Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XV, Berlin Crisis, 1962–1963

91. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy ⁰

Washington, August 2, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Contingency Planning for Soviet-GDR Peace Treaty

At their meeting in Geneva on July 23,¹ the four Western Foreign Ministers agreed that the developing situation indicated that it would be prudent to have a quadripartite review of Western contingency planning concerning a Soviet-GDR peace treaty.

The purpose of this memorandum is to review the existing plans and revalidate the fundamental assumptions supporting them prior to engaging in the quadripartite re-examination. These assumptions, broadly stated, are:

1) that inasmuch as the West cannot in the last analysis prevent the conclusion of a Soviet-GDR peace treaty, Western efforts should be directed toward minimizing the importance of the treaty; and

2) that the Western Powers are prepared to accept implementation of existing procedures on ground access to Berlin by East German personnel substituting for Soviet personnel.

Assumptions Underlying Plans for Western Response to Peace Treaty

The complex of assumptions underlying the specific plans for the Western political and diplomatic response to the separate peace treaty, itself, are as follows. The Western Powers must realistically assume that the Soviets will probably carry out their announced intention to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. Available political and economic countermeasures are insufficient to prevent the signature of the treaty or to affect subsequent Soviet actions appreciably. They would, in addition, probably have unacceptable side effects. In these circumstances, Western reaction should be such that the signing does not appear to constitute a victory for the Soviet bloc such as the erection of the Wall was considered in some quarters. If the Western Powers adopt a position of deep concern and foreboding over the signing of a separate peace treaty, this will necessarily make that signing appear to be a defeat of very substantial proportions. If the Western Powers treat it, on the other hand, as an action which has no necessary significance unless efforts are made to interfere with Western access rights, there would be much less basis for assertions of a resounding loss.

Therefore, Western efforts should be directed toward minimizing the importance of the treaty. To achieve this result, it is necessary to establish widespread acceptance of the legal and political futility of the act, and to limit states outside the Communist orbit from adhering to, or supporting, the treaty. At the same time, the position should be maintained that the conclusion of the separate peace treaty would be another repudiation by the Soviets of their solemn obligations and of basic international principles.

Assumption Underlying Plans for Withdrawal of Soviets from Check Points

If, at any time, it seems that the withdrawal by the Soviets from their functions with respect to Allied access to Berlin is imminent, the three Governments would presumably act in accordance with the agreed contingency plans. The assumption underlying these plans is that the Western Powers are prepared to accept execution of existing procedures on ground access to Berlin by East German personnel substituting for Soviet personnel.

This matter has been the subject of intensive unilateral and multipartite discussion. From 1959 to 1961 the quadripartite position was that in the absence of their explicit delegation as agents of the Soviets (which was considered unlikely), East Germans would not be permitted to date-time stamp Allied travel documents as the Soviets do. Instead there would be instituted the so-called “peel-off” procedure, which in essence was intended to identify Allied movements as being entitled to unrestricted access to Berlin, and would have involved the handing over to East German personnel at the check point of a copy of the Allied travel order but would not accept stamping of a travel order as a condition of passage. However, as the result of the Macmillan visit to Washington in the spring of 1961, and after informal US discussion during the following months, the US and UK revised their positions to permit implementation of existing procedures by East German personnel. Persist-ent physical interference with access to Berlin was chosen as the point at which the West would have to demonstrate its determination. The French and Germans subsequently—and somewhat unenthusiastic-ally—agreed. The essential argument in favor of this position was that the earlier plans did not draw the line at a point which would receive public understanding and support in that they would involve a procedural innovation likely to give rise to criticism that the West was making an issue over who stamped a document.

It was argued that a Western position of leaving well enough alone and not being the one to demand a change in its favor would appear reasonable and unprovocative, and that US allies would move to this position in any event. There would possibly be some questioning in the US press, public, and Congress as to whether the most suitable breaking point had been chosen. There would also be grave difficulties in making the US position plausible to the uncommitted countries. All this would be apparent to the Soviets, and they would be encouraged to press ahead to exploit the Western disarray. In the face of Bloc pressures and Allied disunity, it seems likely that the US, UK, and France would eventually accept the same paper-stamping from the East Germans that they now accept from the Soviets. It would be better to straighten this issue out beforehand to avoid a last-minute change under fire.

Since the decision to accept East German stamping was made, both the US Embassy in Bonn and the US Mission in Berlin have questioned it. Their essential argument is that although who stamps a document is not a good issue over which to use force if necessary, the issue is actually much more than that and really boils down to whether or not the US, the UK, and France are determined to maintain their right of free and unrestricted ground access to Berlin. They argue: 1) that the question of “persistent physical interference with access to Berlin” will never arise; 2) that substitution of East German personnel will be the most visible and objectionable single action that is ever taken by the Soviets; and 3) that thereafter the East Germans will take one infinitesimal step after another—each much less saleable as a breaking point than substitution—until, over a period of time, by gradual erosion Western ground access is completely at the mercy of the Ulbricht regime. Khrushchev recently said to Gorbach and Kreisky when the Austrians visited Moscow that this was more or less what he had in mind, i.e. that action in the period after the peace treaty will be so slow and circumspect that the West will never be provided with a point at which the use of force can be justified. Those who object to East German stamping argue that it will lead at best to self-blockade on the ground and at worst to de jure acceptance of the GDR or withdrawal from Berlin or eventually both.

Although these arguments have a certain weight, the point can be made that there is nothing inevitable about the erosion of the Allied position. The Soviets have had a similar eroding capacity since the ending of the blockade in 1949. By being firm on essentials and skillful in the handling of individual disputes, the Western Powers have prevented any substantial erosion of their basic access rights. In a number of cases present procedures are actually an improvement over those which existed in the immediate post-blockade years. Hence, this line of argument would go, there is no intrinsic reason why, by alert reaction to attempts to change established procedures, the Western Powers should not be able to preserve their essential access against GDR attempts to erode it, given, of course, the continuing unwillingness on the Communist side to press any specific dispute to the point of major confrontation.

