373. Memorandum for Record0

SUBJECT

  • Conversations Between General Lemnitzer, Chairman, JCS and General Sevdet Sunay, Chairman, Joint Staff, Turkish Armed Forces, 1100 Hours, 13 November 1961

PARTICIPANTS

  • Turkey
    • General Sunay, GJS Turkish Armed Forces
    • Admiral Orkun, Turkish Naval attache
    • Brigadier General Enginsoy, J-4 Turkish General Staff
    • Colonel Naiboglu, Interpreter
  • United States
    • General Lemnitzer USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
    • Major General Parker, USA, Special Assistant, CJCS
    • Colonel McCaffrey, USA, Chairman’s Staff Group
[Page 715]
1.
General Sunay delivered a prepared statement outlining his views for the improvement of the Turkish Armed Forces. (Copy attached hereto.) In summary, General Sunay stated that increased effectiveness in MAP could be obtained through closer cooperation. The Military Assistance Program should be jointly prepared based on mutually agreed requirements and priorities. Otherwise, automatic supply would continue causing waste, delay, and misunderstanding.
2.
MAP should be improved qualitatively and quantitatively.
3.
US economic aid administered by agencies such as ICA should be directed primarily toward activities relating to defense posture. General Lemnitzer’s support on this measure was requested.
4.
General Sunay suggested a conference as soon as possible with staff representation on the highest military staff level aiming at the attainment of an improved and accelerated MAP. He suggested this meeting could be held at General Lemnitzer’s convenience or on 15 December at EUCOM at the conclusion of the NATO meetings. In conclusion, General Sunay expressed appreciation for the meeting and the opportunity to make his views available.
5.
General Lemnitzer stated that he was grateful for the statement of views by General Sunay. With respect to MAP, the Chairman stated he had had many years of experience in defending the program before the US Congress. Last year, Congress gave us less than we asked for and this required world-wide readjustments. The Turkish program is now the largest grant aid program in NATO. The US is, of course, not able to meet all the requirements advanced by all governments for military aid. However, within the resources allocated to Turkey, every effort is made to meet the most important requirements of Turkey. General Lemnitzer emphasized it was not a Washington program. Turkish requirements prepared in Ankara are the basis of the program. JUSMMAT was established there for this purpose.
6.
In response to a question for specifics, General Enginsoy, J–4, Turkish Armed Forces, stated that some equipment (AF tires) of the wrong type had been delivered. He was also of the opinion that there was an improper balance in communications equipment furnished. The Turks desired a logistics system based on requirements, not on automatic supply.
7.
In answer to General Lemnitzer’s query as to what would be the object of a meeting to be held at the conclusion of the NATO conference in Paris on 15 December, General Sunay stated the purpose of the meeting would be to achieve an effective and expedited military assistance program to meet the Berlin crisis in order to get the best results from the aid program.
8.
General Lemnitzer stated that he had one or two problems to discuss with General Sunay. We would like to know how we could progress the establishment of a tropospheric scatter site in the vicinity of Ankara. This communication facility was essential to provide links to the US custodial sites in accordance with US law so that nuclear weapons can be prepositioned for use by the Turkish Air Force. General Lemnitzer made it clear that while these weapons were now available, they would not be delivered to US storage sites in Turkey until the communications problem was solved.
9.
General Sunay stated that Turkey does not object to the US having custody of the radar and signal sites and to the US operation of them. They feel, however, that their own personnel should have access to these sites and to receive training in operating them. A second point concerned area acquisition. The US had contacted and made certain agreements with local people without the knowledge of the Turkish General Staff. Later the Turkish General Staff was requested to pay for the acquisition of land and in this way became aware of the problem. (Note: Ambassador Hare has reported that “after considerable research JUSMMAT and TUSLOG had been unable to locate examples unauthorized use of land as claimed Sunay …”—Ankara No. 262, 18 August 1961.1
10.
General Lemnitzer suggested that two different problems were involved. One problem concerned telecommunications and the other referred to communications receiving sites. However, negotiations last July between Admiral Frost’s group and the Turkish General Staff did not work out well. General Lemnitzer suggested that negotiations be resumed as soon as possible.
11.
With respect to the proposed conference after the December NATO meetings, General Lemnitzer stated he felt it would be unwise to delay this long and suggested a date as early as 24 November 1961 which was agreed upon as acceptable to Turkey. He suggested that General Enginsoy during his contacts with US staff could identify issues and work out solutions where possible. If any problems remain, they could be discussed between General Sunay and himself in Paris at the conclusion of the NATO meetings.
12.
General Lemnitzer emphasized that the established channel from the Turkish General Staff to the Department of Defense via JUSMMAT and EUCOM was the one that should be followed in dealing with MAP matters. He stated it was his experience that whenever one tried to short circuit this channel it not only did not expedite matters but in fact delayed them.
13.
General Lemnitzer summed up by stating that there was action required by both General Sunay and himself. General Lemnitzer stated he would make arrangements with Admiral Smith of the Joint Staff for Brigadier General Enginsoy to discuss specific MAP problems with appropriate US staff representatives. He urged General Sunay to take the necessary action in his area to resolve the problems related to the construction of the troposcatter communications facilities in order that this facility, which is so important to both countries and to NATO could be completed as soon as possible. General Lemnitzer felt the conference had been very helpful to him and he appreciated having the benefit of General Sunay’s views.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.5–MSP/11–1461. Top Secret (Secret When Separated From Enclosure). Prepared in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The enclosure, General Sunay’s prepared statement, is not printed.
  2. Not printed. (Ibid., 711.52/8–1861)