Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

206. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations⁰

Washington, November 28, 1961, 3:24 p.m.

Topol 814. Paris for Emb and USRO. Deliver Finletter 9:00 am November 29. Topol 800 and 803, Polto Circular 64.¹

Following is additional guidance for NAC discussion Nov 29 on Finland.

You should endeavor dispel belief Novosibirsk talks have eased Finnish problem or altered essentials situation as set forth Topol 775.² Sense of euphoria in Finland and idea Kekkonen scored great triumph most disquieting as is feeling of relief apparent in Scandinavia and in some other NATO countries.³

Favorite Soviet tactic is to exert heavy pressure and present exorbitant demands then settle for something less and claim public applause for reasonableness. Danger to Finland’s neutrality and independence is just as great from series of nibbles aimed first at paralyzing Finnish will and ability to resist as from all out effort at immediate satellization.

Finnish people and leaders are not necessarily in best position themselves to assess significance of Soviet moves or steps which must be taken to counteract them. NATO itself should judge facts irrespective of what may be intentions of individual Finns or interpretation they may seek to place on recent events.

Starting with October 30 note Soviets in our opinion have asserted successfully right to exercise large measure control over major internal and external Finnish policies. Finland’s freedom to act has been severely restricted. Soviets have:

(a) Ensured reelection President Kekkonen by in effect causing withdrawal of leading opposition candidate.

(b) Demanded withdrawal from political life of Finnish political leaders and other Finnish elements considered by Soviets to be anti-communist (i.e. too pro-Western); a demand reiterated publicly by Kekkonen in Finland.

(c) By their seeming magnanimous treatment of Finland given filip to election prospects of Finnish Communist Party.

(d) Defined, in Kekkonen’s words, Finnish neutrality as essential part of Soviet security policy.

(e) Elicited statement from Kekkonen to effect that maintenance of Soviet confidence is not only Finland’s responsibility but that loss of that confidence would be “exclusively” fault of Finns.

(f) Obtained Kekkonen’s concurrence that it is Finnish Govt’s duty in light future developments to initiate military consultations with Soviets under Article II; onus therefore on Finland to observe and interpret developments in Northern Europe in manner acceptable to Soviets.

We note also that Finland has signed new trade agreement with Soviets providing for 25 percent expansion in trade. If implemented this would serve increase Finnish dependence on Soviets and provide further important lever which Soviets may use for political purposes.

According to Kekkonen–Khrushchev communique and Kekkonen’s Nov 26 speech “relaxation” of Soviet pressure dependent on Finnish performance on matters noted above and “easing of tensions in Northern Europe”. Latter defined to mean reduction in military preparations of Sweden, Norway and Denmark. Warning thus served on Sweden, Norway and Denmark that unless they relax their military posture and attenuate ties with NATO and FRG new Soviet demands on Finland will be made. In sense Finland being used by Soviets as hostage for policies on part of Scandinavian countries deemed “proper” by Soviets.

Thus NATO should not conclude matter may be left at rest or that Soviets will not resort to further pressures on Finland. Firmness especially on part of Scandinavians essential at this juncture. Appearance of weakness will only encourage Soviets. Would be grave error in our view to regard situation as hopeless (as done by Boyesen, para 6(b) Polto 64). In essential respects situation does not resemble that existing in 1939. We doubt Soviets would be prepared to use military force in Finnish context alone. Given close inter-relationship of all elements in present world situation, overwhelming deterrent power of Free World, of which Soviets well aware, provides all nations assurance against resort to arms. In non-military areas NATO can do much. Efforts will be greatly complicated unless Finns themselves are brought to understand significance of current developments now taking place and are prepared to stand up to Soviets. Thus first task is to strengthen Finnish resolve. We hope Norway, Denmark and through them Sweden will take lead. We should study desirability individual demarches, public statements and use of propaganda themes bringing to world attention what transpiring.

NATO should also prepare itself to move quickly to provide economic and commercial support should Soviets resort to pressure in these fields.

FYI. We concur that as first step USDel to OECD should prepare recommendations as to actions that would be required under various contingencies (Polto 698).⁴ End FYI.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375/11–2861. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Christensen and Burdett; cleared in draft by BNA, RA, EUR, SOV, and Kohler; and approved by Burdett. Repeated to Helsinki, Oslo, Copenhagen, Stockholm, London, Bonn, and Moscow.
1. Topol 803 is printed as Document 204. Regarding Topol 800, see footnote 1 thereto. Polto circular 64, November 27, reported on the reactions of the Norwegian and Danish Permanent Representatives to the Khrushchev–Kekkonen communique. (Department of State, Central Files, 375/11–2761)
2. Topol 775, November 21, authorized transmission to Paris of telegram 266 from Helsinki. (Ibid., 660E.61/11–2161) Telegram 266 is printed as Document 201.
3. In telegram 1621 from Moscow, November 26, the Embassy reported that Hallama had expressed “satisfaction” with the outcome of talks with Khrushchev. “He said no specific demands had been made of the Finns and the question of political guarantees was not even raised.” (Department of State, Central Files, 660E.61/11–2661)
4. Polto 698 from Paris, November 24, had suggested a delay in NATO consideration of the Finnish situation until after the talks between Kekkonen and Lange and Khrushchev. (Ibid., 660E.61/11–2461)