Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVI, Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey

145. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State⁰

Belgrade, January 3, 1963, 6 p.m.

848. Part II.

1. We have it within our power to affect degree of strain on unity of regime which will be produced by any effort to implement Tito’s new line. If we fail to react now or react only in words, Tito will point to this as proof correctness his assessment of what he could get away with, and his hand will accordingly be strengthened. If we make it plain that he is no longer to be permitted to have best of both possible worlds, saying nice things to Russia in public and giving us perfunctory reassurances in private, opposition to his new course will be greatly strengthened.

2. To date I have tried to work here only through Tito, appealing to his own sense of self-interest and making it apparent he could have our friendship if he wanted it and was prepared to reciprocate. So deep is now his commitment against us that I feel we have no choice, while not making personal issue of it, but to strive for intensification of forces which oppose his new line. We now have little to lose. Danger of pushing him back into bloc no longer has same significance as before. His reasons for not formally sacrificing his independence at this time have much less to do with us and our aid than was previously the case. On other hand, he proposes, if undeterred, to take his country on path which would in any case cause that independence to lose much of its value for us. For example important liberalizing and divisive influence Yugo has hitherto exercised on satellites will be forfeited to extent Yugo practices are brought into accord with those of bloc.

3. In weighing our course of action in light Tito’s present posture, two things are quite clear to me: (A) in absence any further and reassuring statement by him making plain his determination to keep country genuinely nonaligned and to cultivate his relationship with West, we cannot proceed to full implementation of program set forth in my A–543.¹ Some parts this paper would still stand in light recent events. Others would have to be written differently today. Urge again all this be placed in abeyance pending clarification present Yugo position. (B) We should not attempt to use MFN issue as means of pressure on Yugos. This was senseless and inappropriate measure from start. I think President should fight this as straight issue of principle in connection his Constitutional responsibility for conduct foreign policy, and should not encourage view that suitability of such measure stands or falls with political climate of our relationship with Yugoslavia.

4. Fact is that at present juncture our only effective means of pressure on Yugos is PL-480 agreement, which we have legal right to suspend or cancel at any time. No evidence Yugos care about other aid programs. They have no prospect getting new ones anyway in present circumstances. Continuation PL-480 over coming winter they desperately need.

Whether or not we are to react actively in case Tito persists in pres-ent course is therefore mainly question of whether we are prepared to play PL-480 card. We would be mistaken to think he would be impressed, or his opponents strengthened, by empty pleas or protests that stop short suspension of wheat shipments.

5. Should we be disposed to play this card in last resort, our procedure should be as follows: I should go to Tito on instructions. I should point out our policy of recent years has been based on premise Yugoslavia was truly unaligned nation in substance as well as in form, but his recent statements arouse doubt whether this is still case. President Kennedy has instructed me, I should say, to voice hope that if these doubts are unjustified, he, Tito, would make early public statement to this effect, making it clear Yugoslavia is not morally or politically aligned with any outside bloc or political force. I should insist we can not be satisfied with private and unpublished assurances. Carefully refrain from giving any indication what we would do if he fails to make such statement. Simultaneous and similar statement would be made to Micunovic.

If after proper interval (perhaps one to two weeks) there has been no satisfactory response (and it is unlikely there will be one), President would draw attention publicly to unsatisfactory implications of Tito’s recent statements, would explain that we had waited some time for some more reassuring word from him but none had been heard, and would say that he had therefore ordered thorough re-examination of premises our policy toward Yugoslavia in light recent events. He would add that pending completion this re-examination he had ordered suspension PL-480 program. All this would be strongly plugged to Yugoslavia on VOA.

6. This course would give following implications: (A) It would infuriate Tito and would place our USIS libraries and other facilities here in some jeopardy. However, pro-Soviet course Tito intends to steer would, if he gets away with it, imply gradual freezing out of these facilities anyway at some point. We are all agreed it would be better to throw them into balance now, while they still have some weight, than to lose them by erosion and get nothing in return.

(B) Effect on our own domestic opinion would be such that aid to Yugoslavia would presumably be not for long time to come. [sic] But finding in question would be objectively justified, and frank admission of it might serve to regain Congressional confidence in objectivity and integrity of Executive in approach to Yugoslav problem and thus facilitate resumption programs at later date if circumstances were to warrant.

(C) Effect on Yugoslav policy-makers would be dual. Some would use it as instrument for closer relationship with bloc. But since reasons for Yugoslav’s abstention from formal association with bloc no longer derive mainly from considerations of relations with us, I doubt this factor would be decisive. Effect this action would be to heighten greatly distrust here of Tito’s good judgment and discontent with his intended course. It might well bring other leaders to insist more vigorously on his early retirement into honorary Presidential position, which could only be in our interests.

(D) For other neutrals this would be striking demonstration US unwillingness to be blackmailed by threats of intimacy with bloc and unwillingness to concede non-aligned status when certain limits are passed in pursuit pro-Soviet and anti-Western course.

7. If we are not prepared to play PL-480 card, then we should keep quiet, make no approaches, let aid programs now under implementation run their course, and reply to any and all requests for new favors by saying Tito had, through his recent statements, deprived us of earlier possibility of being helpful. What we should not do, and what I implore Department to spare me, is to go to Yugoslavia making pious noises of unhappiness and threats of displeasure which we have no intention of backing up in practice.

Kennan

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 768.11/1–363. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Zagreb and Sarajevo.
1. Document 140.