344. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Talbot) to the Ambassador to Greece (Labouisse)0
Dear Harry: The Secretary has asked me to respond to your letter of April 5 to him. The information conveyed by General Kardamakis to Colonel Baldry is indeed disturbing and we would like to be kept informed of any new developments resulting from subsequent contacts with General Kardamakis.
We agree with your analysis there is no justification for the type of action Kardamakis proposes. We concur that it jeopardizes much of what has been accomplished in Greece’s economic as well as military advancement. Such a “solution” would be regarded as a blemish on Greece’s good name, particularly here in the United States. In view of our long involvement and large investment in Greece, we could not stand idly by and witness the creation of a Latin American type of totalitarian government in Greece, nor do we want a return to the Metaxas kind of tyranny. We are therefore unalterably opposed to such a “solution” in Greece.
[2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] It occurs to me that the General may be trying to justify action on lines similar to the May 27 movement in Turkey. However, Greece’s economic indicators belie him. The rate of Greek progress has indeed been most impressive. [4–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Some of the current frustrations with the social system are a result of the economic progress of the last decade.
Your action in informing the General of the dire consequences to Greece of such contemplated action was well taken. We would like to add that Greece with a totalitarian government in the Balkans would be a staggering blow to the cause of democracy in the area; the derogation of democracy would be a source of satisfaction to Greece’s Communist neighbors.
You may also indicate to Kardamakis that the use of United States equipment to achieve such a “solution” would be regarded with grave misgiving and disappointment by the United States. Such a development would jeopardize MAP on a world-wide basis and add fuel to criticism from some sources that it is used to displace democracy in its very homeland. We would also find it difficult, if not impossible, to continue our MAP for Greece at anywhere near the same magnitude as in [Page 668] the past; at a minimum it would cause a review of our military assist-ance programming.
Obviously it is impossible for Caramanlis to remain in power indefinitely and we are prepared to cooperate with another government should it come to power through constitutional means. We would not be diffident concerning the possibility of working with such a government as long as the turnover did not involve Communists or find them represented in the cabinet. In the meantime we would not wish to do anything to compromise the effectiveness of Caramanlis’ Government as it still has considerable time to serve in office—nor can a politician of Caramanlis’ skill be discounted in the next election by any means.
We are aware of the dilemma caused by the Center Union’s “inexorable” struggle and realize that perhaps this causes anxiety and frustration among various circles in Greece. A political pot that is warm or hot is not, however, particularly unique in Greece. Consequently, we are not unduly concerned about the Center campaign, although we would quite obviously prefer the Center to focus its energy on Greece’s real problem areas, rather than its present activities, including accusing the United States of meddling in Greek affairs. Approaches similar to the General’s probably point to one of the Center’s problems—the need to satisfy the Army as to their attitude toward the monarchy in the short run.
Please keep us informed. I look forward to the opportunity the Istanbul meeting will give us to review these problems.1
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 66 D 232, Athens. Top Secret; Official–Informal.↩
- On May 1, Labouisse reported that Colonel Baldry had made a detailed presentation to Kardamakis outlining U.S. opposition to any attempted coup and that Kardamakis indicated that he no longer regarded a coup as inevitable. Labouisse also reported that U.S. soundings indicated that many military men would oppose a resort to force, adding: “In sum, I believe there is less reason for concern about the situation than seemed the case three weeks ago.” (Letter from Labouisse to Talbot, May 1; ibid.)↩