liberty to discuss tactics and that he could not guarantee success, but that if the general atmosphere is favorable, he would be hopeful.

The Secretary said that there are other things we might do to help our relations. We should press ahead in the field of exchanges. We hope that we can improve the channels of trade, although our role in that respect is limited by the nature of our economic system. In general, we would like to steer the boat of our relations in a favorable direction, but the waters are sometimes choppy.

In response to a further question concerning how we see the future of US-Polish PL 480 agreements in general, the Secretary noted that it had been possible to conclude an agreement recently and believed that in the absence of a change in the situation, there was no reason why we could not have another look later.

Ambassador Drozniak said that he wanted to express his thanks for the Department’s active help with regard to the boycott of Polish goods in the US and the threatened ILA boycott of Polish ships.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL Pol–US. Confidential. Drafted by Wortzel on February 21 and approved in S on February 28. The meeting was held in Secretary Rusk’s office.
1. For text of the agreement, signed in Washington on February 1 and entered into force the same day, see 14 UST 803.
2. Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos, and General Phoumi Nosavan, leader of the Laotian right wing. In August 1962 the factions involved in the Laotian civil war, including the Communist Pathet Lao, had attempted to carry out an agreement for the withdrawal of foreign involvement and the peaceful settlement of their differences. The settlement soon broke down.