372. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Embassy in France0
68. Paris pass Stoessel from Ambassador. Your telegram 21.1 As indicated our telegrams 506 and 5222 there is not in our judgment uniformity of thought and objectives between military forces and political parties in Turkey today. Basic conflict between parties and military has been important factor during election period, has been especially highlighted over past few days and could become decisive in future. Regret if our reporting has not made clear basis for this conclusion, but following analysis of forces at issue, as we see them, may help clarify.
Essential difference between military and civilian concerns role of military forces in government. Party leaders and independent intelligentsia visualize Democratic system more or less as we know it in US, with military subordinate to duly elected civil authority. At same time, however, there is somewhat contradictory and perhaps grudging [Page 713] awareness of fact military on whole conceives of their role as protectors of Constitution and of future of Turkish people as they see it. As consequence most Turks initially welcomed May 27 coup as bloodlessly ending period of great strain and potential strife. Developments since, however, have in general alienated civil elements, who have come to desire end of military and return to civil rule.
Military forces themselves are by no means united on political goals. There are those, probably encompassing present top commanders, who desire return to civilian government but with military holding watching brief on conduct that government. There is also group younger officers who are disenchanted with politicians, have never favored return to civil government. This group, probably unorganized in any formal sense, may include elements which per se favor military dictatorship and those which simply believe there remains basic job of reform and education before government can again be entrusted to civilians. Difficult specifically delineate these groups and reports regarding them vary widely [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] identifying individual officers representing various schools of thought within military.
Among parties military as whole and CNU favored RPP since that party shared enmity for DP regime. As one major party surviving May 27, RPP went along with coup and subsequent military government, but determiners this policy always viewed it as best approach in terms national welfare and one most likely get military out of government. RPP therefore prepared accept CNU reforms, refrain from any punitive measures. As such it became party most acceptable to CNU and military. While many military officers and some CNU emotionally prejudiced in favor of RPP, area of support party recently won in these circles based far more on feeling party was safe, would preserve reforms on which military insist. This is not because RPP has been tool of military but because party leaders consider this course best means of gaining power and ultimately reestablishing proper balance between military and civil authority.
Justice Party is something quite different. Original impetus for its formation came from retired officers who hated CNU because these officers were retired and took to political forum in hope reversing August 1960 purge of military. Furthermore and even more importantly as party, JP has successfully appealed to voters in wide areas of country as logical successor to former Democrat Party, whose members primarily interested in rectifying wrong of May 27 and some of whom desire avenge execution their leader. Party if it came to power would therefore offer little physical security for former CNU members, little support for so-called reforms CNU considered important.
[Page 714]If RPP had won majority, transition to civil rule would probably have taken place without incident. Fact that elements basically opposed to regime of last seventeen months won majority maximized fears that reform may be reformed and even Yassiada repeated with new cast. Fact that no group won majority and future involves uneasy coalition strengthened elements in military which oppose return to civil rule, argue that average Turk voter not ready for democratic government. Military leaders (meaning leaders regular military establishment and not CNU) have in past few days pressed for four-party coalition which would have silent military backing and probably control. While this might appear minimize immediate concern within military over danger of hostile corrupt civilian politicians coming to power, it is but a temporary palliative and not solution and basic conflict between military and parties will remain of continuing concern.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/10–2661. Secret. Repeated to the Department of State as telegram 540, which is the source text.↩
- Not found.↩
- Telegram 506, October 19, gave the Embassy’s analysis of the outcome of Turkish elections. Telegram 522, October 24, reported on negotiations for the election of a President. (Department of State, Central Files, 782.00/10–1961 and 782.00/10–2461, respectively)↩