343. Letter From the Ambassador to Greece (Labouisse) to Secretary of State Rusk0
Dear Mr. Secretary: We have received disturbing information this week concerning the organization of a possible coup d’etat against the Greek Government. While the indications are that the coup is not planned for the immediate future, the information, which comes from General Kardamakis, the recently retired Chief of Staff of the Greek Army, has such a ring of authenticity that I believe you and the President should be advised without delay of this possibility of an overturn in Greece some time in the coming months.
The story was told by General Kardamakis to Colonel Baldry, our Army attache. The following is the gist of Colonel Baldry’s report to me.
[13–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Something would also have to be done about controlling the venal and disruptive press.
General Kardamakis stated that the decision for a coup d’etat has already been taken, that it is no longer a question of whether, but when. General Kardamakis described the officer corps of the Army as broadly divided into two groups, with the majority consisting of “truly patriotic” strong, loyal officers who form a large bloc and look to him as their leader. This group, he said, was fully organized—he supplied names of some key officers—and capable of assuming power. They believe that the time to strike will soon arrive.1
[4 lines of source text not declassified] On the other hand, he expressed the opinion that the sizeable left-leaning element of the nationalist opposition would combine with the communists to win the next elections. Dissatisfied with the present, this officer group is not content to wait for elections and allow the latter to happen. It, therefore, plans a military take-over before waiting until blood would have to be spilled.
General Kardamakis said that he himself felt that such a revolutionary step should be taken only as a last resort and that he has been resisting heavy and mounting pressure from the younger officers in the group for some time now. To get away from this pressure he has decided to leave Greece at the end of the month on an extended European trip with his wife, to be abroad two to three months. He did not think the [Page 665] coup would take place in his absence, but he could not guarantee it in view of the rising impatience of the officers (it could also be that, if such a move is being planned, the General would prefer to be out of the country at the time of execution so as to avoid responsibility and would then expect to be called home to take over the helm).
Colonel Baldry pointed out to General Kardamakis the very serious consequences both in domestic affairs and in Greece’s international relations which would follow on such a coup and suggested various other possibilities of easing the situation. The General was not, however, to be dissuaded and expressed the determined conviction that a military coup is the only way to bring about necessary reforms in Greece. After two years or so the government could then be returned to the people under a new, stronger constitution. The General stressed that the Army’s loyalty is to the country and to the Crown.
As for our analysis of the above, General Kardamakis is known to us as a blunt, dedicated, but opinionated officer who is not averse to using the Army for political purposes and who is of the type inclined to feel that the Army is the true guardian of the country’s honor and knows what is best for Greece. His identification of other key officers in the conspiracy was forthright, and there seems little reason to doubt his general description of the forces at work among the officer corps. In short, his presentation seemed sufficiently genuine and accurate to be greatly disturbing.
We have from time to time had vague rumors and bits of information concerning Army cliques, secret societies within the armed forces, predictions that the Army would never allow nationalist opposition leaders with any leftist tinge to take over in the event of electoral victory and the like. Of late rumors have been somewhat on the increase. However, we have considered that, despite rather feckless attempts of the Papandreou–Venizelos opposition to draw the Army into politics, there was little likelihood of violent overturn in Greece [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. In fact, one of the achievements of recent years in Greece has been the removal of the Army from politics to a more proper military role. If Kardamakis is right in his appraisal of the situation, then we are indeed headed for trouble here. [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
In my judgment there is no remote justification in the present local situation for the type of action General Kardamakis declares he and his group are planning and which, unfortunately, they may well be in a position to carry out (the appointment several months ago of the present Army Chief of Staff was more or less forced on the government by the Kardamakis group, and the present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is regarded as a figurehead). [13–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Resentments [Page 666] of this sort may lie at the base of the current disaffection of Kardamakis.
It would seem, however, that other factors also weigh heavily in the balance: the impatience of the officer corps (which comes largely from the economically less advanced rural areas) with social inequities and with the pace of social reform, as well as irritation over the inevitable loose ends of democracy, such as a largely irresponsible press and petty venality, along with the fear that the next election would result in a Popular Front Government. While there is no doubt some corruption in the Greek bureaucracy, we have considered it to be of rather mild proportions for this part of the world.
I have considered this problem at some length with Colonel Baldry and with my Deputy, Tap Bennett. Because of the sensitivity of the information we have not yet brought in any other officers of the Mission. Colonel Baldry has informed his superior, Major General Fitch, Army G–2, by personal letter. I am sending a copy of this letter to Phil Talbot for his information, but am making no other distribution.
I am planning to have Colonel Baldry arrange another discussion in the near future with General Kardamakis, at which time he would be provided with a carefully worked-out rundown of the fateful consequences to Greece of this contemplated action. The General would be advised in emphatic terms of the damage to Greece’s international reputation, the blow to NATO confidence in this country, the dangers of upsetting the essentially fragile economic structure and the creation of an instability which would frighten away the very investment which is only now beginning to come to Greece and which the country so desperately needs for its economic development.
[1 paragraph (7–1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Greek Desk Files: Lot 66 D 232, Athens. Top Secret.↩
- The three officers whom Kardamakis indicated as leaders of the conspiracy were Brigadier General Odesseus Angelis, Colonel Alexander Hatzipetros, and Lieutenant Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos. Colonel Baldry reported that Papadopoulos was “not known to this office.” (Memorandum from Baldry to Labouisse, April 3; ibid.)↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