144. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State0
847. Part Two being sent as separate message for Department only as Belgrade’s 848.1
Part One of Two.
Tito’s speech of December 29 and New Year’s message (my telegrams [garble—833], 841, 843, 8442 round out picture of views and intentions with which he returned from Moscow. After careful study his various statements, we are forced to conclusion that what is implied does indeed represent in several respects an essential change in Yugo relationship to bloc. This is first time we see evidence of intention to make important changes in internal Yugo practices (crackdown on Western cultural influences, increased pressure for collectivization, et cetera) with view to aligning them with those of bloc and thus narrowing ideological differences. This is first time we hear it suggested that Soviet armed forces have role in defense of Yugo socialism. This is first time we note disposition, at least on part of Tito personally, to back off from use of term “nonaligned” with reference to Yugo itself. We cannot ignore fact failure to join bloc formally now publicly motivated not by alleged iniquity of Soviet bloc politics, as in previous Kardelj thesis, or by concern for maintenance acceptable relations with West, but by tactical considerations pertaining to relations with Afro-Asian states, which considerations Tito indicates also serve Soviet interests. Cracks against West are not new, but failure throughout series of statements to balance them with even most perfunctory phrases of reassurance re future course Western-Yugo relations contrasts sharply with Tito’s behavior when he returned from Moscow in 1956 and is flagrant and provocative, especially when taken with his contemptuous repudiation of Western sympathies for Yugo system.
It is clear Tito does not have in mind any normal reassociation with bloc at this stage. What he does contemplate is heightened moral and political support for USSR in international arena, farreaching effort to narrow ideological gap between the two systems, and gradual shifting Yugo position from that of nonaligned country cooperating closely with [Page 316] nonaligned group. These changes, if followed, would leave Yugo’s independent status drained of a good portion its previous value for us, and would oblige us, in my opinion, to revise assessment of Yugo’s position on which our policy has rested to date.
Department will please bear in mind that in absence any effective US press reporting from Yugo facts on which this judgment based are wholly unknown to US and large parts of world public, but they are familiar to all thoughtful observers here.
In deciding on this turn of policy, Tito must have been guided by any or all three of following considerations:
(A) That US aid and friendship no longer vital to his regime, (B) that our motives in giving aid are so subjective and our fear of Yugo’s formal return to bloc so great that we will continue to extend certain programs and favors (notably PL 480) regardless of his stance, (C) that value of collaboration with US has been greatly reduced any way by virtue its unreliability in light of US Congressional and public opinion.
Probably all three considerations play a part, but I suspect (A) would be valid for him personally, even if others did not apply. This would not be true of many in his entourage, who are well aware of vital importance of continuation of PL 480.
Tito’s new line has been sprung unexpectedly on country. No evidence prior consultation or discussions in senior party XV [or?] governmental bodies. Obviously no preparation public opinion. Press and Foreign Office apparently left flatfooted. No evidence that story [effort?] has even been made at working out coherent rationale on various informational fronts. Until this process undertaken and completed situation in policy making echelons will continue be one of considerable uncertainty and disarray.
We cannot tell at this stage to what extent Tito’s line will be actually implemented. It will arouse much discontent and opposition within hierarchy. In past, there has been tendency to let him talk but to go on with business as usual in absence specific instructions. It is significant that since his return from Russia Yugo press has treated his statements and whole subject Soviet-Yugo relations with stony editorial silence. Obviously, recent statements were intended for Russian ears, not ours. Tanyug agency, in putting out English text of New Year’s message, has already made significant change involving flat mistranslation, designed to conceal from unaligned and Western public full sharpness his original remarks. Possible much of his intent may be sabotaged, compromised, or glossed over in practice. However, previous experience suggests that some will stick. In any case, he is Premier, President, and Party leader and mere utterance by him of such sentiments represents political act of high importance.
End Part I.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 768.11/1–363. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Moscow, Zagreb, and Sarajevo.↩
- Document 145.↩
- Telegram 833, December 30, 1962, reported on and anaylzed Tito’s December 29 speech. (Department of State, Central Files, 768.11/12–3062) Telegram 841, December 31, provided further analysis of the December 29 address. (Ibid., 768.11/12–3162) In telegram 843, January 1, 1963, the Embassy supplied the highlights of Tito’s New Year’s Day address. (Ibid., 768.11/1–163) Telegram 844, January 1, provided the Embassy analysis of the speech. (Ibid.)↩