Contingency Plans for Peace Treaty

Three stages are envisaged in the agreed contingency planning for the treaty. The first is action, to be taken when indicated by events, to prepare public opinion so that the conclusion of a separate peace treaty will not be regarded as a Soviet victory. The second begins when invitations are dispatched to a peace conference, or its organization is announced. The third is after signature of the treaty.

For the first stage, guidelines have been prepared as the basis for a series of high-level, authoritative public statements. These guidelines set out the essential points that: 1) by the Bolz-Zorin exchange of letters at the time of the last Soviet-GDR treaty in 1955² the Soviets reserved for themselves the processing of the traffic of the Western garrisons in Berlin which passes through East Germany; 2) subsequently the Western Powers have continued to hold the Soviet Government responsible when problems have arisen concerning Berlin, communications therewith, or Germany as a whole; 3) the mere conclusion of a purported “peace treaty” would not in any way change the existing situation; and 4) the Western Powers will continue to look to the Soviet Government to fulfill its responsibilities and will take whatever action seems necessary and proper to the extent to which the Soviet Government fails to do so.

In the second stage, representations would be made to the Governments of all the states invited to attend the peace conference, which would include suitable emphasis upon the legal arguments against a separate peace. The representations would also develop the point that this treaty would do nothing to establish peaceful conditions in Europe, but would be much more likely to have precisely the opposite effect. Primary responsibilities for representations to the Governments invited have been assigned.

At the same time, the Three Powers and the Federal Republic would sent notes to the Soviet Government covering the legal aspects and pointing out to the Soviet Government its obligations arising out of Four Power responsibility. Drafts of such notes have been prepared.

These notes would also be published as a statement of the Western position. Supplemental talking points have been prepared for press guidance and for use in discussions with the various countries invited to the Soviet peace conference. For the third stage, after signature of the treaty, a draft has been prepared for a statement to be made by the Three Powers in conjunction with the Federal Government. Essentially this statement would say: 1) that the Soviet Government has knowingly created a situation which could lead to a breach of the peace; 2) that the so-called “peace treaty” has no international validity; 3) that it cannot affect in any way whatsoever the obligations of the USSR under agreements and arrangements on the subject of Germany, including Berlin, previously concluded between France, the UK, the US and the USSR; 4) that the three Western Powers are prepared to defend their interests with respect to Germany and to fulfill their obligation to maintain the freedom and security of Berlin; 5) that they are, nevertheless, prepared at any time to resume negotiations with the Soviets looking toward a just and reasonable settlement of the questions of Germany and European security; and 6) that they hope that, in view of the danger implicit in its course, the Soviet Government will recognize the wisdom and importance of resuming negotiations.

If the second stage campaign has been successful, and few or no nations outside the Sino-Soviet bloc have signed the treaty, this fact would be capitalized on to minimize further the significance of the treaty and even to ridicule the Soviet diplomatic effort.

It may be advisable for the Western Governments to point out publicly that the coming into force of the treaty will not give rise to any untoward results so long as the Soviets and East Germans do not take unilateral actions injurious to Western interests such as altering present access procedures, or attempting to interfere with the presence of Allied troops in West Berlin, or with its other links to the West. The announcements should be coordinated with any steps toward Solution C, which, under the circumstances, might be pertinent.

The position taken by the Three Powers should be endorsed by all the NATO Governments.

An additional legal and historical background paper has been prepared for use in diplomatic and press guidance.

Possible Military Measures

No specific decision has yet been made as to whether military measures should be taken in connection with the peace treaty. Nothing in the current planning would preclude the undertaking of military measures, including a further buildup, in an attempt to affect the terms of the treaty or its subsequent implementation, but this would require a subtle campaign to avoid the impression that the purpose was to prevent the calling of a conference or the conclusion of a treaty, over which the West can exercise no control. A real problem in such a course would be whether these measures—particularly a buildup—could be sustained over, and whether they would be effective against, the long period of very cautious, piecemeal treaty implementation that may ensue. However, the possibility of influencing by military measures the content of the treaty and its implementation is certainly worth examining. The JCS is currently studying the question of possible military measures taking into account the level of the present buildup. A decision concerning the desirability of a buildup will be difficult to take in advance, because it will have to be governed somewhat by the state of the discussions with the Soviets at the time and by the indications of whether diplomatic moves have some prospect of influencing the Soviets, or whether they are determined to go ahead in an uninhibited way. Once the JCS has completed its studies, a basis will exist for taking appropriate US decisions in the light of the estimated need when it has been concluded that the Soviets plan to proceed with their treaty.

Conclusion

In the review, therefore, of Allied contingency planning for a separate peace treaty, I would propose that we continue to maintain the existing basic assumptions:

1) that inasmuch as the West cannot prevent the conclusion of a Soviet-GDR peace treaty, Western efforts should be directed toward minimizing the importance of the treaty; and

2) that the Western Powers are prepared to accept implementation of existing procedures on ground access to Berlin by East German personnel substituting for Soviet personnel.

A further relevant subject is that of the relationship of possible military mobilization measures to existing contingency planning. This can be examined once the JCS has completed its current studies.

Dean Rusk

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Secret. According to another copy, this memorandum was drafted by Cash and Hillenbrand on August 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.62B1/8–262)
1. Presumably Rusk is referring to the meeting on July 21; see Document 82.
2. Regarding these letters, September 20, 1955, see footnote 3, Document 8.