161. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State0
1583. Paris for USRO. We believe that dominant mood of Tito and leading advisors in confrontation with problems of Yugoslavia’s international position must today be one of much uncertainty, sensitivity, and indecision. Tito’s Moscow visit last December, and reflection it found in his subsequent statements, caused some consternation and alarm within party and population, where it was feared he had been swept by Khrushchev’s charm, by deference of Soviet officialdom, and by his own strong desire to influence outcome of bloc differences, into sacrificing relations with unaligned group and with West and thus forfeiting what had become traditional balance of Yugoslavia’s position. When, in January and February, Russians showed signs of raising price for continued support of Yugoslavia in face of Chinese opposition, this alarm was not only heightened but came, we suspect, to be shared in some degree by Tito himself. We view obvious Yugoslav eagerness for Rusk and Nasser visits1 as evidence primarily of Tito’s desire not only to reassure his own followers but actually to give some reassurance both to unaligned group and to West that he had not sacrificed balance of Yugoslavia’s position.
Today, great and disturbing uncertainties are still visible here on eastern horizon. Yugoslavs probably know little more than we do concerning Khrushchev’s personal position. They will have noted in recent weeks, and particularly in last few days, evidence that attitude toward Yugoslavia is coming more and more to constitute touchstone of Chinese-Russian differences, with Chinese showing every sign of regarding [Page 354] rejection of Yugoslavia as sine qua non of any reconciliation. Yugoslavs will note with interest and some apprehension that Russians are plainly reluctant to hold Central Committee meeting and to redefine their ideological line before they have talked with Chinese. In all, Yugoslavs are well aware events could easily take a turn which could put them back in position not dissimilar to that which they occupied after 1958 differences. Faced with these uncertainties they are obviously trying to hold all lines open and to reserve to themselves widest possible latitude of choice in reshaping their international position if this becomes necessary.
Question of course presents itself as to how Western circles can exert most useful influence in this highly fluid situation. They cannot hope to change in any brief space of time ideological convictions of Yugoslav leaders or their insistence on clinging to their image of themselves as important contributors to international socialist cause and to “struggle” of developing nations against colonialist and neo-colonialist pressures. What Western governments can do in these circumstances is to shape their policies in such way as to demonstrate daily to Yugoslav regime and people that Yugoslavia always has option of economically fruitful relationship with West, on terms not dangerous to stability of regime, if it wishes to make reasonable effort in this direction. I must reiterate, at cost of repetition, that unless such prospect of open Western door is maintained, friends of Western orientation, and even those among Yugoslavs who fear closer relationship with East, have no effective arguments.
This means that if there was ever a time when it was folly for Western countries to confront Yugoslavs with attitude of emotional rejection or indifference, and above all with seemingly impenetrable economic restrictions and barriers, concerning which there appears to be no possibility of useful discussion, it is this present moment. So long as and to extent that this situation endures, Western countries can expect, in development of Yugoslav policy, almost any eventuality except those most favorable to Western interests.
I must again emphasize heavy responsibility now being taken upon themselves by those congressional figures who insist on confronting Yugoslavia through this present period not only with MFN denial specifically but with angry and vindictive posture generally. Yugoslavia’s problem is a complex one. Outlook and behavior present governmental leaders will never be such as to permit wholly untroubled and satisfactory US-Yugoslav relationship. On contrary, we must expect that so long as present uncertainties endure, Tito will continue to accompany his efforts at reassurance of West and nonaligned with other efforts designed to emphasize to Eastern eyes Yugoslavia’s socialist quality and thus to help Khrushchev defend Yugoslav tie against Chinese attacks. [Page 355] This will inevitably continue to place restrictions on conceivable intimacy of Yugoslav relationship with West. Nevertheless, even within these narrow limits there are possibilities of variations in Yugoslav conduct in coming period which are of considerable importance not only to us but to Western security in general, particularly in view of Yugo-slavia’s status as a strong and independent military factor in this area. To ignore these possibilities, or to play fast and loose with them, and thus to leave to the Russians exclusive privilege of trying to influence and manipulate them (and this is implication of certain of attitudes we have recently encountered in congressional and public opinion) strikes me as clearly indefensible, particularly from standpoint of advancement of Western interests in face of international communism. I would deeply hope that one more effort could be made to explain, where explanation is due, need for sober and considered approach to Yugoslav problem coupled with greatest possible flexibility of action for executive branch in handling relevant problems, and that as consequence these explanations something more encouraging than anything yet visible could be caused to appear for Yugoslavs on Western segment of their complex horizon.