92. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Secretary’s Conversation of August 8 with Ambassador Dobrynin
PARTICIPANTS
- (See attachment)1
The Secretary stated that he would like to report briefly on his conversation of August 8 with Ambassador Dobrynin.2 He said he could [Page 263] report briefly because no perceptible business was transacted. Apparently Mr. Dobrynin had no fresh instructions on any subject that came up and the conversation did not advance any of the issues discussed. The Secretary said he had mentioned three subjects:
[Here follow sections on a nuclear test ban treaty and non-diffusion of nuclear weapons.]
3. Deputy Foreign Ministers’ Forum. The Secretary recalled that the question of a Deputy Foreign Ministers’ forum had been raised with Gromyko as early as the previous spring. The Secretary had asked Dobrynin whether he had instructions from Gromyko on the question of establishment of a Deputy Foreign Ministers’ forum for discussion of matters relating to Germany and Berlin. Gromyko had said at Geneva that he would have word for us as to whether the subject would be dealt with in this way. Dobrynin replied that he would mention this question to Moscow but observed that Khrushchev and Gromyko were on vacation now.
The Secretary said the question of the UN delegation had come up and that Dobrynin had said nothing about Khrushchev’s coming. He had said the Soviet delegation was usually decided upon around the first of September and had predicted that Gromyko would probably be there.
The Secretary invited comments or questions. Lord Hood said it was a rather depressing story.
The Secretary agreed. He had asked Dobrynin whether it would be safe for him to take a vacation in August, but Dobrynin had not been responsive.
Mr. von Lilienfeld asked what impression the Secretary had as to the next move.
The Secretary said he thought that exploratory talks and probes have about run their course. For some time both he and Dobrynin had been repeating themselves. The Secretary stated he had been as long winded and repetitious as the Soviets. He said that unless they have something new to offer he does not see much coming out of the bilaterals. He felt that they might seek a different forum or might have something to say to some other member of the Western group. He recalled that Gromyko at Geneva had indicated that he was glad to pursue bilateral talks but had referred to talks with the Western Four as “better still”.
The Secretary recalled that he had emphasized to Dobrynin that we could not accept charges that we have delayed. If we had delayed a year and a half in agreeing with them, they have likewise delayed that long in agreeing with us. He had told Dobrynin, however, that we can always rush to a crisis, while a resolution of differences must necessarily proceed more slowly. [Page 264] As to what the Russians are going to do, the Secretary said they seek to leave the impression with us that something is going to happen. We are not inclined to think they will announce the signing of a peace treaty with East Germany overnight. They will probably take some action with other governments of calling a conference first. Next Monday will be the anniversary of the wall and the Soviets might be inclined to celebrate it with harassment or a new move. The Secretary said he did not know what they will do and was by no means certain they had themselves decided. He mentioned it was about time for another Soviet space spectacular.
Lord Hood said they probably have not decided what to do but that one idea in their minds is probably to sign a peace treaty.
The Secretary recalled that he had not had reactions from all of the Western Four on whether if the Soviets called a conference we should propose a meeting of Foreign Ministers or Deputy Foreign Ministers in response.
As to the coming debate in the United Nations General Assembly, the Secretary thought the introduction of specific substantive questions could lead to confusion. He thought, however, we would find wide support for the idea of talking instead of shooting—for the idea that neither side should take any action which would aggravate tensions. He thought, however, that a number of solutions on the question of troops or of access would look easier to the UN membership than to those of us who bear primary responsibility.
Lord Hood said he had received comments from his government on a number of papers, but not on this specific proposal regarding Western responses to a Soviet call for a conference.
Mr. von Lilienfeld said that he had received and transmitted to us comments on the conference question but not on the related papers. He commented that we should do something to regain the initiative of action on our side.
The Secretary said he did not know how much we could rely on Soviet advance planning, but that they wanted to send their Minister of Agriculture in September. He said if we were expecting to precipitate a crisis with another state, we would certainly not be sending one of our cabinet members to visit the state at the time.
Lord Hood asked whether we thought the Soviets, if they decided to go ahead with a peace treaty, might not want to minimize the awkward consequence by compensating gestures. They might well be interested in a meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers and propose that we seek to agree on how to handle our disagreements.
The Secretary commented that this might be a rational reaction, but if the Soviets were not pressing matters to a crisis it seems they would [Page 265] have desired to pick up various opportunities which have been before them to avoid a crisis. In recent months they have increased their public commitment to action on Berlin, and have increased for themselves the prestige problem involved in not doing anything.
Mr. von Lilienfeld commented that they had in several ways, however, seemed to accept the idea that the West would still be in Berlin in the future.
Mr. Lebel asked whether they would be likely to precede a move in Berlin with a move in the UNGA.
The Secretary replied that he would feel more relaxed if he thought GA action would necessarily be their first move.
Lord Hood raised the question whether they could get the United Nations to approve the idea of a peace conference.
The Secretary said that we will be in a powerful position in the United Nations if we say to the Assembly in effect, “Ask the Berliners and ask the East Germans what they want to do”. This fact may give the Soviets some pause in deciding what to do in the United Nations. He asked if anyone had any doubts as to what the sentiments of the Berlin people would be.
Mr. von Lilienfeld recalled they had made their views clear in every case where they had had an opportunity to do so. He added that there had been indications that the Soviet test series might be concluded by October and this might have a bearing upon Khrushchev’s attendance and Soviet strategy at the Assembly.
The Secretary said there are enough hints and noises around to indicate that the anniversary of the wall may take on some significance to the Soviets. We do not, however, expect a move of the kind that would precipitate a military crisis.
Lord Hood commented there may be harassments.
The Secretary and Mr. Hillenbrand recalled that our mission in Berlin had sent a message indicating the possibility of harassments at Friedrichstrasse and possibly a move to cut off access to East Berlin.3 Mr. Hillenbrand said we have contingency plans for this possibility, but that they should be reviewed.
The Secretary commented that we could well have some move of that sort.
Mr. von Lilienfeld asked if there had been any shift in emphasis by the Soviets from the question of the presence of Western troops to the question of sovereignty of the GDR.
The Secretary said not really. If this were the Soviet intention they had overlooked opportunities to make it clear. The Secretary recalled [Page 266] that the only stiff talk by the Russians to him was on the first day of his recent Geneva meeting with Gromyko. Gromyko had read from a paper on that occasion and the rest of the several days of conversations appeared to be an effort to soften the impact of the prepared statement. Even as Gromyko was reading it, he pointed out that the statement did not take into account things which he had already said that same day.
Mr. Hillenbrand, in response to the Secretary’s question, said he considered the difference between Gromyko’s statement on the first day and on subsequent days to be more a difference of tone than of substance.
The Secretary recalled that when he had rejected Gromyko’s threat, Gromyko had not come back and redoubled it.
The Secretary stated he supposed that all intelligence services were alerted with their antenna out to sense any indications of a new Soviet move. Our intelligence service had been alerted.
Lord Hood asked what was next as regards the exchanges with Dobrynin.
The Secretary said that they owe us comments on two propositions, namely, the proposal regarding a Deputy Foreign Ministers’ forum and the matter of non-dissemination involved in the Irish Resolution. He did not expect that Dobrynin would be giving us further comments on the test ban question in the near future.
- Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information but it was approved in S on August 21. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)↩
- Not printed.↩
- A short memorandum of the Secretary’s conversation with Dobrynin on August 8 is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8–862.↩
- Telegram 160 from Berlin, August 8, received in the Department of State at 11:44 a.m. (Ibid., 661.62B/8–862)↩